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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 
THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL BY RAIL 
DO WE NEED MORE PROTECTION? 
AUGUST 15, 1991 
Los Angeles, California 
CHAIRMAN RICHARD KATZ: I'm Assemblyman Richard Katz. On 
my left, I am pleased to be joined by Assemblyman Jack O'Connell, 
in whose district one of the incidents occurred, and who convened 
an earlier meeting, as well as an on-site inspection that he and I 
did several weeks ago. On my right is John Stevens, Senior 
Consultant to the Transportation Committee. Also in the audience, 
Mr. Hou, representing Senator Hart. Mr. Hou, if you want to join 
us up here you're more than welcome on behalf of Senator Hart. 
In a two week period there were two derailments. One 
sterilized the river and the other shut down Highway 101 for a 
week. Both endangered lives. The volume of hazardous material 
shipped by rail is increasing, as is the risk to Californians. 
It's clear that toxic time bombs are on trains rolling along track 
located near our homes, schools and work places. While rail 
transportation continues to be safer than trucks; that's not much 
comfort to the folks who lives near Dunsmuir, or live in Ventura 
County. Our confidence has been shaken by these accidents. But 
recently even more disturbing information has come to light. 
Information that I'd like to focus on during this hearing. We have 
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reports that over 90 percent of Southern Pacific locomotives failed 
safety inspections conducted by teams of state and federal 
inspectors at SP's Roseville and Tucson's maintenance facilities 
earlier this year. 
In addition, very serious allegations have been made that 
in June, just weeks before the Dunsmuir and Sea Cliff derailments, 
a team inspection of Southern Pacific locomotives in Southern 
California was called off by Federal Railway Administration 
officials and that any major assessment of the safety of Southern 
Pacific trains and operations were suspended for a six week period, 
purportedly to give the railroad a chance to get back on their 
feet. During that period, both Dunsmuir and the Ventura 
derailments occurred. 
What we want to know and we are trying to get to the 
bottom of today, and let me make it clear to the people who are 
testifying today, that while you are not under oath today, if 
necessary I will put you under oath. If necessary, I will subpoena 
documents and witnesses. This committee has the power to do that 
and will use it. We will do it today; we will do it at our hearing 
next Monday in Sacramento, if that is what is necessary to get the 
documentation and the truth out about some very serious 
allegations. We want to know if these allegations are true. We 
want to know if, in fact, inspections were called off. If so, why? 
Who ordered it? What pressure were they put under, if any, and 
from where? And what impact these actions had on the derailments 
that would have generally been attributed to equipment failure. 
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Those are very serious concerns, and will be the major 
focus of what we are doing here today. In addition to answering 
those questions, we need to make sure that the state is doing every 
thing possible to protect the public. In addition to those 
questions, we want to look at what the state is now doing to 
regulate rail transportation of hazardous material, and what should 
the state be doing. 
What needs to be done in addition to ensure that 
hazardous substances are not released into our air and water? What 
information is available to those who are first at the scene of a 
derailment? What additional information needs to be available so 
that good decisions can be made in dealing with hazardous spills? 
I'm working on legislation along with Assemblyman O'Connell and 
Senator Killea that will address some of these issues. That 
legislation will be introduced next week. 
We are hoping that this hearing will give us some answers 
and some additional information as we craft legislation to correct 
the problems designed and protect people. One thing that is very 
frightening to me, and one thing that I hope to understand better 
today is what role the agencies who are responsible for 
implementing these rules and regulations and law have played in the 
last several years, as far as oversight for the railroad. We can 
write great law and we can have great regulations, but if the 
enforcers are not enforcing, and the regulators are not regulating, 
and the bureaucrats aren't doing their job, none of it means 
anything and the public is at risk, and that's something that none 
of us will stand for. 
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So, we are looking for some answers today. Again, I want 
to remind people, if necessary we'll go to and we'll go to 
subpoenas. But I'm hoping we can get the answers without having to 
resort to that. Jack, do you want to make some comments? 
ASSEMBLYMAN JACK O'CONNELL: Thank you very much 
Assemblyman Katz. I first, of all want, to thank you not only for 
this hearing today to help try to answer many of the questions and 
the points that you raised, but also for coming to the Sea Cliff 
area two and a half weeks ago and staying on site as long as you 
did. Your staff's interest in this issue, not just for the last 
couple of weeks, but for a several years have really been in the 
forefront. I'm most appreciative of your sincere efforts in this 
area. 
I did have an opportunity to go to the site in the Sea 
Cliff area on two separate occasions. I put in a total of about 
eight hours trying to learn first hand, as did Assemblyman Katz, by 
working and looking at the command center, talking to the folks 
that had been involved, and trying to learn as much as possible to 
get better educated. 
Since that time, I also conducted a meeting with many of 
the individuals that were responsible for the cleanup 
operation--representatives from industry, from both local 
government, state government and the federal government-- who 
attended the meeting that I had a couple days ago. It's rather 
clear to me that the adequacy of the information for the mitigation 
and for remediation is not complete. Although on a 1 of 
or the manifest there appears to be adequate information for the 
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first response units, that we are lacking in terms of a particular 
information to help us begin an immediate cleanup of that 
particular area. 
It's also rather apparent to me that the railroads need 
to do more to work with local government in the event of a spill. 
They are inadequately involved in the planning in the event of an 
emergency. We need to do more to help local government work and 
integrate with the emergency response units that local government 
has responsibility for. Also the inability to identify containers 
which have been separated from rail cars and the potential 
co-mingling of incompatible materials continues to be a major 
concern to me. 
It's also apparent that the federal government, while 
they do have a lion's share of the responsibility, at least 
historically, is not doing an adequate job of regulating the 
transportation of these materials. 
It's clear that public confidence in the area of rail 
transportation of these hazardous materials has been shaken. Many 
of us are greatly concerned due to the fact that we have an aging 
rail transportation corridor. It's a major concern as these rails 
go through many of our bedroom communities. 
I'm pleased that the Public Utilities Commission took a 
modest step about a week ago, the unanimous vote of general order 
161, which does require some very basic and modest guidelines for 
the transportation of many of these materials. 
I'm here today to learn first hand, (1) how can we 
prevent the spills from occurring, such as that which we 
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experienced a month ago at Dunsmuir, and a couple of weeks ago at 
Sea Cliff in Ventura County? (2) In the event of a spill, how we 
can improve the cleanup operation of the material? I want to know 
what works, what doesn't work, how we can improve it and I look 
forward to working with Assemblyman Katz and his leadership role in 
trying to pass legislation. As he pointed out, even more 
importantly, how we can follow through the implementation of that 
legislation. So, thanks again Richard, for being here. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Jack, thank you. I'd like to ask from 
the Federal Railroad Administration, Tom Paton, the Regional 
Director of Safety to come forward. Also at the same time from 
the Public Utilities Commission, we had confirmation that Patricia 
Eckert, President of the Commission, was going to be here. Is she 
here? We had some stories yesterday that she was going to duck out 
of this hearing. Mr. Oliver? Mr. Oliver, why don't you join us 
then, as head of the Safety Division for the PUC? 
Let me start. Do you want to make brief statements or 
just respond to questions? Lets do it this way. How about, Mr. 
Paton, if you'd describe for us your job and your responsibilities 
as the Western Regional Director of Safety for FRA. 
MR. H.T."TOM" PATON: I'm responsible for safety 
inspection programs. I manage the safety inspection program to 
assure compliance with the federal laws and regulations applicable 
to railroad safety. In additional to that we make special 
investigations for compliance, waivers, and accident 
investigations. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: And how many people do you have working 
for you doing that? 
MR. PATON: Roughly twenty-seven Federal Inspectors and 
it's supplemented by about fifteen State Inspectors. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: And that's in California? 
MR. PATON: No. That's in four states--Arizona, Utah, 
Nevada, and California. The bulk of those are located in 
California. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Was there an inspection of the Southern 
Pacific locomotive at the Roseville Maintain Yard? 
MR. PATON: We continued to make inspections at Roseville 
of locomotives. We made a very special ins~ection of the 
locomotives involved in the Dunsmuir accident at Eugene, Oregon. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I'm interested in some time, lets say, 
since January 1st. I don't want to lose information because I have 
a date off here. Was there a team inspection done out at 
Roseville? 
MR. PATON: During the month of June we made four team 
inspections on the Southern Pacific; one of those included 
Roseville. The other three locations were in Tucson, Arizona, 
Bakersfield, and Sparks, Nevada. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: And that was in June? 
MR. PATON: Yes, that's during the month of June. All 
four of them were team inspections. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What were the results of the June 
inspection in Roseville? 
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MR. PATON: We inspected 61 locomotives, and found 48 
defective. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: 48 out of 61 defective. Let me ask a 
question here, so that I understand the process. I'm familiar with 
how the Highway Patrol does it with school buses, because we've 
been through that with them. But I just want to understand. When 
we're talking about inspections like this, are we talking about 
some surprises? Knock, knock, guess who's here kind of thing? 
MR. PATON: No, no they are almost all surprise 
inspections. We do not announce our coming. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: When you show up, and I understand by the 
intensity of this kind of inspection, its a 48-hour procedure, 
roughly? 
MR. PATON: No, it depends on the number of people we 
have there. We generally work two-eight hour shifts as a routine. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Your first intent is the equipment that 
is about to go out of the yard. 
MR. PATON: Routinely on a team inspection, we only 
inspect those locomotives that have been prior inspected by the 
Southern Pacific. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You only inspect those that have been 
prior inspected by the Southern Pacific. What I'm hearing is we 
have a 48 at a 61 failure rate of locomotives that SP has already 
cleared as being worthy of going on the track. 
MR. PATON: They have offered them for service. That is 
correct. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: Is that a high number? 
MR. PATON: It's far too high to satisfy me, yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay, so you found 48 out of 61 
locomotives. 
also? 
The rest of the rolling stock, was that inspected 
MR. PATON: No, in that one it was only locomotives we 
inspected. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay, how about Tucson --
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Mr. Katz, before you leave that 
location, how many other locomotives were there? Like are these 61 
that obviously Southern Pacific thought would pass, and then of 
those 48 in your judgment did not pass, how many of the locomotives 
were there? 
MR. PATON: We don't count that, quite a number. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Can they roll out of the yard the 
day after you leave without inspection of your agency? 
MR. PATON: Very possibly, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: So, these are their 61 that they 
think would pass muster and 48 of those. 
MR. PATON: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: I'm going to confess I've never 
been in a railroad yard. How many other locomotives were there 
which potentially roll out the next day? 
MR. PATON: We don't count those, but usually in 
Roseville they have quite a number of locomotives, some of them are 
standing and waiting for repair, waiting for parts, that type of 
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thing. Others are locomotives waiting to service and inspect and 
offer them for service. We routinely don't inspect those. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: This sounds like-- I'm going to 
tell one quick story. My folks use to own a motel. When we heard 
that AAA rating services were coming, we had one room that was 
spotless. When the AAA folks came to see our motel, my folks used 
to say that every room was full except for one, we'll show you the 
one. Guess which one room we used to always show? And guess who 
always got a AAA rating? And the place was a dump. 
MR. PATON: That's not entirely different than the 
locomotive inspection. Usually, when we first arrive on the 
property, they don't know we're coming, and we have a few 
locomotives that they've offered for service. That's a realistic 
monitoring of the condition of the locomotives. Then we stay for a 
day, or two or three days after that, and they know we're going to 
be there, or they presume we're going to be there, and it's a 
different world the longer we stay. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: So, has it always been your 
policy that you just inspect that have to you? 
Wouldn't it be a little better policy that if they have 200 trains 
and you're only going to inspect 60, maybe you'd to inspect 
every third one? 
MR. PATON: Well, we don't want to perform the inspection 
for the Southern Pacific. The basic respons lity for that 
inspection rests with the railroad. And we're there to monitor, 
how good of a job they do on that inspection. And obvious 48 out 
of 61 is unacceptable. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: That's not very good, at all. 
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Frankly, I'm a little taken aback by the 
numbers. We're talking about 78 percent failure rate of stuff that 
the railroad has said is okay to go on the track. We're not 
talking about doorknobs being out of whack here. 
MR. PATON: It can be a variety of things, Mr. Chairman. 
Generally, we don't defect a locomotive for one light bulb out, or 
that type of thing. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You might do it if the governor on the 
locomotive is not working properly? 
MR. PATON: Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The sort of things that SP has said 
caused the Dunsmuir or could have contributed to the Dunsmuir 
incident. Those kind of conditions would have been the kinds of 
things you would have tagged a locomotive for? 
MR. PATON: we take it for personal injury hazards, 
particularly safety hazards on the locomotive itself. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: This was a June inspection in Roseville? 
Were there any other team inspections, or team assessments, I guess 
the kinds that show up on the so-called Motive Power Equipment 
Forms 59, the box type that come out as fives. Were there any 
fives done this year? 
MR. PATON: I don't follow the question? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You're familiar with the MPE forms? 
MR. PATON: Yes. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: On an MPE 59 1 
Equipment Form, 
that was done. 




designated by a 5 
a team assessment 1 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: Were 
done at Roseville this year? 
inspection is 5. 
any other 
MR. PATON: None that I have 
of these team inspections, on those I 
memorandum to Washington, telling them what we 
had found. From that record, I assembled a list 
have been more than what I 
through our volume of 59 







I made a list 
method of 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: How team assessment? Just rout 
I assume were? 
MR. PATON 
a daily bas to 
's one 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let's move to Tucson Te 
results of Tuc Tucson so June. 
MR. PATON: was 





defects. This inspection, Mr. Chairman, was a bit different than 
what we would have conducted as Roseville because Tucson is not a 
major locomotive repair point. Our purpose at Tucson was to 
monitor locomotives that were coming out of West Colton, out of Los 
Angeles, and from El Paso. We were looking at inbound locomotives, 
not prior inspected by the railroad. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: In that case, you found 79 out of 92? 
Does the FRA have the authority to take equipment out of service? 
MR. PATON: Yes . 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What does it take for you to take 
equipment out of service? 
MR. PATON: We fill out a form called a 6180.8. That's a 
special notice of repairs. The locomotive is no longer permitted 
use until it's repaired. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Was that done either in Roseville or in 
Tucson? 
MR. PATON: I know it was done in Tucson. I don't have 
with me the documentation on Roseville. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: How many locomotives in Tucson was it 
done on? 
MR. PATON: I'd be guessing 4. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: We're averaging here somewhere 80 percent 
failure rate in the two yards. I would assume somebody at FRA is 
starting to get concerned about SP's operating ability at this 
point? 
MR. PATON: Yes. Let me give you a little background on 
these team inspections, if I may? It might give you a little 
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better insight. Our f team was in 
which is in Reno. f 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: were f ? 
MR. PATON: were 43 out so. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: 's 86 
MR. PATON: Because I was unhappy 
basically at that location, we're out 
of Roseville and Salt Lake City, I arranged a team inspection at 
Bakersfield the following week, in addition, at Roseville that 
following week. That was, again, unacceptable. 'S why I 
organized a team inspection for Tucson. Tucson, ically, is a 
choke-off point for Southern Pacif 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Give me the numbers out of Bakersfield, 
just to complete the picture. 
MR. PATON: f I we had 36 out 45. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: 1 's you're 
seeing a pattern 'S to You to Tucson, as 
the choke-point, as to it? 
MR. . .. 
Pacific f our Tuc 
Chief Mechanical f 
operation we conduc at Tuc more 
than $1 million s f I etc. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You 
Interruption of traf cost h a 
less than Dunsmuir Sea iff to cost To 
extent do you care how much cost SP, at ? 
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MR. PATON: I didn't care. That's why I went to Tucson. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. That was my question. I'm trying 
to figure out how things weigh here. It would seem to me from a 
safety standpoint, what it costs the railroad is irrelevant. 
The question is, if they can't afford to put safe 
equipment on the track, they ought to be in a different business. 
As my understanding that's where FRA comes from on this. 
MR. PATON: We have two basic methods of achieving 
compliance. one is filing violations on defective units. The 
second, is going to Bakersfield or a Tucson for a choke-off point. 
When we interrupt traffic because they have dispatched defective 
locomotives, that information goes to the General Manager and the 
Vice-President of Operations immediately. Violation process 
sometimes takes a year for them to receive official notification on 
it, to actually pay the fine. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: In terms of putting the equipment, you 
can do that on site. Why only four locomotives in Tucson out of 79 
with 255 defects were put out of service? 
MR. PATON: It's a judgment item, on taking a locomotive 
out of service. If we feel it's unsafe to continue service, then 
we issue a Form 8. 
with me. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: That was done on only four locomotives? 
MR. PATON: As I recall, it was four; I didn't bring that 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You can produce for me the 79 locomotives 
in Tucson, or the 48 out of Roseville, are on what is referred to 
as MPE 59 Forms? 
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MR. PATON: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You can produce that? 
MR. PATON: I can, through our 's f 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: All right. I'd like them for four 
facilities. Let me shift for a minute to the ic ities 
Commission. Before I do, let me ask a question. Are you familiar 
with an internal document from Southern Pacific Railroad, that I 
believe is about two-and-a-half years old. I think it was in 
response to an inspection done at Roseville about two-and-a-half 
years ago. I believe it was sent to you with a cover letter from 
Ken Moore and Ron Barry of the railroad, that was promising to make 
significant improvements in their compliance rate of locomotive 
maintenance. 
MR. PATON: Dated March 1990, and they developed that 
Locomotive Compliance Plan based on a previous trip to Tucson, 
where we did a similar exercise. I have a copy here. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: It took two-and-a-half years to develop a 
document? 
MR. PATON: No. We conducted inspection 
Tucson before where we seriously interrupted traffic in 
February of 1990, and they produced their Locomotive Compliance 
Plan in March of 1990. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I'm under the impression that there is 
one previous to that also. 
MR. PATON: I'm not aware of that. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Going back to '89 or '88. 
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MR. PATON: I'm not aware of that. I think this is the 
one you're talking about. I'd be happy to give you a copy if you 
want. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I'd appreciate that. What were the 
recommendations for improving the compliance step. Let me ask you 
this question? That was based on a Tucson inspection. What were 
the results of that Tucson inspection that triggered that report 
from SP? 
MR. PATON: There were two inspections during that 
period. They were just of short duration. We inspected 
locomotives at Phoenix, again at Tucson. We defected 53 out of 53, 
as I recall. One hundred percent. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: 100 percent in the toilet at this time. 
What is it that SP said they were going to do try and get at least 
one locomotive that met your standards? 
MR. PATON: Basically, in their compliance plan, they 
were going to take specific action, by July, 1990, to reduce their 
defect ratio by 50 percent. They have not achieved it. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: They haven't come close? 
MR. PATON: I would agree. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: From SP's standpoint, they went from 0 
out of 50 to 13 out of 92, making it. Let's shift to the PUC for a 
second, then come back. Mr. Oliver, describe for me your 
responsibilities and authority. 
MR. BILL OLIVER: I'll zero in on what we do as far as 
rail safety. The Safety Division has other responsibilities before 
and in addition to rail safety. We are the authority from the 
- 17 -
constitution of the Public Utilities Code, the Vehicle Code, and 
the Labor Codes. From these, the commission issues orders from the 
corr~ission, or we have about twenty general orders that count our 
specifications that deal with rail safety. We're pre-empted by the 
federal rules of the federal government through the FRA, 
establishes rules. We are pre-empted from that area of safety. 
However, there are some areas--track, equipment and operating 
practices where states can become certified. We have become 
certified in those three areas. We have three track inspectors, 
two equipment inspectors and three operating practice inspectors. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Give me the numbers, again? 
MR. OLIVER: Three track inspectors. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Three track inspectors? 
MR. OLIVER: Two equipment inspectors. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Two equipment inspectors? 
MR. OLVIER: Three operating practice inspectors that 
enforce the federal rules. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Three operating practices. We've got 
7,000 miles of track in California? 
MR. OLVIER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: And we've got two track inspectors. 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. One in Los Angeles and one in ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: How're they doing? 
MR. OLIVER: They're busy. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I've never inspected track before, but it 
seems to me that the ratio is off a little bit. 
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MR. OLIVER: We work with the Federal Railroad 
Administration, and our two track inspectors aren't the only track 
inspectors in California. What they try to do is work through a 
priority, looking at the high speed lines, lines that have 
passenger trains, and lines that have hazardous materials on them 
as a priority. Also, they have other duties that come about, 
accident investigations, and so forth. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Mr. Oliver, specifically, what are you 
responsible for? 
MR. OLIVER: As far as track inspection equipment, and 
operating practices, that's to carry out and enforce the federal 
rules with FRA. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: That's your direct responsibility? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Working for you are the inspectors you 
just named? Who else? I'm just trying to get an idea of what your 
scope and authority and responsibility is? 
MR. OLIVER: We deal in a lot of other areas. We have 
rail safety authority and we have people working in that area. We 
have rail transit authority; we have people working in that area. 
Besides just the federal inspectors, we have people that look at 
other things, and enforce our general orders. For example, 
clearances on rail, and the other general orders that we have to 
enforce. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What was the PUC's involvement in the 
inspections that Mr. Paton mentioned that took place in California? 
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Obviously, you're not going to be in Tucson, but I would assume 
that in Roseville, Bakersfield, there was PUC involvement? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. We had at least one there. I'm not 
sure whether they were both there or not. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: At which inspection? 
MR. OLIVER: At Roseville and Bakersfield. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Who are your inspectors in Roseville? 
Who was there in Bakersfield? 
MR. OLIVER: Jim McCall was at Roseville and Bakersfield, 
I'm not sure whether Jim McCall Jr. was at both of those, too. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Jim McCall Jr. or Randy McCall? 
MR. OLIVER: Randy McCall is Jim McCall Jr. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. You use the same MPE 59s--you use 
the federal forms for your inspections? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Those forms are kept at the PUC, also? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes, we keep copies. We submit them to FRA, 
but we keep a copy. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. I would like your MPE 59s for both 
inspections. In fact, what I'd like from both of you 
gentlemen--and I'd like it in a very expeditious manner which in my 
mind means before my hearing on Monday--is your MPE59s for the six 
months of this year, the time of this year leading up to the 
accidents having to do with Southern Pacific. Actually, what I'd 
like to see are your 59s, your 58s, and your 65s. As I understand 
it, your 58s are your track reports, and your 65s are your 
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operating practice inspections. As I understand, operating and 
practice inspections have to do with such things as how you 
operate, maybe whether you use helper cars or not, how you load 
hazardous materials or how you load the weight distribution in a 
train. Those are the things I think of when I think of operating 
practices. Is that not what's covered in your MPE 65s? What's 
covered in your 65s? 
MR. PATON: That can be covered by any the federal 
operating rules deficiency. Also, it can cover, in some cases rare 
and operating rule deficiencies. It can cover hazardous materials 
deficiencies. It can cover hours of service, blue signal. A 
variety of things. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay, I'm interested in them. 
MR. PATON: For six months? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Yes. For 1991. Mr. Oliver, we've heard 
discussion of four inspections that were done in June half in and 
half out of California. Do you have any information on an 
additional inspection done sometime in that same period, and again 
I'm being general specifically, having to do with either the Tailor 
Yards or the West Colton Yards? 
MR. OLIVER: I don't have information. However, I could 
get it for you. I don't have personal information of when they 
were done or what the result was. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Well, it's very important. Mr. Paton, 
how about you? West Colton or Tailor Yard inspection. Not 
necessarily completed but started. 
MR. PATON: Could you repeat the question. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: I'm interested in if there was an 
inspection that was begun at the Tailor Yards or the West Colton 
Yards sometime in the same time frame. 
MR. PATON: Yes. I can answer that question. Following 
our exercise at Sparks, Bakersfield, Roseville, and Tucson, and 
prior to arranging all of those team inspections, we had organized 
a team inspection for freight cars at West Colton. The serious 
disruption of traffic through these other four team inspections 
caused me to change that team inspection at West Colton. It would 
have been the week of the 23rd I believe. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Of June? 
MR. PATON: Of June. It caused me to change that team to 
go to the Santa Fe at Barstow. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. Explain to me why you pulled out 
of Colton and went to Barstow. 
MR. PATON: I felt that I had pushed the Southern Pacific 
as about as far as I could and still maintain effective enforcement 
relationship. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Wait a You're going to to 
help me here because we're getting in an area that sounds real 
bizarre to me. I'm thinking back to how we do school buses. If we 
see a pattern of problems, the highway patrol sees a 
problems what they do is they come down hard. And if the pattern 
continues, they come down harder. Our interest not 
viability of the company. It is not that it costs the company a 
million dollars a day or it make live difficult for shippers. 
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Our concern is the public protection which is, as you mentioned 
earlier, the role of FRA. What it sounds like you're telling me is 
in the wake of four inspections that scare the hell out of me 
hearing about now. Your decision was to pull out of the Colton 
Yard because it was causing too great a burden on the railroad? 
MR. PATON: Basically, that's what I'm saying. I have to 
maintain some degree of credibility. Let me give you an example. 
The Vice Chairman of Southern Pacific, Bill Holtman, was advised by 
the chief mechanical officer that he did not feel that it was the 
intent of Congress for FRA to have the ability to bring a railroad 
to their knees, which basically is what I had done in Tucson. I 
felt under those conditions I would be better off to postpone the 
West Colton car inspection. Let me remind you, we're talking 
freight cars again rather than locomotives which the other four 
team inspections were ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I understand. I'd also point out that it 
was at Seacliff that a freight car failed. At Dunsmuir, it was a 
locomotive. So let's keep it in context. 
MR. PATON: The freight car problem that we were 
addressing at West Colton was not nearly as serious as the 
locomotive compliance problem that we are addressing at ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I understand. I'm smiling because there 
was whole lot of room between not as serious and the problem we got 
with these other our inspections. We're talking 80 percent failure 
rates over here. There's a lot of room for serious problems before 
you hit 80 percent. Your decision is that because of the economics 
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of operating a railroad which 't your concern. 
trouble with is why should you give a damn about 
What I'm 
f al 
condition of the railroad when your job 
public? 
the safety of the 
MR. PATON: To achieve improved compliance, I have to 
maintain some degree of credibility with whatever railroad I'm 
dealing with. It was felt, in my opinion, I would be better to 
postpone West Colton rather than to bring them to their knees again 
for the fifth week in a row. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me ask you a question though. 
Credibility. Explain to me why you need credibility with the 
railroad if you've got the authority and a bunch of forms that say 
if you can't do your job I'm putting you out of business? It seems 
to me that the hammer you have with the railroad is the threat to 
shut them down. If they don't do their job, you shut them down 
until they're doing it right. That seems to me as a public 
employee whose role is to protect the public and somebody else can 
worry about the financial viability of the railroad. The bond 
holders or whoever. But isn't it your job to protect the public? 
If you're worried about credibility with the railroad, who's 
protecting the public? 
MR. PATON: Well maybe it was bad judgment, Mr. Chairman, 
to have postponed it. Nevertheless, I elected to do that and I 
take full responsibility for it. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Did anyone from headquarters, or 
Washington, or DOT talk to you about postponing that? 
MR. PATON: No, but I discussed it with them. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: Who is Washington did you discuss it 
with? 
MR. PATON: Mr. English our Director of Safety 
Enforcement. I told him it was my feeling actually to postpone it, 
that I had pushed the SP about as far as I could, and I told him 
that I was going to postpone that inspection. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Your conversation with Mr. English was at 
your initiation or in response to an initiation from him? 
MR. PATON: It was my initiation. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I see. Anybody else? Carmichael, 
Skinner--anybody else have impact on that decision? 
MR. PATON: No. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Input to the decision? 
MR. PATON: No. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Totally your decision? 
MR. PATON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Am I correct in characterizing the 
decision as something you decided. I think at some point, 
you used the phrase, give them a six-week window of breathing 
opportunity in order to allow the railroad to get back on their 
feet. Let me rephrase that. was there a time during which you 
didn't want them inspected again? 
MR. PATON: No. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: But you called off the inspection on June 
23rd. 
MR. PATON: The team inspection. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: The team inspection on June 2 
Colton Yard. 
MR. PATON: That's correct. 
at the 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: And then within two months, we have two 
major derailments most of which apparently is attributed to 
equipment failure of some sort? 
MR. PATON: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The kind of equipment particularly with 
the locomotive that had inspections continued would have forced 
those locomotives out of service? 
MR. PATON: At this point, we haven't been able to 
determine where the second and third locomotive failed. I'm still 
trying to determine that. We can only do it by documentation and 
employee interviews. I've not been successful so far. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Explain to me what you mean by not being 
successful. 
MR. PATON: We found, following the Dunsmuir accident, 
during a simulation run that the second and third locomotives were 
emitting excessive exhaust , smoke would indicate that 
the locomotive was loading and unloading. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Explain. My experience with are 
real small ones you know, little Lionel things. So what's loading 
and unloading? 
MR. PATON: You've got a diesel engine in the locomotive. 
The diesel engine drives the main generator which converts to 
fraction motor electrically which converts back to mechanically to 
drive the locomotive. They had electrical on both 
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locomotives that caused the locomotive to load and unload. It 
would load up to its maximum kick off and unload. It would equate 
to driving down the highway with your automobile. You step on gas 
and let off, step on the gas and let off, step on the gas and let 
off. We confirmed that through our tests when the locomotives 
arrived at Eugene. We spent ten days basically taking one apart 
and putting it back together with the Southern Pacific, and this is 
what we found. At this point, we don't know where they failed. 
Whether they were defective prior to being dispatched out of West 
Colton or whether they failed in route. We have not been able to 
determine that yet. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: If you had done the inspection at West 
Colton, you might know that. 
MR. PATON: We weren't looking at locomotives in West 
Colton. That was just a freight car inspection. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I see. Mr. Oliver, you had PUC 
inspectors on site at west Colton?. 
MR. OLIVER: I'm not sure. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me see. They work for you but he's 
telling me you did. How come you don't know that? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. I can't say exactly who was there, but 
we work as a team with them. If there's an inspection, we usually 
send a person from either LA or San Francisco, or if needed, 
we can send them both. I can't say exactly who was there. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: With all due respect, explain to me why 
the FRA knows where your guys are and you don't. 
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MR. OLIVER: Well, the FRA 
inspections .•. 
the one that plans these 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I understand that. We're talking about 
something that took place in June. We're talking about hearing 
that's scheduled today that you knew about. You know we're going 
to talk about railroads and inspections, and Southern Pacific. 
We're not talking about the universe here. I want to know why you 
don't where your people are and they do. 
MR. OLIVER: I just don't know. I don't keep track of 
everyone on my staff that closely. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Apparently. Did you or anyone at the PUC 
in the last, say, 72 hours, I'll keep the time frame short, 
instruct PUC personnel not to talk to members of the Legislature 
about any of these incidents? 
MR. OLIVER: I instructed my staff that they should work 
through our legislative people. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. How about a yes or no answer to my 
question? 
MR. OLIVER: That's what I instructed them to do. To 
work through our legislative people, Les Johnson. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Did you instruct them through your 
computer net in the last 72 hours to work through your legislative 
people and not on their own to talk to members of the Legislature? 
If you want, I'll subpoena your computer records because they are 
there. So we can do it easy; we can do now or we can do it hard. 
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MR. OLIVER: Well, I was trying to figure where I was in 
the last 72 hours. No, the answer is no. Not in the last 72 
hours. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay, in the last four weeks? 
MR. OLIVER: I sent a note out saying that when they're 
contacted by the legislative people, whether it is a legislator or 
their staff, they should work through Les Johnson, our legislative 
person. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Les Johnson. Is he an inspector? 
HR. OLIVER: No, he's in our Office of Governmental 
Affairs in Sacramento. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: So he's not a safety personnel. He's not 
an inspector. Does he have any expertise whatsoever in railroads 
or in PR? 
HR. OLIVER: I doubt he has much in railroad, but he's 
our legislative contact person. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Why would I want, hypothetically, to talk 
to him about what we're talking about today as opposed to people 
who understand and know where they are and know the questions to 
answers? 
MR. OLIVER: Well, the instruction was that they should 
work through Les. So he's aware what's going on. If he wants to 
refer them to somebody else, he can do that. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: As I understand it, -- I'll tell you what 
I'd like you to provide me with. I'd like to have the travel 
vouchers for all your rail safety personnel since January of this 
year. Since you don't remember where they are, I'll go through 
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your travel vouchers and I'll let you know where they were. If we 
have to do this brick by brick, we will do it brick by brick. But 
I'm trying to understand is where the hell the PUC's been. I'm 
beginning to get an impression about what's happened at the FRA. 
It's not very good. I don't like it at all. I can't do anything 
to the FRA. I can write to my Congressman. I will talk to my 
Senators and Jack and I will talk to a number of Congressmen about 
the FRA and their role. But I can do something about the PUC. 
What I want to know is, does the PUC, since your 
inspectors I believe are federally- certified. That's how you work 
as these teams together. The PUC has the authority to put 
equipment out of service. Is that correct? 
MR. OLIVER: Through the federal regulations just like 
the FRA does. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: In other words, when an inspector goes 
into that yard, whether they're PUC or FRA and they're going down 
their MPE 59s and they're finding governor's or whatever out of 
whack. Either one of those people, as long as they are using the 
same guidelines, can put that equipment out of service. 
the PUC? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: When the FRA pulled out of Colton, did 
MR. OLIVER: I imagine we did. We're part of the team. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Can you stay on your own? 
MR. OLIVER: I am not aware whether they did or did not. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I didn't ask that. I said do you have 
the authority to stay and inspect on your own without the FRA? 
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HR. OLIVER: Yes. 
CHAIRHAR KATZ: Okay. 
ASSEMBLYMAN JIM CQSTA: Have they ever? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Mr. Costa asks have you ever? 
MR. OLIVER: We do inspections on our own without the FRA 
all the time. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What inspections have you done in the 
last six months of Southern Pacific yards on your own? 
MR. OLIVER: I don't know specifically. I can get you a 
list. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. What did you think we were going 
to talk about today, just out of curiosity? 
MR. OLIVER: What? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What did you think we were going to talk 
about today? 
MR. OLIVER: I understood an issue we were going to talk 
about was the Seacliff accident. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. 
MR. OLIVER: I got your agenda last night at 5 o'clock. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Well, I think your chairperson had it 
before then beca~se she had been scheduled to testify. Can you 
tell me, in your memory, has a Public Utilities Commission 
inspector ever put a piece of equipment out of service? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
CHAIRHAR IQ.TZ : When? 
MR. OLIVER: Numerous times. 
CHAIRMAN IQ.TZ: Give me an example. 
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MR. OLIVER: Well, I can't give you the time, date, and 
place but ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Just give me an example. I mean and I'll 
give you some leeway. I mean I'm not going to hold you to the 
time, date, and place. Just give me some examples. 
MR. OLIVER: Well, (inaudible) used to work independently 
and go into Roseville and taken the pieces of equipment out of 
service by himself without a federal inspector there. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: This year? 
MR. OLIVER: I can't say exactly when or where, but I'm 
sure he has. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Can you -- in view of the staggering 
reports coming out of Roseville and Bakersfield, assuming for a 
second you didn't know about Sparks and Tucson, so you're doing 
Roseville and Bakersfield. What action did the PUC initiate based 
on that horrendous failure rate? 
MR. OLIVER: We just work with the FRA. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: In other words, nothing. You did nothing 
on your own. 
MR. OLIVER: We didn't do anything independent of the 
FRA. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Why not? 
MR. OLIVER: Because they are the ones that set up the 
inspections and we work as a team. I'm not sure if we did anything 
additional. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Under the situation you're describing, do 
you need the PUC or should we just have the FRA? 
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MR. OLIVER: If you want more inspectors in California, 
you need the PUC. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: But if they're not going to do anything 
unless the FRA is doing it, what's the point. What you're sitting 
here telling me is you've got--- You're head of safety, right? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. You're head of safety. Your guys 
come in and they say, listen, we've got this minor little problem 
here with Southern Pacific. We've got 36 out of 45 engines going 
down the tubes in Bakersfield. We've 40 out of 61 going down the 
tubes in Roseville. Gee boss, do you think we ought to do 
something about it? And your response is, wait for Uncle Sam to 
call? You're head of safety, not public relations, not railroad 
solvency, not protecting the stockholders at Southern Pacific. I 
mean, head of safety means, in my mind and please tell me if I'm 
wrong, that you're concerned about safety. 
MR. OLIVER: That's true. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: So how do you sit there and tell me that 
when someone comes in and says, I've got a ton of locomotives that 
aren't worth crap, you don't do anything. I don't get it. 
HR. OLIVER: Well, I don't see where we didn't do 
anything. As I said, we work with the FRA and we also make 
independent inspections. We certify their rules and enforce their 
rules. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What is keeping you from showing some 
backbone on your own and going out there and protecting the public? 
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Tell Mr. O'Connell and his constituents, tell the folks in Dunsmuir 
what you did as the Public Utilities Commission because you didn't 
think the FRA was doing enough. Did you do anything? 
MR. OLIVER: I don't know what we did. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Can you point to anything concrete? 
MR. OLIVER: We make our own inspections. We work as a 
team in investigating these accidents. We've been highly involved 
in trying to figure out what can be done as a result to them. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me tell you why I'm having a problem 
here. We're looking at legislation designed to toughen the rules 
and regulations to put more heat on the railroads--all the 
railroads--to operate more safely. What good does it do me, or 
Jack, or our constituents to pass that legislation that tells the 
PUC we think you ought to be doing all this stuff in addition to 
what you're supposed to be doing already, if your response to 
everything is "Oh we're partners with the feds and when they get 
around to doing it we'll do it, but we're not initiating anything 
on our own". 
MR. OLIVER: Well, I say we're enforcing the federal 
regulations. We can do more. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Why haven't you done more? 
MR. OLIVER: We only have two equipment inspectors in the 
whole state. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Have you asked for more? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Who'd you ask? 
MR. OLIVER: We asked the budget people for more. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: The budget people at the Commission in 
the Governor's office. Budget people Where? Which budget people? 
process. 
MR. OLIVER: Department of Finance through the budget 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: And what was their response? 
MR. OLIVER: We got some. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You've got two. You went from one to 
two? Wh~t did you get? 
HR. OLIVER: A couple of years ago, we only had three 
inspectors in the state. Now we have eight. We got two or three 
through the budget process in the last couple of years. We asked 
for two more in the next budget. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: We're talking current year budget or a 
couple of years ago? 
HR. OLIVER: Current year meaning this budget. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Fiscal '91-'92? 
HR. OLIVER: '92 we did not get any inspectors. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You requested but were turned down? 
HR. OLIVER: I'm trying to remember. No, we didn't 
request inspectors, we requested other ones. We requested two more 
in '92-'93. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay, but you didn't think you needed 
more for this year? 
MR. OLIVER: This year, no. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The Public Utilities Commission has 
authority granted to it by the feds to order additional safety 
equipment on tracks where have been, I don't remember the exact 
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phrasing I guess, local problems over the years. Am I phrasing 
that correctly? 
MR. OLIVER: We have authority to address local safety 
issues independent of the federal government. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The Dunsmuir track, I'm told by your 
staff, is among the most dangerous or hard to navigate or 
transverse in the western states. 
MR. OLIVER: It's one of the most difficult. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: And there have been how many derailments 
there in the last ten years? 
MR. OLIVER: Eight. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Eight derailments. Is that high? 
MR. OLIVER: I'd say it's high in that short a distance. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Part of it's defining how large an area 
of track we're talking about. I'm talking about right around that 
curve area. We're talking about eight in the last ten years? 
MR. OLIVER: Eight in the last ten years is in the 
two-mile stretch. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: If you go into a 20-mile stretch, I 
believe that number goes up significantly? 
MR. OLIVER: I doubt if it goes up significantly. I 
think it's concentrated probably in that two-mile stretch. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: In view of that, a high accident rate, a 
difficult piece of track, what has the Public Utilities Commission 
ordered the railroads to do to increase safety in that area? 
MR. OLIVER: We haven't ordered anything as far as 
specifically in that area. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: How come? 
MR. OLIVER: We inspect the track to make sure the track 
is brought to the right standards in the area. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: We've got eight trains that fell off that 
track in the last ten years. You said yourself that's a high rate. 
I'm taking your work for it, but we don't do anything else? 
MR. OLIVER: We haven't ordered anything in that specific 
area or instituted an investigation. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Has the staff recommended changes in 
terms of operating practices in those areas? 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: So it's not even a question of the 
Commissioner's turning it down. The staff hasn't even made 
recommendations? 
MR. OLIVER: No . 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Can you enlighten me as to why? The 
reason I'm asking--again going back to the legislation that we're 
all contemplating and other things, it seems like you've got a 
problem, you admit there's a problem there, you acknowledge there 
is a problem there, you acknowledge that you have authority, but 
you're not doing anything to use that authority to increase the 
level of safety. 
MR. OLIVER: Most of those accidents, it was not 
equipment or track, it was human failure. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. Did you recommend more humans on 
the train? 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: Did you take a position on the issue of 
cabooses on trains? 
HR. OLIVER: When it was before the Legislature, we did. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The Commission did? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: And your position was? 
MR. OLIVER: In support. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: In support of keeping cabooses on trains? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. I'm at a loss as to where to go 
from here. I'm shocked at a minimum by what both you gentlemen 
have told me. I am very concerned that those people with the 
authority to make a difference aren't doing their job. What I'm 
being told here is that despite a failure rate of upwards of 80 
percent -- and again you know the thing that makes this so 
incredible is this isn't just knock, knock, surprise inspection, 
let's see what you got, and that's an 80 percent failure rate. 
This is a surprise inspection where they get to fix everything 
before they show it to you and its still got an 80 percent failure 
rate. On top of that happening on four occasions in June of this 
year, we find no significant increase in the amount of trains being 
put out of service, we find no significant numbers of locomotives 
being put out of service, we find no independent action at all by 
the Public Utilities Commission's safety staff, we find no activity 
by the Public Utilities Commission, which, as I understand, last 
week adopted some of your hazmat rules which were first proposed in 
1979. 
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MR. OLIVER: We issued a general order, yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: This is the result of something that 
started in 1979? 
MR. OLIVER: No. This is a result of something that the 
Commission really started three years ago. We started a lot of 
things in 1979, including legislation. That's where we started. 
None of it was successful. Then, we went into OII, three years 
ago, to set up the rules. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I am overwhelmed by what has not been 
done, in view of such glaring safety problems. Is a failure of 
government and bureaucracy to protect the public of proportions 
that I could not imagine. I've got a pretty good imagination. 
Both the federal level, and I appreciate Mr. Paton taking 
responsibility. That's unusual for people in his position. 
We heard a gentlemen say that, "I decided that the 
railroad was suffering too much, so we'll put the public at risk, 
while the railroad tries to right itself fiscally. We'll continue 
to put the public at risk", knowing what he knew. 
The PUC just sits there, and say if the feds don't care, 
we don't care. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: It seems to me the railroads have 
enough lobbyist and advocacy for themselves. It's the citizens 
that need to be better protected. That's the disappointment that I 
have. Assemblyman Katz and I, and everyone this room want to 
emphasize the prevention. I'm just floored. Richard uses the 
term, he's overwhelmed. I'm underwhelmed, I think, at the level of 
protection, in terms of the prevention that can be taken. 
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Maybe you can take me through exactly what the inspection 
are again. It seems to me that my analogy, and maybe you can tell 
me if I am wrong, that the trucks that now transport hazardous 
materials are safer today, by talking to the Highway Patrol. We 
have representatives, some spoke persons here today that are on the 
agenda. They will tell you that the trucks are safer today in 
carrying these hazardous materials than they were ten years ago. 
Maybe they're a result of a couple of spills that we had around the 
state. There was one in Santa Barbara in 1984. There were others. 
Perhaps, we need to have this as bellringer to help the rails 
improve their transportation, too. 
I am sure that the industry will tell you that they want 
to do everything that they can to help prevent these type of 
occurrences and incidents. Maybe you can take me through the 80 
percent figure. When you come, yes, there's surprise inspections, 
and you knock on the door at the railroad yard, and say, "We're 
coming". Do the trains then have a chance. Do you give them a 
24-hour period to fix their locomotives? That's the first 
question. Number two: How about the boxcars? The Sea Cliff 
accident was not a locomotive. It was a boxcar, a problem with the 
axle. Can you take me through how those work? Can you let me 
know, do the railroads also pull out 60 boxcars, like they do the 
locomotives and say, we think these are our 60 best. Hope you 
don't find 80 percent to put out of commission, because we're going 
to let the rest of them roll? I understand that even the boxcar at 
Sea Cliff wasn't owned by the railroad, but they're responsible 
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because they were pulling it. Can you take me through how that 
works? 
MR. PATON: There's been concern about taking locomotives 
out of service--insufficient numbers being taken out of service. I 
think that we have to recognize that the Safety Improvement of '88 
gave FRA individual liability authority. Oftentimes, it is not 
necessary to issue a Form 8 to take it out of service, because an 
individual that would order that locomotive to be used, or 
continued in use in defective condition is subject to an individual 
fine, or perhaps disqualification from that position, or perhaps 
both. I don't think this is really an issue that we should be to 
concerned about, is the number of locomotives that we take out of 
service. When we arrive at a locomotive service area, the 
locomotives that are ready at the time of our arrival is a true 
monitoring of their meeting of their responsibilities. 
ASSEMBLYMAN 0' CONNELL: So, it's not real surprise, 
they know you're coming? 
MR. PATON: Only, those initial ones that are ready. 
Following our arrival, those that are inspected and offered for 
service after that, they have the opportunity to do a better job, I 
presume, if they elect to do so. That's one reason are a bit more 
alarming than what ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: They're very alarming. 
MR. PATON: I wanted to assure you, this committee, that 
I have had a very active program in locomotive compliance on the 
Southern Pacific, probably the most active in the country, or in 
the 17 states that SP runs in. I've allocated more of my resources 
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in P&E wise for the Southern Pacific than I have on the rest of the 
railroads in my region. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me ask you a question? If we're 
getting a whole more protection that the rest of the country, I'm 
very concerned for the rest of the country. Your comment in terms 
of allocating a lot more of your resources to SP, is that because 
their accident rate is significantly higher? 
MR. PATON: It's because their compliance is worse? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Because their compliance is worse? How 
much worse is their compliance than other railroads--Santa Fe? UP? 
Whoever? 
MR. PATON: I think it would unprofessional for me to 
compare one railroad to another in a public hearing. I could 
better answer that by saying that I have allocated more of my 
resources to the Southern Pacific, and I'm not happy with the 
improved compliance that we've achieved to date, and I'm not going 
to quit. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What are you going to do to bring them 
into compliance if you cancel inspections because you want to give 
them breathing room? 
MR. PATON: This was only an isolated occurrence. I've 
been a reasonable director for five-and-a-half years. It's the 
first one I've canceled. I felt that I was making a good judgment 
to do it then. Perhaps it was bad judgment. 
To answer Assemblyman O'Connell's question on freight 
cars, the railroad has a responsibility to make a pre-departure 
inspection and a brake test when a train is assembled. Our 
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inspection usually occurs after that procedure has been performed. 
So, again, we're monitoring after they have inspected. In the case 
of the Sea Cliff accident, we were present at the bearing tear down 
at the Sacramento shops. The manufacturer of that bearing was 
there. He attributed the cause of bearing failure as being a loss 
of clamping pressure in the bearing due to rubber seals being 
applied behind the cap screw bolts, and backed out 3-32nds of an 
inch or so, and rear seal failed. Hence, you had a bearing 
failure. Since 1988, those rubber seals have not been installed. 
This one was rebuilt prior to that. I'm not sure that had the 
railroad or FRA or PUC had inspected that car at LATC yard, that 
they would have identified that as a problem bearing. 
We had four more bearings in that train that we 
inspected. Those also were taken to Sacramento shops as suspects. 
They were showing signs of grease around the outer seal. Those 
four were torn down. They were fine. There was nothing wrong with 
them at all. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Do you have any requirements 
whatsoever in terms of how often locomotives or boxcars should be 
inspected? Pretty much catch as catch can? 
MR. PATON: We try and direct the enforcement activity 
and inspection activity based on the degree of compliance we're 
achieving at that location. A mechanical-caused accident can be 
due to a problem where a failure was in Chicago and that particular 
car failed in California. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Are you a little familiar with 
the system that the hazardous waste haulers use where they have the 
certification, the stickers in the lower left or right hand corner? 
Chief Rude, is it in the lower corner of your trucks, 
right hand corner of the front windshield, for your hazardous waste 
haulers? It's good for at least three months, and it won't be 
inspected again for at least three months. Would something like 
that work for your locomotives, at least? Or even for the boxcars 
if they do get inspected more than ... Isn't there a scenario where 
some trains could be inspected every other month, and others may go 
never being inspected? 
MR. PATON: That's entirely possible. The railroad is 
required to make a periodic inspection of a locomotive every 92 
days, because that's when it's necessary. We could inspect a 
locomotive in Los Angeles, and again in Roseville the next day. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Similarly, you may not ever 
inspect a locomotive, the life of that engineer. 
MR. PATON: There's no practical way to track , with 
two million freight cars in the country. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Truly, a catch as catch can 
system. That jeopardizes public health, in my opinion. 
MR. PATON: We have to remember that the responsibil 
for compliance with that freight car, that locomotive, still rests 
with the railroad. The PUC and FRA are there merely to monitor 
their meeting that responsibility. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I've got to take issue with that. You 
have the ability to put them out of service. 
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MR. PATON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: We shut down restaurants when roaches are 
found in restaurants. We shut down restaurants. We close down 
terminals if school buses or trucks present a danger to the public, 
or because the safety records aren't up to snuff, or the 
inspections don't make it. Yet, for some reason, we're letting the 
economic viability of the railroad take precedent over public 
safety. I don't understand that. I understand your decision. I 
also want to ask the Public Utilities Commission about that. 
There's two separate roles in this. There's the FRA role. I 
understand what happened there, I think. I'm not quite sure how 
you came to the conclusion you did. What you've told me there was 
no outside influence on you. The railroad didn't try and influence 
you. The shippers didn't try to influence you. The people in 
Washington didn't try to influence you. You just came to this 
decision on your own, even though it was different than everything 
you've done for the last five years. 
MR. PATON: That's right. But you have to remember that 
my arrangement in Sparks, in Bakersfield, in Roseville, and Tucson, 
was at my own initiative because I was concerned with the problem. 
That's an aggressive program. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I agree with you completely, but that's 
what your job is. 
MR. PATON: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: In Sparks, in Roseville, in Tucson, you 
did your job. For some reason, when it came to Colton, you said to 
give the railroad a break. 
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MR. PATON: I had problems in Barstow and the Sante Fe, 
too, and we're addressing those problems. The SP is not the only 
railroad I have responsibilities for. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I appreciate that. SP are the only guys 
that have dumped stuff off the track in the last month or two, at 
least in California. In a significant way. Bob, you can respond 
to that when shot. SP are the only people I know of who've 
sterilized a river, and shut down a major highway in the last 
couple of months, as far as I'm aware. Let me go back to the PUC. 
I'm told there are some very pro-railroad folks on the Public 
Utilities Commission. Is that your impression? 
MR. OLIVER: I don't know. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You don't know. Has the Commission ever 
communicated with you, anything having to do with inspections or 
the safety record, or how aggressive or non-aggressive you're to be 
in terms of safety issues with the railroads? 
MR. OLIVER: No . 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: There's no correspondence whatsoever. 
MR. OLVIER: You mean this present commission? No. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. I'll do a public records search 
starting in the morning. I won't find anything in your files that 
indicate that the Commission has shown an interest, no way or the 
other? 
MR. OLIVER: I won't say that they showed an interest. 
You asked if they asked me to more aggressive. The answer is no. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: So, the Commission has never asked you to 
be more aggressive. What kind of information does the Commission 
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get? We've got some serious failures in the safety side based on 
inspections that you folks have been participating in. How does 
that go? Is the Commission aware of that? 
MR. OLIVER: They only get information on something that 
would probably be of a serious nature that we think they should be 
aware of. They don't get all the routine information. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Would you agree that Roseville and 
Bakersfield are of a serious nature? 
problem. 
MR. OLIVER: You mean the inspections at Roseville? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Yes. 
MR. OLIVER: I think that it points at that there is a 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Has that been brought to the attention of 
the Commission? 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: It has not? 
MR. OLIVER: Not till now, that I'm aware of. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Why not? 
MR. OLIVER: When we feel that there is something that we 
have to do, we would recommend to them to do something. We did not 
recommend to them to do anything. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: How many spills does it take? How more 
severe did the disaster have to be? How many more locomotives 
would have had to have failed for you to tell the Commission 
there's a problem here? 
MR. OLIVER: We told them there was a problem a while 
back when we tried to get this Hazardous Material General Orders, 
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through. We got that through. It wasn't easy. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You started on that in '88, you said. 
MR. OLIVER: Right. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: That took three years to get through, 
having to do with hazardous materials. That seems to me the 
Commission is not moving at lighting speed. Let me separate for 
one second the hazardous materials versus the safety problem. Has 
the accident rate for Southern Pacific been going up, in terms of 
numbers of accidents or accidents per mile? 
MR. OLIVER: You mean derail~ents? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: No, I didn't say derailments. I said 
accidents. 
MR. OLIVER: What kind of accidents? I can't respond. 
Railroad grade crossing accidents where trains run into each other? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: How do you keep your statistics? 
MR. OLIVER: We keep a running list of all the accidents 
that are reported to us. We put out an annual report that shows 
trends. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay, whats' the trend based on how you 
keep your statistics? 
MR. OLIVER: I don't think it shows a large increase in 
accidents on SP. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Does it show an increase? 
MR. OLIVER: I can't recall exactly what it shows. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You're the head of safety? You can 
recall the trend? 
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HR. OLIVER: It didn't point out a trend that would make 
us do something. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. Roseville and Bakersfield didn't 
point out a trend. ? 
MR. OLIVER: It pointed out that SP has a problem with 
their locomotives. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: But not enough for you to do anything? 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Have you discussed your testimony before 
this hearing with any of the commissioners in the last several 
days? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ : No . 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: No, discussion at all. 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Even when the Chairwoman said she wasn't 
going to come? 
MR. OLIVER: I haven't spoken with her. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Have you spoken with the Executive 
Director of the Commission? 
anybody? 
MR. OLIVER: No. Not in the last few days. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Have you discussed your testimony with 
MR. OLIVER: Just with the legal division. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What did the legal division tell you? 
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: (inaudible) 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I didn't ask you the question. I asked 
him the question. I'll ask you the question, next. 
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MR. OLIVER: Mostly, what we wanted with the legal 
division was to try to spell out where the state role is and the 
federal role is, and where we're pre-empted. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Did the legal division give you any 
instructions on what you could or could not testify about? 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Who was the person that started to come 
forward? 
MR. OLIVER: Her name is Judy Lamson. She's in our legal 
division in San Francisco. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Ms. Lamson, do you want to join us? 
MS. JUPY LAMSON: I would like to clarify a few things 
that have been discussed earlier. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Before we get to that, have you had any 
discussions with the commissioners about that testimony at this 
hearing? 
MS. LAMSON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Would you tell me the nature of those 
discussions? 
MS. LAMSON: Generally discussing what the scope of the 
hearings would be. 
the Sea Cliff spill. 
As I as understood it, we would be discussing 
Maybe a little bit of the Dunsmuir spill. 
Generally, the focus would be on what the state is authorized to 
do. The difference between the federal authority and the state 
authority, that sort of thing. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Have you been instructed to limit 
testimony in any way? 
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MS. LAMSON:: No. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Has the Commission instructed you to make 
available all relative to questions from this inquiry? 
MS. LAMSON: I have no instructions of that sort. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You will make them available, though? 
MS. LAMSON: Yes. Subject to ... We do have some 
information that is confidential under the California Public 
Utilities Code pending the investigation. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What's the nature of that information? 
MS. LAMSON: There would be factual matters that were 
investigated at the sites of the spills. We're certainly willing 
to work with the Legislature and the staff in developing 
legislation. We're not trying to be uncooperative in any sense of 
the word. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You've got to keep in mind, I'm not 
necessarily interested in developing more legislative authority for 
the PUC. If you're not using what you've got. The failure of the 
agency to adequately protect the public raises serious questions 
about whether or not undue influence has been brought on 
commissioners or by commissioners. It raises serious questions 
about who's looking out for the special interests, as opposed to 
who's looking out for the public interest. Based on the 
information I hear today, I'm very much frightened for the public 
interest. I may be rethinking whether or not, at least for my 
legislative efforts, I want to give more authority to the PUC, in 
view of an appalling lack of use of the authority that you 
currently have. 
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MS. LAMSON: Unfortunately, we are also very limited by 
the federal scheme. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Excuse me, ma'am. The limits by the 
federal scheme do not prevent you from taking equipment out of 
service. They do not prevent you from doing additional inspections 
on your own. They do not prevent you from exercising your 
authority to increase safety procedures on the track at Dunsmuir. 
MS. LAMSON: There are limitations in those areas. For 
one, we are certified as was discussed earlier. We are certified 
to work with the FRA and inspect. However, our inspection reports 
are referred to the FRA where they are prosecuted. We do not have 
independent authority to prosecute beyond the law. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: No, you don't. You do have authority 
under the federal designation of your inspectors to put equipment 
out of service. You may not be able to assess penalties without 
the feds, but you can take stuff off the track. You can take 
equipment that poses a threat to the safety of Californians off the 
track. You haven't been doing it! 
MS. LAMSON: As we noted earlier, we have eight 
inspectors for the entire state of California. This is the one 
area in California--railroad safety--that is not user-funded. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Because there's an exemption for the 
railroads? 
MS. LAMSON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Has the PUC tried to eliminate that 
exemption? 
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MS. LAMSON: Yes, we have. It has not succeeded at the 
legislative level. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Passed the legislature, vetoed by the 
Governor, or not passed the legislature? 
MS. LAMSON: I believe it did not pass the Legislature. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The Public Utilities Commission last 
requested that legislation, when? 
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: Probably about five years ago. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: During Governor Deukmejian's time. You 
haven't requested it since then? 
MS. LAMSON: Not that we are aware of at this table. We 
could get back with you on that. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me give you some information. I 
believe both Senator Thompson's bill and my bill will eliminate 
that exemption. I'll look forward to your letters of support for 
both efforts. In addition, I still have serious concerns about the 
role of the Commission. The fact, that the Commission has not over 
time instructed the staff to do more inspections, or raise the 
question, or shift the resources which the Commission has the 
ability to do. We've worked with you before on that one, when we 
had problems in the tour bus industries, and other industries. 
Until such time as the legislation was available for 
funding, you have ways of making it work. It hasn't been the case 
here. What I will do after the hearing, I will look at our options 
both legislatively. But I'm also concerned, and I think the 
relationship between the Commission and the railroads needs to be 
looked into. Someone is not protecting the public interests and we 
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need to know why. Mr. O'Connell is correct in being suspicious and 
concerned. I think, people who hear this testimony today, both 
from the federal level and what has not been done, but in our role 
from the state level, what was has not been done to protect the 
public is frightening and unacceptable. I appreciate it if you 
would communicate that to the Commission. We have gone as far as 
we can go without getting more totally frustrated. 
We will be in touch. I look forward to the documentation 
that I've requested. I'd like it before Monday's hearing. I think 
everyone knows what it is. My staff will work with your staff in 
making sure that happens. 
MS. LAMSON: May I add one other thing, sir? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Yes . 
MS. LAMSON: In terms of what the PUC is doing, they will 
be considering an order opening an investigation, a formal 
investigation at a special meeting on August 22nd, at 10 A.M., in 
San Francisco. That investigation would include looking at the 
causes of the derailment, and looking at what needs to be done at 
the regulatory level, at the inspection levels, state and federal 
levels. There will be a full investigation. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Counsel, let me make something very 
clear. I frankly don't understand why it takes till August 22nd to 
come to that point. These accidents have occurred a while ago, 
already. Maybe the PUC was not aware of that. Don't for a minute 
expect me to be snowed by the Commission's own investigation as 
being an excuse to not provide documentation. Our request is in 
advance of your notice. It's in advance of your investigation. We 
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expect the materials to be provided. I do not expect the 
Commission to behind our on-going investigation as an excuse 
not to provide information. That will not be acceptable. Clear? 
been made. 
MS. LAMSON: Sure. I haven't heard any excuse having 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I'm just putting you on notice. 
MS. LAMSON: We will be cooperative. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Thank you. 
MR. PATON: One clarification. On the inspection reports 
that you want, is that solely the Southern Pacific? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: At this point, it's Southern Pacific. 
MR. PATON: If I can produce a computer summary, would 
that be acceptable? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: It'll be for the initial request? Yes. 
I reserve the right to back and ask the rest of it. I appreciate 
your time problem. 
MR PATON: It's a lot of I'm not sure I can get 
it to by Monday. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The computer summary you can, though? 
MR. PATON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I'll start with the computer summary. 
Mr. Oliver? 
MR. OLIVER: If FRA provides you that, you want us to 
send you our duplicate copies of those forms? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I believe I've asked you for more than 
I've asked FRA for? 
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MR. OLIVER: You asked for the same form that you asked 
FRA, plus, you wanted travel expense claim. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: That's right. I'd like to see your 
files, also. I want to know how much of you've got, they've got. 
Let me ask, Southern Pacific Railroad. Mr. Starzel, 
Vice-Chairman, Michael Ongerth, Assistant Vice-President. I 
believe; we have some other folks. 
MR. R. F. STARZEL: May I proceed with a statement, Mr. 
Chairman? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I'd appreciate it, Mr. Starzel, if you 
would summarize your statement. You might want to also respond to 
some of the questions that have raised. 
MR. STARZEL: First, may I introduce, Mike Ongerth, 
Assistant Vice-President of Operations. I also have with me, Jack 
Jenkins, who is the Assistant General Manager for this region and 
who has been on site at Sea Cliff, and Herbie Bart, who directs the 
Emergency Response Teams which we have at the railroad. 
Since you do have the statement, which we have brought 
with us today, and since you have raised questions that relate in 
part to that statement, but also raise other questions, let me go 
right to those. I can understand listening to what you're focusing 
on, some heightened concern about safety. I want to give you some 
assurances that when you look at the broader picture, you'll find 
there is a great concern for safety by the railroads. They have 
programs which work, and as a result, you will find that safety on 
the railroads, nationally and in California, has measuredly 
increased. 
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Over the past ten years the rate of accidents has been 
cut down to 1/3 of what it was in 1981. That's good performance. 
That's performance that assures the public that they are being 
handled safely. The concern over the public agencies which have 
regulatory powers ought to receive further perspective, as well. 
In the structure of the complex operations of railroads, the public 
agencies have to depend upon the railroads to operate safely, to 
institute programs and systems of control, and to be certain that 
they do comply with them. In fact, that is what railroads do. And 
that is why the inspections that are on-going are only on top of 
those and are monitoring, as the word was used. The industry has 
been effective. 
Let me just point to some Department of Transportation 
statistics and give you kind of a Harper's Index. The number of 
fatalities since 1980, which have resulted from, and been 
attributed to, the transport of hazardous materials by train. 
One, the number of fatalities resulting from, or attributed to, the 
transportation of hazardous materials by truck, 318, in the same 
period of time. In 1989, the last reported year for which we can 
get Department of Transportation statistics on trucks, the amount 
of ton miles of hazardous materials carried by trucks and trains 
was just about the same. A little over, in each case, a billion 
ton miles of hazardous materials carried by trucks and trains. But 
the difference is dramatic. In the period of '82 to '89 actually, 
the number of injuries resulting from truck operations with 
hazardous materials was 1,356 and for railroads it was 389. The 
number of incidents where there was a release of hazardous 
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materials from truck transportation was 40,241 during that period 
and only 7,474 from railroads. It's quite clear that railroads are 
four times better than trucks. Now this goes to a point that you, 
Mr. Chairman, raised, "Why should we be worried about cost?" Well 
if costs are imposed upon the railroads we move traffic to the 
highway. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me interrupt for a second. Don't for 
a second assume that I'm looking to compare trains and trucks. You 
know, as do most people in this room, that if anyone has made a 
career the last five years of trying to get trucks to comply, its 
been me. I'm not satisfied with truck rates. I'm not satisfied 
with their accident rates. I'm not satisfied with the way they do 
business. That's why Senator Seymour and I increased inspections 
by 100,000 a year. It's why we carried BIT the program and a 
variety of terminal inspection programs. None of that is relevant, 
I think. I will grant you that trains are safer than trucks. That 
doesn't mean a whole lot to people in Sea Cliff and Dunsmuir right 
now. Just like it wouldn't if it had been a hazardous materials 
incident with a truck. I'm interested in how the railroad 
operates. That's what I'm interested in. I'm not interested in 
how the trucking industry operates because I could spend an hour 
telling you what we've done to hammer them in the last year. 
MR. STARZEL: I only offer that as a factor to the 
contrast and safety, railroads are basically safe. Let me go to 




We are in a system that is international in scope, and we 
must meet those standards. We're also in an international 
marketplace, and we must compete for business that way. Since 1981 
in the Staggers Act, we are on a commercial basis. In the primary 
perspective of it, we are unregulated. Therefore, we are 
market-driven. Market-driven means we must be more reliable; we 
must assure the shippers that, in fact, there will be no accidents. 
We, as other railroads that are operating in California, have very 
strong programs that are intensely followed to cut down on 
derailments. We're much more anxious than even you can be to cut 
down on accidents, because they mean not only cost, but the loss of 
business because people want reliability and we want to give it to 
them. 
Now, the connection between the inspections that you are 
talking about and these accidents that occurred is not even 
tenuous. There is no connection. Let us go to what the DOT 
statistics are for the latest years and discover what the kinds of 
problems are that need to be addressed. There were slightly over 
3,000 accidents in '88 which is the last DOT year for which, I 
think, we have these statistics. The train accident causes in 
3,051 train accidents only 29 related to locomotives. Only 483; 
that's just slightly over 15 percent related to equipment. The 
problems that you look at as the major problems are always the 
track and human problems. Now in the case of Sea Cliff, we know 
exactly what happened. It was a journal that burned off, it was 
not maintainable, it was inspected, and it can be inspected; but 
that's all that can be done with a bearing of that sort. Keep in 
- 59 -
mind that particular bearing came into the industry only some 12 
years ago and has been part of the reason that the rate of 
accidents has dropped significantly in the railroad industry. So 
what we have is a bearing that's sealed and they will fail. And we 
regret that it failed where it did because that was obviously with 
a very serious consequence. 
Now in Sea Cliff, we have briefed you, Mr. Chairman, and 
we have briefed the press diligently to tell you where our 
investigation has taken us. You can inquire further, but let me 
just briefly summarize. We know that they were a complex set of 
factors which led to excessive lateral force that caused the wheels 
to pop off to the inside of the curve. We know that there is a 
possibility of certain kinds of engine failures. One could have 
been from a burnt out electronic circuit board ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Excuse me, I believe me you mean 
Dunsmuir, not Sea Cliff. 
MR. STARZEL: I'm sorry. Excuse me. I meant Dunsmuir. 
You're right. 
There was a possibility of a burnt out circuit board, an 
improbable now but possible governor question. There was a 
theoretical question, not an observed question of grease on the 
rails. We know that the relationship of long and unloaded cars 
right in front of a tank car by itself create an angularity on the 
coupler which meant it twisted and it put greater force upon that 
point and could have also contributed to it. 





CHAIRMAN KATZ: One question on that. Who is testing the 
MR. STARZEL: Who is testing the governor? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Right. 
MR. STARZEL: The governor was taken off the locomotive 
Both the FRA and I believe the NTSP were present at 
Their investigation is ongoing. Taking you back to an 
earlier statement you said when you were questioning Mr. Paton, 
"Tell me what the governor is doing?" If that governor was 
hunting, that would cause the engine speed to increase and 
decrease. But in terms of what it could have been doing to the 
locomotive at the wheels, is that it would have been, if this was 
happening, would have been causing the engine to slowly load and 
then slowly unload. Now we had people on the locomotive during the 
test run after the derailment, including an FRA inspector, and they 
did not take exception to the operation of that locomotive. The 
FRA inspectors rode that locomotive leaving the site going to 
Eugene and they did not observe ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me ask you a question. 
MR. STARZEL: So this is only a possibility. The 
governor is ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me ask a question. Why is it being 
tested in Eugene and not in California? Are there not facilities 
here to do that? 
MR. STARZEL: Because that was the closest maintenance 
location to the point at which the accident occurred. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Closest SP maintenance location? 
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MR. STARZEL: Yes, that is correct. 




MR. STARZEL:: They are in our shops. Yes sir. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Where is the ... 
MR. STARZEL: The NTSP and the FRA were present during 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Where is the governor physically, now? 
MR. STARZEL: I believe it is still in Eugene under lock 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Lock and key in whose possession? 
MR. STARZEL: I think, ours. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. Go on. 
MR. STARZEL: What we see in that governor is the 
possibility that it was hunting because it was losing governor oil, 
but that's not conclusive at this point. 
May I also say that the question of how much that had to 
do with the accident really relates to how much power was then 
applied to the rail which is all that has to be tested through 
simulation using computers. Which is to say, we are not finally at 
a point where we can tell you with any confidence what actually has 
happened. But we have taken, in the meantime, steps which will 
result in more conservative operation of the trains through that 
area. We are also, at this time, designing a bridge that would 
have the capacity of, should we not be able to prevent further 
derailments there, catching cars and not allowing them to go into 
river. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: So you're committed to rebuilding the 
bridge at Dunsmuir? 
MR. STARZEL: Well, we have an engineering firm under 
contract. They've given us five concepts. One of those was shown 
in the press. It is a widened bridge with a berm on it and then a 
sloping side so that if anything goes off, it's ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I understand the difference between 
concepts and commitments. Are you committed to rebuilding the 
bridge at Dunsmuir or are we just looking at engineering designs as 
an option at this point? 
MR. STARZEL: We're committed to rebuilding the bridge at 
Dunsmuir if after the design, we see that we have a significantly 
decreased risk as a result. We want to do something that is 
effective. We don't want to just build a bridge to make cosmetic 
changes and make people feel good. We want to make a real change 
if there's one to be made. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I appreciate that. We can trade 
statistics all day. For instance, the Federal Railroad 
Administration shows that there were 254 accidents involving the 
release of hazardous materials between '85 and '89 on rail. The 
Research and Special Projects Administration figures show a steady 
increase in rail incidents involving hazardous materials during the 
same time up to as many as 1,195 in 1989. So we can trade stats 
back and forth all day and, as most people know, stats do whatever 
people want them to do. I can make them look one way. You can 
make them look one way. we can all do that stuff. What I'm 
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particularly interested in is your awareness of the inspections at 
Roseville and at Bakersfield. 
MR. STARZEL: Well, we didn't come prepared because we 
had not been given any advice that, in fact, this was going to be 
discussed in any detail. We'll be prepared at a later time to do 
that. I would like to say, generally, that the FRA focuses on a 
number of things that go far beyond and outside of anything that 
relates to what we consider to be safety problems and certainly 
none that we know to be related in any way to the Sea Cliff or 
Dunsmuir accidents. In fact, I could probably send into the house 
of everybody in this auditorium inspectors who could find 
unhygienic conditions. There are white glove inspections that go 
on by the FRA ..... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: There's one big difference. Not everyone 
sitting in this room runs a train with hazardous materials through 
neighborhoods or on track. So, I think your analogy off base. I 
think you can always find things. The difference is, and the 
reason I think you ought to be held to a standard, is that you take 
hazardous materials as a business and other materials as a business 
and run them up and down track that goes through neighborhoods, 
goes past sensitive ecological areas, goes by schools, goes by 
factories, and that puts you in a different position than folks in 
this room who may have left a can of Ajax sitting somewhere they 
shouldn't have. 
MR. STARZEL: That's true, but we're required by law to 
carry those, Mr. Chairman. We have no choice. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: I understand that. You're also required 
by law to maintain a certain level of safety for your operations. 
I'm curious about something. 
MR. STARZEL: ... knows whether there's any relationship 
that's causation between the defects. There was no inquiry with 
the FRA about that. Our people contended to me that the kinds of 
defects that are turned up and create in your mind a horrendous 
situation are the sorts of things that do not change the safety of 
the operation, do not change the eveness of the power, do not 
change the kinds of things which could be related generally to 
accidents. The statistic I just gave you is very important because 
if only 29 out of 3,051 accidents in 1988 were related to 
locomotives, we have to focus in on what are those things on 
locomotives that can cause a problem. It certainly isn't a dirty 
windshield; it's not grease on the floor which are some of the 
things that are cited. In fact, these are white glove inspections 
and they look for defects like that, and they are not directly 
safety-related. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: It seems to me, and I asked the question 
specifically of FRA. Are these door knobs out of whack or are they 
serious, and the response we got back was they're a combination of 
both. No one's maintaining that all of the 255 defects of Tucson 
were of the same severity. The point that I'm concerned about, and 
I'm concerned about your response also, is that you have 
locomotives that fail at an 80 percent rate on four inspections. 
MR. STARZEL: We have a different measurement though, 
about ... 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: Excuse me. They're responsible for 
setting the standard, not you. I mean, you may have a different 
measure but it doesn't count because the measure that counts is the 
measure that the FRA says is safe and unsafe. If not, why would we 
have an FRA? I'm wondering already why we have a PUC. 
MR. STARZEL: The question though is, "Of what severity 
are the defects?" I think we will find and we will be happy to 
produce people for you who will testify about that, under oath if 
you wish, and you will find that the severity of the defects are 
not there and they are not accident causal related. As a result, 
you will find that the concern that's been raised by these 
horrendous statistical numbers is actually misleading. The focus 
is not going to help us create any more safe railroad operations 
than we have now. We have a measurement which is really very 
important and that is what are the availability to us of the 
locomotives. We need to have locomotives that work and run. We 
can't have them dying out there. We can't have them become 
defective. So we have an inspection every day of our locomotives, 
and we examine our cars every thousand miles. We cannot afford to 
have them stopped. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: And all of these locomotives that failed 
were cleared by your people before they failed. All the 
locomotives in Roseville, in Tucson, in Sparks, and in Bakersfield, 
all of them that failed had already been cleared by your people. 
Yet the Federal Railway Administration said that they're not safe. 
MR. STARZEL: That's right because we don't ask our 
people to inspect with white gloves and they will be willing to 
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send out with some dirt that the FRA may not like. They're willing 
to send out with some door knob problems with ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: So in other words, you don't think the 
FRA serves a purpose. 
MR. STARZEL: I think the FRA keeps everybody on their 
toes. I think the same reasons that you need to have somebody 
watching over you are, in every area, justification for the FRA. 
But we do have serious dispute with them whether, in fact, the 
defects which they cite are of such a nature as to be a concern for 
public safety. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me ask you this question. If they 
trucking industry were to take issue with the Highway Patrol 
inspections, who do you think I should listen to, the trucking 
industry or the Highway Patrol? 
MR. STARZEL: Since the statistics say that 318 people 
died as a result of those accidents involving hazardous materials, 
I'd say you better listen to the police. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: So at what point, then, how many people 
have to die before the railroads acknowledge that the FRA has a 
role to play? 
MR. STARZEL: We had one die in industry ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: That's not what I asked you. What you're 
saying to me is that the reason the Highway Patrol should be 
trusted instead of the industry in that case is not that their 
competitors of yours but because of their accident rate. My 
questions was, "How many people should die or how many gallons of 
hazardous materials should be spilled before you'd acknowledge the 
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FRA ought to be listened to instead of the industry? What's the 
cut off?" 
MR. STARZEL: I don't think that's the dichotomy. The 
question is: Are they intelligently assessing public safety 
related issues when they cite defects? In fact, a great number of 
the defects will relate simply to things within the cab of an 
engine which may relate to the personal safety of the engineer. 
You will note that not one engineer has died in the last ten years 
in any one of the hazardous materials derailment. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Mr. Starzel, if Sea Cliff had happened in 
Northridge, how many people would have died? 
MR. STARZEL: In where? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Northridge. 
MR. STARZEL: I'm not familiar with Northridge. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Middle of San Fernando Valley. Right 
where the main line runs. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I don't know. I understand that the 
public authorities of the county handled this one so well from a 
public safety standpoint, that I would hope that given that 
circumstance in the same place, they would have kept anybody from 
dying. In fact, I hope that our Emergency Response Team 
Training--and we have in the last year trained over 10,000 firemen 
and over 3,000 policemen--will help them with that kind of problem, 
will help them, indeed, and they won't lose anybody. We don't to 
lose anybody. We desperately don't want anyone to be injured or 
killed as a result of any accident. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: I think there's sepaate points to this. 
Obviously, I think it's commendable that you've trained 10,000 
firemen or whatever it is. I'm more interested in seeing that they 
never have to do anything. It's my view, and I assume it's 
probably your view, and the trucking industry's view that emergency 
personnel hopefully will never be used. My goal is to put enough 
on the front end to make that happen. 
You, in your statement, alluded to the fact that market 
forces are much more effective at compliance, than regulators. 
That's the essence. 
MR. STARZEL: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I'm paraphrasing. Therefore, it's a 
logical conclusion that your interest is in keeping trains running 
as opposed to taken out of service. 
MR. STARZEL: Running safely and reliably, yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Has anyone from your company, to your 
knowledge, had any contact with the FRA or the PUC to encourage 
them to keep trains running as opposed to keeping them out of 
service? 
MR. STARZEL: I don't know. Of all the contacts we've 
had because of the inter-reaction, as I started out saying, the FRA 
and the PUC have to rely on the railroads to do their job. There 
is a constant flow of communication. I don't know everything 
that's been said back and forth. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: would you explain why market forces ought 
to work. I have an FRA Regional Administrator, who said in his 
comments that he'd had contact with the VP for the railroad. Also, 
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say that, for the first time in five years, he pulled off an 
inspection because he thought it was important that the railroad be 
allowed to keep running. I'm getting a real strange feeling that 
there are economic considerations that are driving safety decisions 
and that the public is not as well-protected as they ought to be 
because of it. 
MR. STARZEL: I think that's unfair. I think, in fact, 
that what happened there, he referred to a statement that he had 
heard that Vice-Chairman Holtman had made, which was that he didn't 
believe that the federal law was intended to close down railroads 
and bring them to their knees. In fact, it's intended to bring 
about compliance with safety regulations. We believe that, too. 
We want safety as well. There are not economics driving safety 
problems and creating safety problems. 
In fact, as you'll see from my statement, despite the 
fact that this railroad has produced no operating income, we are 
still investing heavily in this railroad to be sure that it is 
safe. Over the past two and a half years, we put in more than 
$700 million in capital expenditures. A great amount of what goes 
into tracks, signals, safety devices, ties, ballast, curves, all of 
the things that make this railroad operational. We are not 
stinting. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: So we ought to be content, then, with the 
sterilization of the Sacramento River, and Sea Cliff, were just 
freaks of nature, then. Accidents happen. So, hey we're doing the 
best we can, the market's doing it. We didn't kill anybody, just a 
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couple of thousand fish. We came close, but no cigar. We ought to 
be happy with that? 
MR. STARZEL: We would never say it in such a facetious 
way. We are very, very sorry that these accidents happened. 
Nobody likes this. We don't like to have Harvey Barton go in in a 
moonsuit and clean up a mess. We don't want to put anybody at 
risk. We really tried to avoid that. So, no, we're not asking you 
to accept the notion. We're trying to tell you exactly what we're 
doing that makes the operation safe. We're putting in a lot of 
money. We have training programs. we have an effort to avoid 
derailments and to get at the causes and cut them off so we don't 
have derailments. We are trying to create safety. We think you 
can rely upon that, because that is the basis for our survival. We 
must be a safe railroad if we are going to survive. That's what 
drives us. It drives us entirely. 
I think there's something backwards about the notion that 
somehow that regulators can make railroads safe. I think it's 
quite clear that railroads have to make themselves safe, and the 
regulators have to help us do that. I believe that they have 
limitations upon them, but they work do that, as well. The 
relationships, while they are adversarial, lead to more safety. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What actions have you taken at your yards 
to increase your compliance rate? We made reference earlier to a 
memo by Misters Moore and Barry, that was over a year old seeking 
to reduce by 50 percent, based not on what you think is 
appropriate, but based on the FRA Rules and Regs. And they haven't 
come close. 
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MR. STARZEL: Are you talking about the locomotive 
compliance program? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Yes. 
MR. STARZEL: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The little thing that failed up in 
Dunsmuir. Locomotives. 
MR. STARZEL: We generally follow a Parreto principle 
rule, which is we put the greatest effort into where we can get the 
greatest results. So we have training programs which are 
essential, so that people are trained and do the right thing. We 
have as part of our quality programs, which is to constantly 
improve, we are developing process engineering steps which look at 
all of the places where we could go wrong. Just as the Japanese 
have done so successfully, we try to straighten out that process, 
so we don't make those mistakes. So we don't keep doing it wrong 
over and over. As to any specifics about what we're doing at 
Roseville, Mr. Ongerth, he's not actually the person that's in 
charge there. Perhaps he has something to add. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What I'm curious about is--I'm looking at 
a memo written by a gentlemen by the name of Moore, and a gentlemen 
by the name of Barry. Moore is the VP for Operations, at least he 
was in March of 1990 .... 
MR. STARZEL: He still is 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: ... in which he says that the goals of 
this program are to promote a safe and reliable locomotive fleet. 
By January 1, 1990, reduce by 50 percent the defect ratio. By 
January 1, 1991, an additional 25 percent reduction. To avoid 
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diverting resources from preventative maintenance to handling FRA 
induced service disruptions. 
I don't think you're getting there. I'm looking at 78 
percent in Roseville in June of 1991. I'm looking at Bakersfield, 
an average of 80 percent. 
Six months after you've achieved a 50 percent reduction, 
and a 25 percent reduction on top of that. What's the problem? 
MR. STARZEL: We can't answer that here, because Mr. 
Moore who as you say, is this Vice-President of Operations. 
Mr. Barry, who is the Chief Mechanical Officer are not here. We 
did not have notice that this would be the focus of the hearing 
today. 
company? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What's your area of expertise for the 
MR. STARZEL: My particular expertise? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What are you in charge of? 
MR. STARZEL: I'm a generalist. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You just know a little bit about 
everything. 
MR. STARZEL: That's what executives are supposed to do. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: But nothing about this? 
MR. STARZEL: I'm not an expert in this area. The 
gentlemen who are here are involved in the safe operations of the 
trains, except Mr. Barton who cleans up after them, if there any 
derailments. By the way, these two derailments are the first time 
he's had to come into California. We've had a good record in 
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California. These two gentlemen are not mechanical experts. We 
will bring them before you if we have an opportunity. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What can you tell me that the company has 
done, to your knowledge, to try and reverse the trend, without 
arguing whether they're white glove inspections or not? What steps 
have you taken to do business differently? 
MR. STARZEL: With our Locomotive Maintenance Program? 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Yes. 
MR. STARZEL: I cannot personally testify to what those 
steps are. I believe we should bring to you the right person to do 
that. That would be Mr. Barry. He would be the essential witness 
on that. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I'd like to know how his programs are 
coming. He seems to be a little bit behind in it. 
MR. STARZEL: We're going to convey to him your thoughts. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I would hope that he has already figured 
it out, without my having to bring to his attention. If he is the 
VP of Operations, I would assume that he is aware that his 
locomotives are failing at an astronomical rate around the country, 
or at least in four inspections. 
MR. STARZEL: They may be failing inspections, Mr. 
Chairman, but they are not failing on the road. We have a very 
good rate of availability of our locomotives and they are 
performing well. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Except we have one in Dunsmuir. 
MR. STARZEL: We've been able to decrease the size of our 
locomotive fleet, in part, because we're raising the availability, 
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in other words, the quality of operation of locomotive. This may 
be a situation where statistics are lying to all of us. We know, 
as a fact, that the operations are improved. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: I basically, have a comment or 
two, I'm not sure you really need to respond. I've been doing this 
going on ten years now, and Richard even longer. 
Mr. Katz did you a real favor by not letting you read 
this statement. I am really offended by this statement and the 
tone of this statement. I hope that the operation of Southern 
Pacific, through all your folks and the folks that I deal with, do 
not reflect the attitude of this statement. I'm just going to read 
you one paragraph and I can find three others. I'm looking at 
Page 5. 
Our Systems Functions, It Ain't Broke and Should Not Be Fixed. 
"We in public agencies will work together to improve 
constantly, but we need no new legislation." 
You're the first folks that I've ever met that tell me 
that they're perfect. That's not the case. And you don't know 
where Northridge is? Or San Fernando Valley, where your trains go 
through? Heavily populated, densely populated area. If this train 
at Sea Cliff has spilled three miles north, not only would it have 
been in my backyard, it would have been in a community of 11,000 
people who would have no access North or South. I'm not sure that 
you understand, for six days, what it meant for the state of 
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California, having the major North-South artery closed along the 
coast during a very busy time. 
I've been saying my prayers every night since late July, 
how fortunate we are that they weren't any deaths. I don't think 
you get it, how lucky, you really, really are in this particular 
incident. Your folks haven't been working with the Office of 
Emergency Services of Santa Barbara County. Until very recently, 
your folks refused to meet. I'm not so sure when you stand here 
and talk about your 10,000 or 15,000 personnel that you've trained. 
I'm pleased you're making the effort. I'm not sure the training is 
all that great. I'm sorry that eight of your Southern Pacific 
employees that you contract had to be hospitalized because you were 
using a different level of attendance around the hot spot in the 
spill. I don't think that is sound judgment. That's not very 
smart, in my opinion. When I was there and observed, I saw all the 
public folks at Level B, in the near moonsuits, not like I saw 
Herbie on Monday. I felt sorry that he had to come here after 
working I don't know how many hours in Dunsmuir, having to jump on 
a charter jet to come down here and make these important decisions, 
at risk for him, his family, his personnel, and the folks in the 
Sea Cliff area. You are really putting folks at risk. The 
attitude that is reflective in your statement is outrageous. 
MR. STARZEL: I apologize. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I ask people in the audience not to do 
that please. 
MR. STARZEL: I apologize for the tone reads that 
way. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Well, it does. If you think that 
we simply have to sit back and allow the federal government to do 
it, we're not. We have higher standards in off-shore oil, in air 
emissions, in water emissions, in education in this state. If 
that's what it's going to take, we'll see you in court. 
MR. STARZEL: We are to a degree caught in the same web 
that you are on this. As I said earlier, we do have to perform 
according to law. That law requires us to carry these things. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: That law may need to be changed. 
There may be a lot of laws changed. I expect you folks, to step up 
to the plate, step up to the table like your advocates do in 
Sacramento. Fortunately, they're not reflective of the attitude at 
this table. Mr. Katz, did you a big favor, let me tell you, by not 
letting you read this. You should send him a thank you letter. 
MR. STARZEL: I would like to put out that we have 
spearheaded a subcommittee that we think, at a national level, can 
take the information that California wishes it to have and improve 
the system which is an inter-state, an international system. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Are you going to support those 
suggestions. Like the suggestion from Barbara Boxer's committee? 
I heard her testify. I was talking to her on Sunday here in Los 
Angeles. She claims that some of your tank cars are as about as 
thick as a dime. She is going to be looking at double hauling and 
some other alternatives. 
Statements that you make in this comment, you want to 
defer everything to the federal government. I am going to forward 
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this to Congresswoman Boxer. That's implicit that you're going to 
be supporting recommendations like that. 
MR. STARZEL: We are going to make recommendations. In 
fact, we have to the AAR through which we have to work to provide 
heavier hulled cars for this purpose. We don't own the cars that 
are used to ship chemicals. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: You're responsible for those. 
MR. STARZEL: As long as they meet the Department of 
Transportation standard, which is set, we have to accept it. In 
other word these thinner hulled llls, one was involved in Dunsmuir. 
We did not have a choice about accepting that. It has to be 
accepted the way it is. In 1990, we asked the AAR to add chemicals 
to the list that would require heavier hulled cars. We were not 
able to get that through. We can only work through the industry, 
frankly. We hope now that the focus that's been brought here will 
allow us to push for much more stringent requirements for 
additional chemicals. Again, I apologize for the tone. It was 
hastily put together, because we didn't know what the subject 
matter was going to be until late last night. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me ask you a different question 
before moving on. The drag detector and the hot box that were on 
site, those pieces of equipment are currently being tested where? 
MR· QNGERTft: They were tested on the site. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: They were tested on the site. 
MR. ONGERTH: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: By FRA? 
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MR. ONGERTH: SP Signal Maintainers and FRA Signal 
Inspectors. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: That same equipment is still on the site? 
MR. ONGERTH: Still on the site. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Has not been removed. 
MR. ONGERTH: Not been removed. It's not defective. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The other thing before we move on to the 
next set of witnesses, that you gentlemen ought to understand, 
that's implicit in Mr. O'Connell's comments is, I frankly, and I 
don't think Jack, most of our constituents, and a lot of the 
legislature care much what the feds do or don't do. 
As Jack pointed out, in hazardous materials, inhalation 
hazardous in trucking, we go beyond what the feds do. 
storage and handling, we go beyond what the feds do. 
In terms of 
We will be 
asking for a state agency--! used to think it would be the PUC, but 
I've got serious doubts about that now--that exercises the 
authority they have and shuts you down when you don't pass 
inspections. I, frankly, don't care if the feds like it or not. 
We have the authority to do it under federal law. It's right now 
vested with the Public Utilities Commission. If they can't do the 
job, we will get people who can. So deferring to Washington, and 
hoping that Washington will come up with a solution, is not going 
to make this go away. We will do what we've done in the past, 
whether it is a response similar to what Jack and others put 
together for oil spills in the ocean that is unmatched in federal 
law. Or it's the trucking laws that are unmatched in federal law. 
We will find a way for you to come into compliance. I don't care 
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about the economy of the railroad. I care about the folks that are 
living on either side of the track. That's where we're going to 
come from in trying to put that together. Thank you for being 
here. 
I would like to move on now and ask from the United 
Transportation Union, J. P. Jones, the State Legislative Director, 
who's going to raise some issues that are similar to issues raised 
also by Greenpeace, David Chatfield, and Laura Lake, representing a 
number of citizens groups. If they would come forward and grab 
some chairs. Mr. Jones, why don't we start with you, with the same 
request for summary as opposed to reading. Maybe this wasn't a 
good idea to do that today, Jack. Let's start with Mr. Jones. 
MR. J. P. JONES: Thank you, Mr. Chairmen, members. J.P. 
Jones representing the United Transportation Union. Passing out 
prepared testimony, which I have. With the indulgence of the 
Committee I will not read, simply attempt to highlight and scope to 
some issues that have been raised here, today. 
You heard a statement by the Federal Railroad 
Administration, Mr. Paton, about discretionary action that the took 
to discontinue an investigation of west Colton. We feel one of the 
items pending before the United States Congress at this present 
time will address this particular problem. It's House 
Resolution 2607, which we have outlined in our prepared testimony. 
House Resolution 2607 will limit the discretionary 
ability of the Federal Railroad Administration to take the type of 
actions that Mr. Paton did at West Colton. It will the 
agency to perform specifically what Congress as directed them to 
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do and cease that kind of conduct in the future. We think that 
this committee and the Legislature should look favorably upon some 
indication to Congress of the endorsement of contents of HR 2607, 
as it currently is written. 
We think it is outrageous that the agency can discontinue 
the authority to police the railroads which Congress has given 
them, and rely upon discretionary language within the current 
legislation that Congress has enacted. We want to tighten that up. 
We want to stop that kind of conduct in the future. We have listed 
a few other items which are contained in that particular House 
Resolution which we feel we assist in aiding the Federal Railroad 
Administration and the application of their authority. One of 
those will be that those who challenge a decision of the Federal 
Railroad Administration in relation to the adoption of a regulation 
or interpretation, will be able to go immediately to the Federal 
Court of Appeals, skipping the District Court level of appeal, and 
speed up the questioning and the authenticity, if you will, of the 
regulations which they promulgate. In other words, speed up the 
challenge process. See if the courts agree that the FRA is correct 
in what regulations they are, in fact, applying and policing in the 
rail industry. 
As indicated, there's a variety of other items in 
HR 2607 which we feel will be of assistance. We've included an 
analyses of that bill, in addition to a copy of that bill, in our 
background material. We would like to work with this committee and 
the Legislature to get legislation passed which would memorialize 
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Congress to pass this legislation and indicate the support of the 
California Legislature. 
We are disturbed by what we hear at this committee today, 
as well as other members of this committee. It is unfortunate that 
regulation has been as lax as it is. We have had a concern for a 
long time about the ability of the FRA, both in an aggressive 
manner as well as an intents matter, to regulate the railroads. 
What we have heard here this morning simply confirms that 
particular fact. We are disturbed. We share the concern that 
economic consideration in relation to safety which the FRA has 
testified here today was a factor in their consideration of 
discontinuing proceedings. It's just outrageous. 
In the interest of brevity, I will introduce John Easly, 
our International Vice-President, who has accompanied me here today 
to answer any questions the Committee may have, and having 
submitted our written presentation and touched on the one point 
which we feel the Committee developed this morning about the lack 
of regulation in an area where the Committee and the Legislature 
can go to correct that in relation to HR 2607, we will be available 
for any questions that you may have. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Do you also represent the folks who would 
be doing the work in the maintenance yards at the facilities? 
MR. JONES: No, we do not. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Who would represent that? 
MR. JONES: That would be the Maintenance (inaudible) and 
the Brotherhood of Machinists. It's a machinist union. We only 
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represent the operating personnel, Mr. Chairman, the people that 
physically hands-on operate the train. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Have you been aware in recent months or 
years of increased concern from your personnel as to the safety of 
the equipment or the status of the equipment that they've been 
operating or working on? 
MR. JONES: Yes. It's the jurisdictional responsibility 
of my office under the constitution of our organization of our 
union to handle as the primary responsibility the health and safety 
matters which are raised by our members, or which come to our 
attention. Yes. There has been, in the last two years a rather 
significant increase in concern raised by our members relative to 
the operation of locomotives on Southern Pacific. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Do you have a view of the relationship 
between the PUC and the railroads? 
MR. JONES: Between the PUC and the railroads? Let me 
say that we feel the relationship between the PUC and the railroads 
is much more oriented towards the enforcement of safety and the 
enhancement of safety for the public than is the case between the 
FRA and the railroads. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Did you run for office, lately, J. P.? 
That was well done. 
MR. JONES: As a matter of fact, in January. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: I understand what you're saying, is that 
the PUC is better than the FRA. In adding my own view, that 
shouldn't necessarily make anybody sleep any better at night. 
Those are my words, not yours. 
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MR. JONES: They spot what I've heard here today, Mr. 
Chairman. My comfort level is not raised at all. As a matter of 
fact, it has decreased quite a bit. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Is there any relationship between the UTU 
and the FRA? Is there any inter-action between the union and the 
FRA? 
MR. JONES: We handle complaints that we receive, or 
communications that we receive, about potential violations of 
federal law and federal regulation directly from my office to the 
FRA. In that regard, we do deal directly with their Washington 
office who in turn contacts the regional office, either in Laguna 
Niguel or in San Francisco, as the case may be here in California. 
Let me just indicate one thing, Mr. Chairman, in that 
area, the area of communication with the FRA. Up until 
approximately three years ago, the process of handling concerns or 
complaints which our members raised, or came to our attention, 
about federal violations, was done in such a manner that we wrote 
directly to Washington, D.C., to the Administrator of FRA, and 
supplied copies of the communication to the two regional offices 
here in California, one in Los Angels, and one in San Francisco. 
We did that at the request of the FRA in an attempt to speed up the 
investigation process, and to have their FRA investigators go out 
more quickly to the site where the alleged complaint is taking 
place. This, in spite of the fact that they actually can't do any 
work or spend any money until a control number comes back from 
Washington, D.C., at the FRA. They can't actually show anything 
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being done with their resources at the FRA. I discontinued that 
particular procedure one reason only. 
What the FRA inspectors were doing with the information 
they received from the carbon copies of the communications which I 
sent to the local offices here in California, they were running out 
to the carriers with the letter, say, "Look here, the union's 
complaining", the carrier would fix it. By the time the control 
number comes back from Washington, D.C., to the local offices here 
in California, and another inspector goes out to officially see the 
problem and corrected it. The problem doesn't exits. Based on 
that conduct of the local offices here in California of the FRA, I 
discontinued the practice of carbon copying the local offices, even 
though it takes a longer time frame for the process to get back. 
We did it because the FRA was running out to carriers saying 
"There's a problem, correct it". So that when somebody made the 
official inspection, the matter would have already been corrected. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: You get the impression that the FRA 
sometimes is in the railroad business as opposed to the regulatory 
business. 
MR. JONES: Clearly, clearly. That's the case, Mr. 
Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me turn to Mr. Chatfield, 
representing Greenpeace. Then, Ms. Lake. 
MR. DAVID CHATFIELD: Well, I've been quite amazed at 
some of the revelations, here, myself. I didn't come here to talk 
about the regulation, per se, of railroad industry. Your words at 
the very beginning, Mr. Chairman, that this is a toxic time bomb 
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waiting to happen, that's something that I should have said. It 
sounds like that really is the case. I should back up and say that 
Greenpeace is part of an alliance of organizations 
other environmental groups 1 communities, Native 
represent 
come together over an issue which is related to this tion, 
which is the establishment of a low-level radioactive waste dump 
out in Needles. The implication of that is twofold. 
the traffic of radioactive waste, whether it is by 1 or truck, 
is going to change in its pattern. It is likely, given this 
waste dump, if it is put in, will attract waste from other places. 
That's almost certain. It's likely to greatly increase amount 
of radioactive waste, low level, and possibly other moving around 
in the state of California. That's why I'm here. That's 
brought us to this issue. 
The thing that I want to say is, basically, to give a 
perspective on an approach that anyone considering legis ion on 
this issue has to look at. It's very, very tempting, 
after hearing what we've heard here today, to get into 1 
of safety and regulat , and double-hulled tankers, and 
if this is a safer means of transportation than truck transport, 
we're in real trouble. 
There are all kinds of things, some of which are outlined 
in the statement that your staff put together, the 
piece. I'm surprised there were only 254 accidents. I 
ional 
I 
must have read about every single one of them in the newspaper. 
You're asking good questions. You're going to to 
answer more questions. Do tests of these containers. We need 
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conditions. We know what happens when tomatoes fall off a truck; 
they splatter up on car. Do we really know what happens when 
something like a radioactive waste container falls off a truck? 
What if it's in fire? What if it's in a fire of highly volatile 
materials? The safety of equipment. Our staff has seen those same 
dime-thin shells for toxic waste. Do communities have access to 
response capability. Does the government have access to response 
capability? What's the problem when proprietary information or the 
overwhelming nature of information supplied by shippers, as in the 
case of sodium metam in Dunsmuir, which we didn't find out for 
weeks that affected pregant women because it was in a stack 
somewhere on a shelf and there was not enough staff to look at 
that. 
All of these issues are going to say something to me, 
which is simply reinforced by what I have heard here today. That 
is that there are going to be a number of situations with toxic 
wastes, and with radioactive waste, where it is simply not possible 
to make railroads safe to transport. We're simply not safe to have 
these kinds of materials in society, at all. I think that is 
particularly true in the case of radioactive waste. It is going to 
be true in all kinds of situations with toxics wastes. 
Our view on, let's say on let's say, 'Well, they have to 
be shipped', especially these waste products, for nuclear waste, 
for low level nuclear waste, our position is these have to be 
stored in monitorable, retrievable, above ground on-site storage 
until there is some real way to get rid of them. In the meantime, 
which I suppose is a little beyond the purview of your committee, 
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our society has to slowly phase out. We have to 
reduce and eliminate highly-hazardous substances are carried 
all over our state in trucks and 
What the gentlemen from SP "We 
shippers present to us". You know, that's true. Part of what you 
need to deal with in order to make a safe transportation system is 
to consider the fact that remedial action, clean-up prevention, 
simply isn't going to work in many cases. You simply have to stop 
the shipment of particularly hazardous chemicals and radioactive 
waste in areas by trains and trucks. 
If that is the solution, and it's self-evident on the 
face of it. If we continue to have statistics like the one that 
actually links your debate about statistics--at the beginning of 
your statement 65 percent increase in the volume of hazardous waste 
carried by rail is what has driven the number of accidents. That 
is simply going to increase unless the Legislature puts a to 
it. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Appreciate Miss Lake? 
PROFESSOR LAURA LAKE: Thank you very much. I'm 
Professor Laura Lake from UCLA's of Public Health. I'm here 
representing the National Council of Jewish Women Los Angeles 
and a number of other organizations. I'd like to note our 
President is here, Fran Lyons, and members of our Environment 
Committee. 
We're part of an all that Mr. Chatf to 
that is very concerned with not just the safe disposal of nuclear 
waste, but the safe transport this material. All of 
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questions so far of this committee have focused on the manifest, 
and treatment, and labeling toxic material. Imagine if these 
two accidents with radioactive material. This material 
is transported to disposal sites out of the state, presently. 
It an ongoing problem. In addition, there is the threat of the 
Ward Valley Nuclear Facility bringing it, not just from all over 
California but, but from all over the United States. 
The record of shipments is something that we need to be 
looking at. It's making more work for this committee, but it's an 
important expansion to also look at the regulatory controls for the 
management of nuclear accidents. There have been some. I'm going 
to give you some clippings that we have of statistics of some of 
these accidents. There hasn't been a lot of research done on it. 
I also want to call to your attention the washout road 
conditions around Needles where the railroad would have to also 
being going through. The proposal is to use railroads and trucks 
disposal. This is a very dangerous proposition for a state to 
be engaged in. 
Specifically, our group has several questions that we'd 
like to ask you to pursue. One of them is the safety and insurance 
record of the firms engaged in hauling radioactive waste. Another 
is the labeling requirements for this cargo. The status of rail 
and road systems leading to the dump at Needles. The liability for 
California and non-California radioactive waste transported to the 
site. The preparedness of first-responders including the Highway 
Patrol, and volunteer fire fighters to respond to radioactive 
spills. Finally, the liability for cleanup of contaminated sites. 
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In other words, the insurance has to be a spec 
called Environmental Impairment Liability. It's 
such policies now, and with a track 1 
intended), it's real bad. 
insurance 
hard to get 
(pun 
I think that it's important for the Committee to be 
asking, not just about property damage, but remediation costs, and 
what kind of safeguard can California require? What kind of 
insurance can we impose be carried to protect the public. Our 
concern is for the transportation riding through every community 
where these loads are going. This was never addressed in the 
Environmental Impact Report process for the Ward Valley Site. It 
was looking at the site, and not at every community at the tracks 
run through. We believe it is very important to look at the 
communities and the whole system. 
In addition, we can give you an example of first response 
experience in other parts of the country for nuclear accidents. 
It's not been a pretty story. In Wichita, Kansas, a truck spilled 
in 1978 with 54 drums of rich uranium yellow cake. The motorists 
there tried to help out to roll them away. They were 1 walking 
through the yellow cake. The Highway Patrol responded immediately. 
The state trooper who was the first to respond died of lung cancer 
seven years later. People had no idea what were walking 
through. There is no reason to believe that just as they was 
confusion with the current wrecks we've , there is this 
latent response for cancer caused by radioactive exposure These 
people who are first on the site deserve to know what they're 
facing, deserve special treatment. We real need to address this, 
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because primarily it's going to be volunteer fire fighters who are 
going to be getting there and the Highway Patrol. That's our first 
response. They're not trained, not seasoned, and just out of their 
depth to have face that kind of nuclear spill. 
The idea of remediation is a very dicey proposition. We 
would urge this committee to instruct the Department of Health 
Services to have a moratorium on the licensing for the Ward Valley 
Site until these issues are addressed. They are a very important 
public safety issue, as an important as the site is the transport 
element. We would urge you to take that action to get the answers 
on the transportation risks associated with nuclear shipments in 
our state. 
We appreciate your holding this hearing. This is the 
right thing to do. In coming here for our coalition, which 
includes Women for Hollywood's Women Political Committee, the SHOW 
Coalition, Greenpeace, the Chimawa Indian Support, the Mojave 
Tribe, we're a very diverse coalition. I'm even more pleased that 
we're here to be able to know how bad the situation is and how 
right we were to be concerned. We do hope that you pursue these 
questions. I would welcome any questions you have. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Your background? 
PROFESSOR LAKE: I'm on the faculty at UCLA in 
Environmental Science and Engineering. I'm a political scientist 
and I've worked on environmental policy implementation for 20 
years. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Thank you. Thanks for being 
here. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: Thank you very much. I'd like to ask the 
last panel to come up. While we're specifically focusing on what 
happened in Ventura, they may also have some insight in handling of 
how a nuclear problem would be handled in that area, a radioactive 
waste problem might be handled. I'd like to ask Assistant Chief 
Ken Rude from the Highway Patrol, the Ventura County Fire 
Department Assistant Chief Jim Smith who is the Fire Marshal, and 
the Santa Barbara County Office of Emergency Management, Mary 
Barron to please come forward. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Good morning, Chief, long time no 
see, as they say. Who would like to start? Mr. Katz will be back 
momentarily. Chief Rude, do you want to start? You got up early 
this morning from Arroyo Grande. 
ASSISTANT CHIEF KEN RUDE: Yes, I did. Thank you for the 
privilege of being able to attend and participate in this most 
worthwhile hearing. In terms of commenting on the roles of the 
California Highway Patrol relative to this incident, I would like 
to point out that clearly this incident was, in terms of definition 
and legal responsibility, outside of the purview of the California 
Highway Patrol relative to specific scene management 
responsibility. However, under the current incident command 
system, a joint command venture was initiated which involved 
agencies that are represented here at the table at this time. The 
role of the California Highway Patrol is immediately to determine, 
assess the impact on the local area, and proceed with securing the 
scene to protect the public. That was done immediately through 
closure of Highway 101 and surrounding roadways coming into the Sea 
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Cliff area. After accomplishing that scene securement, we then 
began to attempt to determine what we had through a command center 
which had been immediately set up at the fire station. It was 
apparent very early that because of the nature of the load that we 
would be faced with some sort of long-term closure. At that point 
we began a diversion plan which was intended to route traffic 
around the scene of the spill which included the use of State 
Route 33 to State Route 150 and back into 101 both north and south 
bound and clearly that was accomplished. We had limited 
alternatives available to us. It wasn't much of a decision to be 
made. We had clearly one route to use and that was the decision 
that drove our use of that roadway. 
When we determined that this was going to be of a 
long-term nature, we also immediately implemented the use of 
changeable message signs in conjunction with California Department 
of Transportation to notify the users of the transportation system 
as early as possible that there was a problem and recommending a 
mitigation major--use of alternate roadways. In addition, we began 
to look more broadly at what transportation systems, what highways 
were available to us. We saw that at the north end of San Luis 
Obispo County, we had State Route 46 which provided the direct 
access across to Highway Interstate 5 where we could route traffic 
that was destined for the Los Angeles area. We also looked at 
State Route 166 for the same reason. What we actually instituted 
was at Highway 101 and 46 we placed changeable message signs 
unattended to advise the motorists what they would be faced with if 
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In terms of other support that was provided at the scene 
at the time we began, at the time removal efforts began and they 
started off-floating containers onto flat bed rail cars, we 
conducted critical item inspections of all of the commercial trucks 
that were used to make that transportation prior to their actual 
departure. We also assisted with the inspection and final approval 
of the movement of the container of naptholene which was one of the 
final hazardous materials containers that we were able to remove 
from the area. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Chief, we appreciate your help and 
everyone else's help when Jack and I were on site and trying to 
understand what was going on. What would be really helpful to us 
from your perspective as a professional--you're the folks who get 
to clean up the mess that somebody else made or stabilize, you're 
the line between the public and somebody else's accident--if you 
could tell us, based on what you learned out there that day from 
the standpoint of having (inaudible). In the staff report there is 
a copy of what I would refer to as a manifest but on trains it 
would be called something different, a consignment I guess. I'm 
looking at this consignment sheet and I mean I hope somebody can 
read it because it would be a long time before this thing meant 
anything to me. It looks like a computer printout where the 
computer just went nuts. It looks like one of those hazmat signs. 
Who knows how to read all that stuff but assuming you're not the 
first one on site and you get handed this thing, I mean what do 
you ... 
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ASSISTANT CHIEF JIM SMITH: 
Mr. Katz. I'm Assistant f 
Department. I was the first 
chief to take command of the 
f on 
ident. 
I'm willing to address that, 
, Ventura County Fire 
scene as county duty 
Before I could take command 
of the incident, I had to determine what we had. Our initial 
attack incident commander was on the north side of the incident and 
could not get, because of the accident, to where we had initially 
set up the command post. He was operating in his fire engine 
outside the door of his fire station because the accident happened, 
or the derailment happened that close to one of our fire stations. 
Within 19 minutes--now the information that's provided by the train 
I've always been told will be given to us by the conductor or the 
engineer of the train--which is not unreasonable because of the 
distance the engine stopped from the derailment was about a mile to 
a mile and a half, the conductor had come down from the engine and 
handed our first-on-scene f captain the conts list, or the 
contents list or whatever you want to call it--the manifest. As a 
first responder, when I arrived and was flown over to that side of 
the incident, I met with the conductor and our captain on the 
scene. The conductor was very able to describe to me the contents 
of the cars that were involved and he was fairly accurate. He 
missed it by two cars on telling us how many cars were in the 
derailment. He said there were two more than there actual were, 
which was fine. He identified four cars that were carrying 
hazardous materials in the mess and he identified the one name that 
I quickly recognized as hazardous, as hydrazine. So, I knew at 
that point we had a major hazardous material incident on our hands. 
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Already evacuations had been ordered of the Sea Cliff colony. The 
CHP had been asked to shut down 101 because the vapor cloud was 
impacting that roadway above the spill. We set our initial 
evacuation because of the name hydrazine at a larger limit than 
what we finally did. I then took this list and flew back to the 
command post side of the incident and handed it to our hazardous 
material response team members who were at that time on the scene. 
They then had to use this list to determine what was actually 
involved and what other consequences we could have besides 
hydrazine. We then allowed the experts to tell us what we had to 
do. we had accomplished and the railroad had accomplished what 
they always said they would do and that is give us enough 
information as first responders to provide a level of safety for 
the public and for the emergency service workers that are 
responding. At that point, then, we were able to accomplish that 
and turn the mitigation effort and the determination and the 
reconnoitering of what else is involved and what other things may 
be happened. We turned it over to the hazardous material team. 
Captain Dysart from our hazardous material response team can talked 
to the other information that may have been beneficial. 
MR. DEAN DYSART: First of all, I would like to thank you 
for allowing a responder to come and speak to you. I feel that 
there is a lot of information that you need to know that we the 
responders have whether it be information that is valuable to us or 
information that is lacking and I'm here today to address the 
documentation that is valuable and the documentation that is 
missing and maybe give you some insight into legislation. 
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When I arrived, I was handed a conductor's work report. 
That is the formal name of the document. It is not a conts list, 
it is not a manifest, it is a conductor's work report. It's four 
phases. The first phase is the line up of the train from the 
engine to the rear end device. The second phase gives you more 
information about the train which is only important to the train 
people. The third phase goes into those hazardous materials that 
are carried on the individual cars within the train. And the 
fourth phase of the document says first responder safety 
information to deal with those hazardous materials. I'm not going 
to go through my dramatics of showing you this engineer's work 
report, but it is a computer printout of approximately 28 pages. 
An on-scene commander, a fire engine, is supposed to decipher that 
information quickly and make some immediate decisions. 
Within this conductor's work report, we identified 
Car 23 which was a flat car carrying containers. The one container 
was hydrazine in 55-gallon drums. The second container was a 
single intermodal container carrying, at that time we had the 
information, combustible liquid NOS. NOS indicates 'not otherwise 
specified'. It carries a UM number of 1993. I have identified 67 
different products that carry UM-1993. It is a catch-all. We can 
include perfume. We can include certain combustible liquids that 
carry pesticides to the plant. It's a wide spectrum of 
UM-1993. 
Also, missing on the work report is the size of the 
container. What we have ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: The quantity of what you're dealing with. 
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MR. DYSART: the quantity. The original first officer on 
site from the railroad--hazmat officer--indicated we should 
not be too concerned about the combustible liquid in NOS because it 
was a single drum. As it turns out after much more research, we 
determined that it was a single drum of between 52,000 and 60,000 
gallons. This information is missing on the work report. I defy 
someone from the railroad to show me, quickly, how I can that 
container size off this work report and make a determination how 
broad the incident is. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Is it supposed to be on the work report? 
MR. DYSART: To my knowledge the work report meets all 
the requirements of federal law. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. 
MR. DYSART: It doesn't meet the requirements of first 
response. There's two things we have to deal with as first 
responsders. Number one is the product. Number two is the volume. 
A small container of a pesticide is much less hazardous to us than 
a 50 to 100 gallon (inaudible). So that was missing. Also missing 
was what the NOS--actually what that product was. Very late in the 
incident before we received that information. Contained within the 
work report are codes; it's codified. A railroad officer, through 
a knowledge of those codes, would be able to tell us what that 
product was, but we do not have privy to that code on a day-to-day 
operation. We're missing, basically, clear text. We would like to 
see clear text information relative to the product, relative to the 
container, size, and the makeup of the container. 
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Had it been an aluminum container, we would have handled 
that differently than if it had been stainless steel, which in fact 
it was stainless steel. We're missing some clear text information 
for the first responders and have these materials response people 
be able to deal with that incident in a timely manner. 
Another piece of information that was missing was the 
shipper. We do have a shipper, and it was shipped from a codified 
shipper to the same codified shipper. The manufacturer of the 
product was not identified on the work report. Therefore, we had 
to go with the process of dialing up KimTrek to make contact with 
the shipper. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Was there a problem during the cleanup of 
the -- were you able or were the railroad personnel able to get 
their hands on enough of what they needed to neutralize or 
stabilize what was there or was availability of those products a 
problem in this? 
MR. DYSART: I was not made aware of any problem with 
availability of the neutralizing products. In a timely manner, 
there was a lot of processes that had to happen before the 
neturalizing took place. Another item that was missing, until 
approximately 2 o'clock in the morning, was the Material Data 
Safety Sheet from the manufacturer of the hydrazine. We had to 
operate on the premise that we were dealing with hydrazine in an 
acreus solution more than 64 percent which is the worst factor of 
the two, until approximately 2 o'clock in the morning determined 
that it was hydrazine 51.2 percent, which is a lesser of our 
concern. 
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Another problem that we have to deal with is 
containerized freight. Within our work report, we have the flat 
car number. On that flat car we have containers. To us, the 
containers were not identified. Whenever the container in the flat 
car upset, we actually had the result of the flat car on one side 
and a pile of containers on the other side, not even closely 
related to the flat car that they were tied to. We feel there is a 
need for at least separate lists. Redundancies on flat cars, 
numbers, and container numbers so that we can track the car once it 
leaves the flat car. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Do you have a sense in terms of equipment 
and personnel available and the ability to respond that we need to 
put something in place, similar to what Jack did and I'm sure some 
of you in terms of ocean disasters, that we ought to replicate 
that? What's that, Jack? 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Clean Seas. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: That we ought to do something for land 
based incidents, that we need some kind of a ... or do we have 
everything? I don't need to work create another layer or another 
agency, if it's all there. I'm curious because we heard from some 
of the people in Dunsmuir. Obviously, the Dunsmuir incident 
provided much greater problems in terms of being able to respond 
for first people on the scene, because of major holes in federal 
law that allowed chemicals to go not properly identified and caused 
problems for on-site personnel. Do we need something more 
comprehensive, like Clean Seas? 
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MR. SMITH: Mr. Katz, I believe that due to the 
proximity of this incident, of the Sea Cliff incident being in the 
urbanized Southern California area, we had more than enough or we 
had adequate mitigation teams in and around the vicinity. We had 
Santa Barbara County north of us. We had two teams along with ours 
for a total of three in Ventura County. We had all of the 
resources in the LA Basin. 
Such as you reported on Dunsmuir, this same incident, say 
in the northern part of the state, you (inaudible) the highways and 
the ocean in the same way this one did, would not have the 
availability of resources as we did. We had approximately 60 
trained fire department personnel on the scene at various times 
throughout that incident. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: To some extent we benefited from the fact 
that the oil industry is so much in evidence in the counties, and 
you've been prepared to work with those kinds of situations in 
advance of this. In that case, I would assume that you drill more 
than a lot of areas do and you work more closely together because 
of what you had in the Ventura-Santa Barbara areas having to do 
with petro-chemical industry and the potential for problems there. 
Something that, obviously, you wouldn't find in Dunsmuir kor 
Alturas. I'm not even sure if you find it in Fontana, for that 
matter. 
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH: That's exactly correct. The 
urbanized areas have higher-level, on-duty mitigating teams. I 
believe, Ventura County daily staffs approximately, along with our 
cities, 15 on-duty Hazardous Material Mitigation personnel. 
- 102 -
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Not many volunteer fire departments, is 
what you're saying, in the urbanized areas. 
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH: That's correct. In Ventura 
County there's only two. Santa Paula and Filmore City, neither one 
of which participant in a Hazardous Material Mitigation team. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Up the coast go up Highway 5, north of 
Redding, I'm not sure where tracks are in that area. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Do they contract with hazardous 
materials or are they totally dependent upon, like on Herbie's 
operation, when they get there? 
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH: I can't speak to that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: Mutual aid? 
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH: It could be that they provide 
strictly on mutual aid. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: When Jack and I were there, we both 
commented from a layman looking in, there seemed to be a lot of 
cooperation:it seemed to be running very smoothly. Still from an 
information standpoint, you had a lot, but not everything you 
needed. There were still holes there. Ms. Barron, do you want to 
add; we'll get you into this discussion here. 
MS. MARY BARRON: My name is Mary Barron. I'm with the 
Santa Barbara County Office of Emergency Services. 
I think my comments will echo what Mr. O'Connell was 
saying earlier this morning. The main point that I wish to make 
is that from a local agency's standpoint, we need to formalize the 
Emergency Response Planning and Coordination Process between local 
agencies and the railroads. I speak from two past experiences that 
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occurred in Santa Barbara County. One, obviously, was the Sea 
Cliff incident, which was just a few miles from our border. The 
other was another incident which occurred on Vanderberg Air Force 
Base in just March of this year. That was a derailment with 
Southern Pacific that involved 20-foot cars and a number of 
hazardous materials. Fortunately, it was in a very remote area of 
our county on the Air Force Base, so it didn't receive the 
notoriety the last two incidents did. It did involve two derailed 
cars each containing 30,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia, which can 
pose a significant hazard to the public. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: If I remember right, anhydrous ammonia is 
classified as an inhalation hazard and covered by our AB 2705 of a 
couple of years ago. 
MS. BARRON: I believe so. I don't know it if it's 
classified under DOT in the strict sense ... 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: It is under California. We use the 
federal lists under my legislation, and was interested in the 
comments going back to the railroad. There is an example where 
shipping something by truck is actually under a stricter 
requirement. To ship that by truck under California law, you need 
escort vehicles; you need a breathing apparatus, emergency 
response, and notification of local emergency response personnel. 
MS. BARRON: The main points that were evident during 
that incident was that the local agencies were not even notified 
by the railroad that there had by an incident. We heard about it 
on local radio, and needed to follow up from our end with both the 





corporate headquarters Monterey Park. The response from the 
local agency's standpoint, while wasn't directly in a county 
jurisdiction--it was on federal property on the Air Force Base--we 
needed to initiate the process. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What was the cause of the derailment? 
Was that ever determined? 
MS. BARRON: I believe a culvert washed out during the 
March rains on Vanderberg Air Force Base. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: This took place, when? 
MS. BARRON: March 19, 1991. While it didn't have the 
off-site impacts that the last two incidents presented, it did 
present significant planning concerns from our standpoint. The 
main issue that we have as a local agency is that we need some kind 
of formal coordination process with the railroads. It's ironic 
that we have very high standards for fixed facilities in this 
state, but that the railroads pass through our backyards posing the 
same risks and don't have those same standards that they have to 
comply with. That's our main concern from a planning standpoint. 
That we need this process formalized. In an earlier meeting this 
week that Assemblyman O'Connell pulled together, Southern Pacific 
indicated that they voluntarily coordinate with local agencies 
through a program called CARE. This is a voluntary effort. While 
I wholeheartedly support CARE, which stands for Community Awareness 
and Emergency Response, it's borne out of the chemical 
manufacturers industry. 
I think that the incidents in the last six months have 
pointed that we more than a voluntary effort on the railroad's part 
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to coordinate with the agencies who are going to be the ones who 
respond to the incidents. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Anything else we ought to know from the 
responders standpoint as we try to put this together? 
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH: Yes. One other thing that I 
would like to say, Mr. Katz, on Page 7 of your staff report, I'd 
like to correct the unified command components that were initially 
put into place. It was the CHP, Ventura County Sheriff's 
Department, and Ventura County Fire Protection district personnel 
that made up the initial unified command that was in charge of the 
Sea Cliff incident. 
Unified Command is the state, I guess I could call it the 
state-mandated system for handling multi-jurisdictional incidents 
where the CHP is involved. Ventura County has used the incident 
command system and unified command for many years. We were happy 
to put it into effect on this incident. We were also very pleased 
with the effect that it had on the eventual outcome of the incident 
in bringing it to I believe, as swift a conclusion as could have 
occurred in any respect. Also, I would like to have Lt. Wells from 
Ventura County Sheriff's Office --he was one of the unified 
commanders on the scene--ask him if he has anything else to say. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Let me ask before Lt. Wells makes his 
comment. Because the spill was still contained on SP right-of-
way, does that mean a different response or a different ... To what 
extent does the company involved have control or input, if any, 
into what procedures are undertaken, when you decide to move, not 
move, and how you decide to treat and not to treat? 
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MR. SMITH: The responsible party, which would be SP, has 
every right to come in and affect the cleanup. We want them to do 
that, as we would with any business that has a spill. We want them 
to take the responsibility for the cleanup, as SP has done in this 
case. But they have to coordinate their efforts for cleanup along 
with litigation and the public safety efforts that the public 
agencies have. So, that means there must be a coordinated effort 
in that cleanup so that mitigation and the cleanup effort are not 
in 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: What I want to understand is whether or 
not it's on their right of way. If they say left and you say 
right, it goes right? 
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH: It goes right. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: ... So, what operations I saw SP involved 
in was with your unified commands, knowledge, involvement and 
agreement that SP would pursue course A, B and c. I mean they 
couldn't come in and say, we've got this great solution. We are 
just going to go and do it. We've got your guys all feeling 
comfortable that this was the proper way to respond. That it was 
up to your agencies to make that unified command decision that then 
allowed SP to go do whatever they were doing. 
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH: That is exactly correct. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. Lieutenant, do you want to give us 
some more? 
LIEUTENANT WELLS: Basically, just embellish on what 
other personnel have said here today. This is a system impact and 
any part of the system that's deficient is going to create a 
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sub-optimazation I terms being an 
incident over seven and working 
with the Highway 
command which is a 
was probably one of the best 
incident. 





to manage the 
place 
throughout the state because in order successful resolution 
you have to have a start on the incident 
itself. We are able to do and I commend everybody at the 
scene for working together 
had to deal with and the 
that as best we could. 
We over 26 other agencies that we 
allowed us to do 
One area that we've touched on conversation 
with Assemblyman O'Connell that I would like to see, and, I think, 
concurrence from the rest 
to have the ability and 
and be exempt from discovery 
our group 
of 
that we need to be able 
to f do that, 
reasons that we need 
that is so we can outline mistakes, be able to identify 
deficiencies, and not 1 
identification of those deficienc 
County Counsel has indicated we 
of incidences in a debriefing or a 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Because of 
LIEUTENANT WELLS: Because 
again, it is part of the system. 's an 
now Ventura County, 
not discuss these types 
1 
component of 
the system. That's all the remarks that I have. 
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CHAIRMAN KATZ: I appreciate that, Lieutenant. 
ASSISTANT CHIEF SMITH: Along with the liability lines, 
if we could identify these types of incidents the same as a medical 
emergency would be protected under the law. They are allowed to 
have a debriefing or a post-incident analysis in a medical 
emergency in the hospital. All that is confidential information, 
not allowed in discovery. If hazmat incidents have that same 
protection, we would feel a lot freer to let everybody know what 
lessons we learned. We will do it, but it is going to be under the 
table, and the people that worked with us will know the lessons 
learned, what successes we had, and what failures we felt we had. 
But, it would be a lot better for Californiaand the United States 
if these lessons learned could be publicized a little better. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Okay. The frightening part of what you 
are saying is that it almost implies that the is right 
about lawyers. I really hate to get to that point. It is a 
frightening concept. Of course, he is one. 
I appreciate what you have to go through because part of 
what Jack and I are looking at are looking at a couple of aspects. 
Obviously, today's hearing, more than others, focused on 
maintenance and some regulatory agencies that seem to get the roles 
confused with private sector entrepreneurial concepts, or something 
like that. 
But, we also when we address this, because we've been 
looking at the rapid deployment issue. Your comments, Chief, in 
terms of having stuff available in these kinds of areas is real 
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important because that will impact on how we're trying to put this 
kind of thing together and may cause us to re-think some of that. 
Obviously there are areas where we do need it and areas 
where you don't. You may need a response team in Southern 
California, but you may not need it at the LA-Ventura-Santa Barbara 
area. You may need it in the San Bernardino high desert area, or 
somewhere like that. So, I appreciate that, and your view in terms 
of what is available and what's readable on those things--on the 
conscripts. That's very helpful to us. 
If you have more thoughts as you chat, but don't debrief, 
and review in your own minds what took place--! know Jack had a 
much longer meeting with you earlier in the week--we would be real 
interested because we need to approach this from two sides. One is 
obviously what do you do after an incident occurs and how do you 
respond and minimize the potential danger and the potential 
exposure both to your personnel as well as the public at large. 
One of the scariest hearings that I have ever sat through on the 
Toxics Committee was listening to somebody in the Orange County 
area a couple of years ago, a Fire Chief who told me that this was 
two weeks after an explosion of 55-gallon drums. He still didn't 
know what he had sent his men into two weeks later, and he was 
scared to death for his men. It is horrifying to sit and listen to 
that kind of testimony, let alone having actually to go through it. 
On the other hand, we also want to do whatever we can to 
make sure that we are doing enough on the front end to ensure that 
you never have to come into play and the laws and the rules are 
adequate. What I'm particularly concerned about today is learning 
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that not only are the laws inadequate in some areas which confirms 
some suspicion, but I have some real serious doubts about 
regulatory agencies--I'm not referring to your emergency response--
at the federal and the state level, whether or not they are doing 
their job, whether or not they have been subject to political 
pressure, or they are making judgments based on things 
inappropriate for safety-orientated agencies, or are not just doing 
their job at all. We will look into, as a Committee and working 
with Jack, all aspects that we discussed today. 
Also, I think that we have to look very seriously at the 
implications of some of the testimony from the safety agencies, 
whether or not laws have been broken, and whether or not undue 
pressure has been brought to bear, and look at what the appropriate 
agencies, whether it is the Attorney General, whether it is 
something like the Fair Political Practices Commission, or a Grand 
Jury, or some members of Congress ought to be investigating it. We 
have to figure out how we sort out what I heard today. That really 
frightens me. 
The comforting side is how you are able to respond to 
minimize danger. Our goal, again, is keeping you guys out of 
action, as much as possible, which I know is yours as well. I 
appreciate your being here today coming down from Ventura and San 
Barbara to help us on this. Jack, do you want to 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: I want to thank you again, Mr. 
Chairman, for putting this together on a very short notice. I know 
how busy your schedule is. Your staff has been very cooperative. 
Also, I want to thank all the witnesses. Everybody that's been 
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here has to be part of the solution to this. It is certainly not 
to be the problem. 
CHAIRMAN KATZ: Thank you. I appreciate Mr. Hope from 
Senator Hart's staff, and John Stevens from my staff, and Kate 
Riley, and others who put this together. I appreciate the 
cooperation of the witnesses. Thank you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN O'CONNELL: And the Sergeants. 
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THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL BY RAIL: 
DO WE NEED MORE PROTECTION? 
TWO DERAILMENTS IN TWO WEEKS ... ONE STERILIZED A RIVER 
THE OTHER SHUT DOWN 101 FOR A WEEK. BOTH 
ENDANGERED LIVES. THE VOLUME OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL 
SHIPPED BY RAIL IS INCREASING -- AS IS THE RISK TO 
CALIFORNIANS. 
IT'S CLEAR THAT TOXIC TIME BOMBS ARE ON THE TRAINS 
ROLLING ALONG NEXT TO OUR HOMES ... SCHOOLS AND WORK 
PLACES. 
OUR CONFIDENCE HAS BEEN SHAKEN BY THESE ACCIDENTS. 
BUT EVEN MORE DISTURBING ARE REPORTS THAT OVER 90 
PERCENT OF SOUTHERN PACIFIC'S LOCOMOTIVES FAILED SAFETY 
INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED BY TEAMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL 
INSPECTORS AT SP'S ROSEVILLE AND TUSCON MAINTENANCE 
FACILITIES EARLIER THIS YEAR. 
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IN ADDITION ... ALLEGATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE THAT IN JUNE 
... JUST WEEKS BEFORE THE DUNSMUIR AND SEACLIFF 
DERAILMENTS ... A TEAM INSPECTION OF SP'S LOCOMOTIVES IN 
THEIR TAYLOR YARD MAINTENANCE FACILITIES IN LOS ANGELES 
WAS CALLED OFF BY FRA OFFICIALS AND ANY MAJOR ASSESSMENT 
OF THE SAFETY OF SP'S TRAINS AND OPERATIONS SUSPENDED 
FOR SIX WEEKS PURPORTEDLY TO GIVE THE RAILROAD A CHANCE 
TO GET BACK ON THEIR FEET. WITHIN· THAT PERIOD ••. THE 
DUNSMUIR AND VENTURA DERAILMENTS OCCURRED. 
WAS THE EQUIPMENT INSPECTION CALLED OFF IN LOS ANGELES? 
IF SO ... WHY? ... AND WHO ORDERED IT? AND WHAT IMPACT D 
THESE ACTIONS HAVE ON THE DERAILMENTS THAT HAVE 
GENERALLY BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO EQUIPMENT FAILURES? 
IN ADDITION TO ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS, WE NEED TO 




WHAT WE WILL INVESTIGATE TODAY IS THE FOLLOWING: 
* WHAT IS THE STATE DOING NOW TO REGULATE RAIL 
TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL AND WHAT 
SHOULD WE BE DOING? 
* WHAT MUST WE DO ADDITIONALLY TO ENSURE THAT 
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES ARE NOT RELEASED INTO OUR 
AIR AND WATER? 
* WHAT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO THOSE WHO ARE FIRST 
AT THE SCENE OF A DERAILMENT? 
* WHAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NEEDS TO BE AVAILABLE 
SO THAT GOOD DECISIONS CAN BE MADE IN DEALING WITH 
HAZARDOUS SPILLS? 
IT'S MY INTENTION TO INTRODUCE A BILL NEXT WEEK THAT 
WILL ADDRESS THESE ISSUES. WE HOPE THIS HEARING WILL 
GIVE US SOME ANSWERS AND INFORMATION AS WE CRAFT 




ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE 
August 15, 1991 
Los Angeles, California 
STAFF REPORT 
THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL BY RAIL: 
DO WE NEED MORE PROTECTION? 
Introduction 
Two derailments of trains operated by the Southern Pacific 
Railroad which carried hazardous material within a two week period 
-- one causing an environmental catastrophe, one a traffic 
nightmare and both posing serious human health hazards -- have 
created concern about the safety of transporting hazardous 
material by rail. This report provides information about the 
accidents, and discusses policy issues raised by those events. 
Background: Transportation of Hazardous Material by Rail 
Between 1985 and 1989, the volume of hazardous materials 
chemicals, poisons, pesticides, and other dangerous substances --
transported by rail in the United States increased by 65% -- to 
1.52 million carloads annually. Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) statistics record 254 accidents involving the release of 
hazardous materials during that period. Research and Special 
Projects Administration (RSPA) figures show a steady increase in 
rail incidents involving hazardous materials during the same 




On Sunday, July 14, a Southern Pacific train over 6,000 feet 
long and weighing 4,295 tons derailed at the Cantara Loop, a 2.2% 
grade around a 14 degree curve, in the vicinity of eight other 
derailments between 1981 and 1989. A tank car containing metam 
sodium fell approximately 25 feet into the Sacramento River, 
releasing about 15,000 gallons of its 20,000 gallon load into the 
river. The spill resulted in the effective sterilization of 
approximately 45 miles of the river from the derailment site to 
Shasta Lake. Additionally, half a dozen people were hospitalized, 
and approximately 300 received medical treatment. Other long-term 
effects on pregnant women for exposure to metam sodium, for 
example, are not yet known. 
Two weeks later, on July 28, fourteen container cars of a 
Southern Pacific train derailed adjacent to State Route 
101 near the Santa Barbara/Ventura County line. Apparently an 
equipment failure caused an axle to snap off a car. Approximately 
16 55-gallon drums of diluted hydrazine ruptured in the accident. 
SR 101 was closed for five days as a team of experts attempted to 
neutralize and remove the toxic substance, prevent the mixing of 
other hazardous materials from the train, and evaluate possible 
damage to a freeway overpass. 
Investigation of the Derailments 
Investigations of the derailments are being conducted by the 
FRA, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), and, for the Dunsmuir 
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spill, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). It will 
be several weeks or more before these investigations are complete. 
While the results of the state and federal investigations are 
yet unknown, SP has completed a preliminary investigation of the 
Dunsmuir derailment, and concludes as of now that it was due to a 
combination of the following factors: 
1) Momentary wheel slip on one or more of the locomotives; 
2) The combination of two empty centerbeam lumber cars 
coupled to the car carrying the metam sodium caused excessive 
sideway movement at the head end of the train; 
3) Possible faulty electrical panel in the third locomotive; 
4) Curve grease distribution on the rails used along with 
sand to provide traction on tight curves; 
5) The governor unit in the second locomotive out of 
balance which could have contributed to the wheel slippage. 
What role should the state play a role in establishing 
stronger rules for local safety hazards such as the Cantara Loop? 
Should there be state oversight of changes by the carrier in 
operating rules in such situations? 
Should railroads' rules be codified by the state in order to 
ensure that they are not weakened? 
A 1976 SP derailment at the site of the Dunsmuir spill killed 
thousands of fish. Press reports indicate that SP had established 
a weight limit of 4,250 tons before requiring a helper engine in 
1976. The train that derailed last month weighed 4,295 tons --
under the current helper limit of 4,500 tons, but over the 1976 
limit of 4,250 tons. 
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Would a helper engine and/or a differently arranged train 
have prevented the Dunsmuir derailment? 
Two types of electronic track-side detection devices are in 
use: the "dragging equipment" detector and the "talking hot box" 
detector. These devices read information about a train as it 
passes, and communicate that information to the train crew. An 
unanswered question about the Seacliff derailment is whether the 
electronic hot box sensor located along the track accurately 
reported the status of the wheel assembly equipment prior to the 
derailment. 
Have electronic sensors along tracks adequately replaced tail 
end staff and equipment, as was promised by the railroads in the 
early 1980's? 
Regulation of Rail Safety -- Is It Sufficient? 
The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-458) 
provides for federal enforcement of rail safety practices. FRA's 
Region 7 includes the states of Utah, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, 
and California. Twenty-three non-managerial FRA inspectors work 
in the region. 
The federal government has generally preempted state 
authority to regulate rail safety except when there is no federal 
rule covering the subject, and when necessary to deal with an 
"essentially local safety hazard". The proposed reauthorization 
of the federal act does not tamper with the existing state 
I 
authority to regulate local safety hazards. 
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The PUC is the state agency responsible for regulating rail 
safety. There are eight federally certified PUC inspectors who 
may issue citations for the FRA: three track inspectors, two 
motive power and engine inspectors, and three operating procedure 
inspectors. 
Do state and federal authorities have sufficient staff to 
inspect and enforce rail safety for over 7,000 miles of railroad 
track and hundreds of thousands of locomotives and cars that 
operate in California? 
In 1979, the PUC proposed a package of regulations relating 
to the transportation of hazardous material by rail. Railroads 
strongly opposed the package, and the PUC spent the next twelve 
years revising the package. In part, the revised rules narrow the 
definition of hazardous material covered, remove the incorporation 
of federal rules into state rules, and otherwise limit the scope 
of the regulations. On August 7, the PUC adopted the new 
regulations. 
State Role in the Enforcement of Rail Hazardous Material 
Transportation 
The 1990 Hazardous Material Transportation Uniform Safety Act 
(P.L. 101-615) allows states to participate in enforcement of 
federal regulations on hazardous material transportation. 
Currently, certified state inspectors can enforce motive power and 
equipment, track, and other federal regulations. The state 
participation program for hazardous materials will begin this fall 
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in California. The PUC must certi staff to participate in this 
program. 
Are there ficient state f to hazardous 
material regulations? 
Information: Do we get enough on toxic shipments? 
Trains carry information regarding toxic substances on board 
in the form of a "consist" -- a listing of each car and its 
contents. The consist includes information on the weight, 
destination, and any restrictions for each car. For hazardous 
materials, as defined by the federal Department of Transportation, 
the consist is "enriched" to include placarding requirements, the 
UN number, and brief information on what to do in the case of a 
spill. The consist from the Dunsmuir train is Attachment A. 
The consist is held at the head end of the train by the 
conductor and, usually, the engineer. As the composition of a 
train changes, the consist is changed. 
When a train derails, the cons provides the first 
information for emergency responders. The responders must be able 
to decipher the consist's in order to the 
appropriate response. 
Are consists sufficiently to emergency 
responders? 
It took several hours before emergency responders Dunsmuir 
came to understand the severity of the situation. It 
• noted that metam sodium was not required to be 





, and the 
information. Only additional research produced the necessary 
information on the toxic effects of metam sodium and its 
by-product, methyl isociothionate. 
Should more information on substances which might be 
hazardous be readily available to first responders? 
Consists and other information on toxics carried by trains, 
such as material safety data sheets, tend to emphasize effects of 
exposure on persons in the occupational environment. The 
environmental effects of pesticides such as metam sodium are not 
as well known. 
Should information about the environmental effects of 
transported chemicals when they interact with water, air, or fire 
be available to first responders? 
The lead agency at the Dunsmuir spill was the Department of 
Fish and Game. Emergency response was coordinated by the state 
Office of Emergency Services. At the Seacliff spill, emergency 
responses were coordinated by a three-way group consisting of the 
California Highway Patrol, the Ventura County Office of Emergency 
Services, and the Ventura County Environmental Health Department. 
Should there be a consistent lead agency to respond to 
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TTZX 86632 HAS A 45MPH SPEED RESTRICTION - SEE TIMETABLE 
BN 625123 EFI7033 KLMBN E7 C 
BN 625123 HAS A 45MPH SPEED RESTRICTION - SEE TIMETABLE 
GATX 19764 LT5Cf27 KLMBN XWEEDKL B T 
MDW 10306 EB63031 KLMBN P7 AGENT C 
lVRC 51,2 EB23032 KLMBN P7 AGENT B 
~NA 419148 EB23032 KLMBN A7 C 
SOU 526468 EB23033 KLMBN N7 AGENT C 
SOU 550163 ED5N038 KLMBN A7 233 AGENT C 
SOU 540237 EA24034 KLMBN A7 C 
MRR 4010 E823033 KLMBN 87 AGENT C 
SOU 532119 EB23034 KLMBN B7 AGENT C 
SOU 526287 EB23033 KLMBN 87 AGENT 
CNW 716346 EB23031 KLMBN P7 AGENT 
MDW 10147 E864032 KLMBN 87 - AGENT 
· GATX 19761 LTSC126 KLMBN XWEED~L 
SOU 528837 EB23033 KLMBN 87 
MP 367759 EA6D035 KLMBN B7 
CS 616445 EFB6033 KLMBN A7 
AGENT 
AGENT 
CS 616445 HAS A 45MPH SPEED RESTRICTION -
GN 319234 EB6C037 KLMBN G7 AGENT 
2 LDS 19 MTYS , 891 TONS 1234 
SETOUT 0300•~ 
WCRC 9176 EFI7033 0t000 A7 Pi455 










FT BLK SUMMt~RY 
WCRC 9176 HAS A 45MPH SPEED RESTRICTION - SEE TIMETABLE 
SP 240575 EB64033 01325 A7 RII C 
BN 244430 EA6C032 PTLBN E7 223 C 
SP 226199 EABD036 04705 AS P0019 F 
BN 222796 EB24033 PTLBN GB AGENT C 
SSW 67759 EABD036 03220 DB P0023 G 
SP 226292 EABD036 04705 AB P0019 F 
SP 700054 EFP5033 00800 A7 PDR B 
SP 700080 EFP5034 00800 A7 PDR B 
SP 700102 EFP5033 00800 A7 PDR B 
SP 700198 EFP5033 00800 A7 PDR B 
SP· . 700103 EFP5034 00800 A 7 PDF: B 
DRGW 18096 EC21032 01500 D7 P0431 B 
GVSR 8561 EPTC039 PTLUP W8 B 
GVSR 8562 EPTC038 PTLUP W8 B 
SP 13261 EB23030 PTLBN D7 P0115 B 
BCOL 17733 EFB6029 PTLBN G7 C 
BCOL 17733 HAS A 45MPH SPEED RESTRICTION - SEE TIMETABLE 
BCOL 17068 EFB6029 PTLBN G7 C 
BCOL 17068 HAS A 45MPH SPEED R~STRICTION - SEE TIMETABLE 
BCIT818676 EFB6029 PTLBN G7 C 
BCIT818676 HAS A 45MPH SPEED RESTRICTION - SEE TIMETABLE 
TT7'\' C:•"'l }' -Jr) r-r # "'--. ,.... ".--, ~ .. •- • ...... • • ~· 
ATTACHMENT A 
JB 142030 0830 
:N F 
: N fl 
:N B 
:N B 
•NO TOPS W/B 049 
NEWPORT WA 049 
GRAFORKS BC 049 
CURLEW WA 049 





•NO TOPS W/B 049 






PASCO WA 049 
MI3593 049 
*NO TOPS W/B 049 















PORTLAND OR 01N 
PORTLAND OR 01N 
VANCOUVERBC 01K 
•NO TOPS W/B 01C 
*NO TOPS W/B 01C 
•NO TOPS W/B 01C 
JJ4 
.·, r ,..·_*'JU -4'· .. , -· , .... ~ -~ -... ""' 
SF' - :~47125 Ui6lJ033 01430 B7 NEWBEF:C c MI6547 ':-) 1 c~ 
.SF' 247990 EA6D033 ()i•i30 B7 NEWBEF:G c MI6547 010 
SF' 246321 EA6D033 011;3•:;) I·-·· ,I NEWilEF:G c MI6547 010 
SF' 246914 EA6D034 01615 [-17 OF:ECITY c MI6551 1() 
SF' 246989 EA6D033 01615 p-; ., OF:ECITY c MJC,:~s ~ () 1 () 
SF· 8613 EA6D033 0~430 B7 NEW c Mf9280 l () 
CLC 1 EFB7042 c; COLJUNCT 1 w,~, 0i:E: 
CLC r1PH TF:ICTI E TIMETABLE 
c TIW?, 01 E: 
t:Lt: 1108 HAS A TIU SEE TIMETABLE 
GVSF:76 7062 EB63034 c MI 021 
SF' 840 D033 c MI9280 010 
SF' 247023 Ef-16D033 NEWBERG c l"il6541' 010 
SF' 246760 B7 NEWBERG c t11654 7 OiO ~ 
SF' 247391 EA6D032 F'9906 c 0,0 
SF' 246288 EA6D033 c i'1I65LI,7 010 
SF~ 228535 EABD03~5 04705 A7 F'00i9 F 030 
BN 410458 EC4A(:)35 F'TLBN B SE?,TTLE W~i (d K 
HOKX132056 ET4204.3 EF'TUF' W7 B T(1Cot1A WA OiF' 
SF' 247711 EA6D032 01430 2:~3 NEWBEF: c 010 
SF' 245966 EA64()36 04000 A7 233 F'0102 c Ot\0 
Gr-.n: 1 LT5D131 04 7'?.J0 HF'HENOL F'B B BOF\DEi'KHEh I C 030 
4 7E> S· SECOND STF:EET 
SF' 70~)0'?~) EFF'5033 00800 A7 PDF: \1 /\ 010 
rw 9<7' i F'TL.UF' (.'17 F'1477 B 02D 
SF' 22i3744 EAf:D036 04 A7 233 XXX F 030 
ssw 7~)451 F'TL.BN D7 P34t; 7 c V i-tN C 0 U '~Ef(~J (-·, OH: 
G'V ~;r::7 t; 7070 EB63034 02100 B7 AGENT c r1 r o2~>o {., ') . v ·- i 
SF! 2469B7 EA6D.Z•33 01615 :t:7 cmEC:ITY c ri I t/551 OiO 
SF' 247701 EA6D032 Oiii~S B7 OF:ECITY c till; Oi0 
CBF:Y 502i LG5C126 EF'TUF' XISCF:i~1F' 1: F'OF:TL(.1ND OF: 02A 
HOI< X 7832 ET42044 PTLBN E7 Df'1N .... COL.JUNCTIWA 01B r;. 
HOI< X 772~) Dt~N r: Tt".:tCOI .. i{-1 Wt:::l ()iF' 
SF' 3380~}6 LGF' 11 9 01500 ;<BILLET B CM:CADSTEF:OL {·) 1 5 
SF' H.! 49()1 
DF:GW 148 B t:-)15 
3200 N 
SPIN .... .0,90 1 ... 
ssw 70152 ECJC033 c v~~·~NCOUVEF:W?l 0H: 
SSW 70365 D7 c 01F.: 
ssw 7464B c 01B 
BCOL866599 EFI7037 F' c OiC 
BCOL866599 HAS ?i 45MF'H I - SEE TIMET (-·,f:LE 
BCIT87 1 EFI F'TLBN c * T W/B 01C BCIT873951 HAS A 45MF'H - SEE TIMET~1BLE 
BCOL873419 EFI 7(132 F'TLBN c TOF'S W/B 01C 
BCOL873419 HAS A TIMETABLE 
SF' 245870 EB64034 c MI0910 0H) 
SF' 226304 EA F IOR 033 
GATX 1 ET5D038 B ATC?·I:t: fl1 K 
SF' 24 EB6 IVER c MI0910 010 
G VSf:7 6 7056 10(:) B8 AGENT rn 1 
SF' 247100 EA6D(-)33 01430 B8 NEWBERG c MI6547 010 
CF' 208579 Ef:i23031 PTLBN Gf.l f: TOPS W/B •:;)1 c 
CLC 3352 EB6D033 PTLUF' F'8 P1•1~J5 c t1Ii015 02D 
SL.C 1013 EA63032 100 t-17 c 021 
('I'"'• 508090 EFB5031 EF'TUF' D7 F'06'0 B POf:::TLAND (1t::• 02A wr '" 
SF' 5~~8C·7~5 EFB503i D7 P0610 f: F' 0 1~: l L (;·,I·J D em 0 :~~ ~~·: 
C''"' r. 577312 X ISCF:r1P B F'CIF:TLAND OF: 02~"1 
s~· 8()0077 123 J: SCF:t-·tP r: F'Ot~:TLr-·,ND OF: 02;~·, 
!];.; 582191 131 XI ~~AP B PllfnLAND OR (:)2~~ 
CR 58221 ~) 1 XISCF:r-1F' B l.:l POF:TL(.li''D 
OR 
r rf: ') •l "\::!P. I 1: .,,~ '! 'YQ \f T 1.7f'"h'~l:' r.; PmHI .::HJTi nP t"':i ~) ...:":, 
SPEP ~127~ ~Lit 0~0u0 At ~~~J0 A 
0 LDS 0 MTYS 0 TONS 
11 LDS 86 MTYS 4294 TONS 
'· UNITS 14000 OK HORSEPOWER 
6069 FT-TOTAL TRAIN LENGTH 
0 FT BLK SUMMARY 
5802 FT TRAIN TOTAL 
HPT 3.26 00267 FT 

COMMENTS BY ROBERT STARZEl, VICE CHAIRMAN, 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION CO. FOR HEARING 
HElD BY ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD KATZ, lOS ANGELES, 
AUG. 15, 1991 
To achieve legislation which effectively improves safe handling of 
hazardous chemicals first requires an understanding of the interrelated events 
which collectively produce transportation. The safety of the system as a 
whole cannot be measured by single events, no matter how tragic they may be. 
The second fundamental point to consider is that the railroads are a 
national system. At this moment we are moving cars from more than 100 
different railroads and car owners, which have been maintained, inspected, and 
repaired on more than 50 different railroads around the country. Locomotives 
from a dozen railroads may any time be operating on Southern Pacific, 
powering run-through trains~ or working off mileage credits earned by our 
locomotives working on their lines. The safety of operations on Southern 
Pacific is dependent, not just on employees of Southern Pacific alone, but 
on uniform practices and procedures followed by inspectors and repairmen on 
other railroads, in other states, which feed us traffic as part of the 
national system. 
The basic components of the transportation system are locomotives, cars, 
track, signals, communication and information systems, and people. Management 
controls seek to bring these components together to work smoothly to produce 
an efficient, safe, reliable, consistent, transportation product. 
Railroads require heavy capital investment, but they simultaneously 
remain labor intensive. Of our total of around 23,000 rail employees, the 
major ty have first-line positions which significantly affect rail operations. 
Our systems of control must be well thought out in advance and they are. 
Railroads operate three to four times more safely than trucks because 
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le traffic 
constantly seek to improve the railroad operations to offer 
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failure here is too high us to otherwise than that. 
Will regulation help? 
costs, its purpose, and its probable di 
reports, and creates a corps of kibi 
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it ires, 
result. If i s 
it 
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However, if they improve i 
some confusion at a derailment. 
ion avail le, it may lp to avoid 
to ion ava i1 le. 
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Dunsmuir we knew nothing of metam sodium, how it separated into two compounds, 
how one could kill fish and other life in the water and how the other was 
irritating but not deadly. The information process is subject to federal 
regulation and demands upon the Department of Transportation. Railroads are 
without power to set requirements for information or to police it. We cannot 
be experts in the characteristics of the myriad commodities that modern 
industry produces. 
Computer printouts carried by train crews do provide information needed 
to respond where hazardous materials, designated as such, are involved in an 
accident. That was the case at Seacliff, where our engineer could walk a 
short distance to a fire station with up-to-date and useful data on hydrazine, 
a very difficult chemical to handle. 
The difference between those spills is relevant to you. Information 
provided in advance means no one died, no one was injured, even though the 
cleanup at Seacliff meant handling a deadly substance. Lack of information at 
Dunsmuir meant a l of flailing around before correct action could be taken. 
It might have made no difference as to the effect on the people, but advance 
information might have meant the compounds could have been broken down and 
dispersed close to the spill. 
Congress has designated the Department of Transportation as the lead 
agency to analyze accident statistics, to review rail safety procedures, and 
to institute rulemaking to be followed nationally. This obviously makes 
sense, because cost-effective measures which should be instituted to improve 
safety ought to be installed nation-wide, not on some patchwork pattern which 
differs from state to state. Recognizing that opinions may differ as to the 
order of priorities to be followed, and that the railroad industry is 
3 
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essentially national in character, Congress has designated one 
the agency which is to receive data the rail , consi 
the states for new or revised regul ions, 






must be consistent with the federal statutory regul scheme. risk 
of enacting legislation in California which is inconsistent wi federal laws 
and regulations is not simply that they will be nullifi by the pre-
exemption doctrine, but if they become too burdensome the traffic will have to 
be priced at such a tariff level that the dangerous chemicals will be forced 
on to the highways. The safety record of rail industry is four times 
better than that of trucking. The rights-of-way are not ly fill 
with passenger vehicles and can be controlled. certainly is no question 
that rail is the preferred mode of transportation for hazardous 1 
generally. It would be ironic if through well-meaning efforts to islate 
for a safe environment you caused a worse problem. On the I-5 corridor alone, 
what is currently placarded as hazardous, if moved the 
highway, would mean an additional 27,000 trucks every year on that hi 
Add what is now classifi as non- as me tam 
s on 
ium which 
caused the Dunsmuir problem, would mean additional 
What we ought to do together is insi isl ion and 
regulations meet the needs of lifornians. ll work with you this 
end. We have already spearheaded establishment of a ttee to the 
Inter-Industry Task Force of the American iation of Rail 
include the CEO's of SP, UP and Conra l together wi 
companies. They will promptly present to the Congress and the 





presently labeled as hazardous under categories requiring the use of strong 
tank cars. We can incorporate the interests of the State of California 
that E of different or inconsistent laws introduces 
confusion and slows response. 
let's look at response. Just so there is no misunderstanding. It is 
the railroads who perform the work to respond to accidents. All railroads 
have emergency response teams. Ours is the best. They train emergency 
workers in fire stations in hundreds of towns and cities along our line, more 
than 11,000 in 1990. SP people react immediately and arrive quickly on the 
scene. They also work with long-experienced contractors whose special skills 
and experience help deal with hazardous materials remediation. 
These teams did their work well both Dunsmuir and Seacliff. Public 
authorities took charge of public safety, and communication and railroad crews 
handled most of the physical work. 
Our system functions. It ain't broke and should not be "fixed." We and 
public agencies will work together to improve constantly, but we need no new 
legislation. 
Do reporting requirements need change? Reports are useful to regulatory 
agencies only if they enhance analysis to predict and then prevent possible 
accidents. Just creating new reporting demands without a reasonable basis for 
expectation that they will lead to better operations would not be an efficient 
nor necessary change. Potentially unnecessary and burdensome requirements 
serve only to raise costs, create distractions and inefficiencies, and 
ultimately thereafter affect the jobs of our 10,000 California employees. It 
is, furthermore, the task of the federal DOT to collect and analyze statistics 
and reports, and to decide when to move forward. 
5 
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Much of the publicity and many of the statements in the aftermath of 
these accidents have created an imbalance in public perception which needs to 
be righted. Southern Pacific and its employees work and ively to 
run operations safely. Yet simple-minded critics paint SP and its people to 
be less than safe. We carry what shippers present to us. Regul ions require 
us to accept traffic even if we prefer not to take it. We make no operating 
profit to create an insurance fund which can be used to finance amelioration 
of all problems resulting from derailments. We strive to improve safety and 
cut risk, and on our mainlines, have a better record than the industry does. 
That's a reversal from the years ago when we were worse. Safety improvement 
is a testament to the efforts of our people. 
Looking forward, with all that, accidents will happen, as they do for 
all of us. When they do, we cannot be held to pay for all consequences. 
Where we could not foresee the causes of consequences, we cannot be expected 
to pay all costs arising from the accident. 
We always try to meet humanitarian needs without regard to liability. 
We will continue to do that. 
Costs cannot be passed through to shippers in all cases. Where they 
are, it means higher costs to shippers and consumers and ultimately threatens 
thousands of jobs in agriculture and manufacturing. Or it could mean that 
more shipments of hazardous materials end up on the highways. 
Our rail operations do not currently produce one dollar for capital 
expenditures. Yet in the last two and a half years we have put more than $700 
million cash into capital expenditures. That is no the performance 
who needs further regulation. 
someone 
In short, we are already more than meeting our responsibilities. It is 
6 
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doubtful that additional legislation can do better than the marketplace on 
this score. Shippers demand reliability and that means fewer derailments. 
That already motivates the railroads sufficiently. 




TESTIMONY OF THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION 
Before the 
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE 
TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS BY RAIL 
DO WE NEED MORE PROTECTION? 
Hearing Held in Los Angeles, California 
Thursday, August 15, 1991 
* * * 
Submitted 
by 
James (J.P.) Jones 
State Legislative Director 
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Good Morning Mr. Chairman and Members: 
My name is James (J.P.) Jones. am the California State 
Legislative Director for the United Transportation Union. With me 
today is Mr. John Easley, International Vice President of the United 
Transportation Union. 
The United Transportation Union represents. among others, operating 
employees on all major Class 1 railroads in California <Southern 
Pacific; Union Pacific; & Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe), as well as 
many shortline railroads within the state. Our organization 
represents the conductors, assistant conductors, brakemen. yard 
operating personnel <switchmen), firemen, and a large number of 
locomotive engineers that are the operating employees of these 
railroads. 
Our organization appreciates the 
participate in your hearing today, 
invitation to comment and 
Our organization has an ongoing 
and sincere interest in safe rail operations within the State of 
California, but especiallY those rail operations where hazardous 
mate r i a 1 s a r e be i n g hand 1 e d and t ran s p o r ted . 0 u r o r g an i z at i on i s 
convinced that the information developed at this hearing today will 




Our organization would take this opportunity to commend you 
personally, Mr. Chairman, tt1e members of tl1is committee, as well as 
your able staff, for the leadership role which has been displayed by 
the holding of this hearing today, 
11 DO we need more protections in the transportation of hazardous 
materials by Rail?" The answer to this question is a clear and 
emphatic 11;S. Some of the actions which the California Legislature 
can take to both support the needed protections, as well as to 
enhance existing protections. are as follows: 
l.) Support the enforcement and enl1ancement of General Order 
No. 16L wt1icll was recently adopted (08/07/91), by trle 
California Put)l ic Utili ties Commission (copy attactled). An 
enhancement our organization would suggest is a requirement 
for additional copies of the EMERGENCY R PONSE 
INFORMATION, already required by f ede ra l regu 1 at ions to be 
given to the train crew, for use by representatives of 
emergency response agencies at the accident/incident scene. 
Additional copies of tf1is information, kept in U1e 
possession of the train crew for the use of emergency 
response personnel, vwuld certainly reduce tt1e response 
time for corrective action to commence. 
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2.) Support House Resolution No. 2607, currently pending before 
the United S tes Cong s. This legis 1 at ion is known as 
the Rail Safety Reauthorization Act of 1991. A copy of 
H.R. 2607, as well as a section-by-section analysis of the 
proposal is attached for your information and review. 
3.) Support and encourage a requirement for addi tiona! 
safeguards and protections to be placed on all railroad 
tank cars in the existing car fleet, as well as those which 
may be bu i l t in the future, This wou 1 d inc 1 ude mandatory 
head shields, thermal protection, and shelf couplers. Head 
shields are extra thick plating on each end of the car to 
protect against punctures of the tank car from objects 
during a derailment. Thermal protection reduces the 
possibility of tank car ruptures under fiery accident 
con d i t i on s . She 1 f coup 1 e r s a r e de v i c e s w h i c h reduce t t1 e 
potential for the car couplers to punch holes in other cars 
during an accident, by keeping the cars attached <coupled) 
to each other during derailments. 
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4.) Support and endorse the full and complete implementation of 
the 1990 Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety 
Act. This federal legislation was enacted by Congress to 
attempt to achieve greater uniformitY in the regulations 
governing the transportation of Hazardous Materials. Our 
organization believes that one of the priority items that 
should be immediately implemented is to all ow for full 
state participation in the FRA's Hazardous Material 
inspection program. This w i 11 allow for the State of 
California, through the California Public Utilities 
Commission, to enforce current federal regulations dealing 
with Hazardous Materials. 
5.) Support and encourage the consolidation of the U.S. 
Department of Transportations' Hazardous Materials list 
with the Hazardous Materials list of the U.S. Coast Guard. 
This consolidation will address the question of safe rail 
transportation, near or adjacent to bodies of water, of 
commodities such as the material involved in the Dunsmuir 
disaster (metam sodium), which is classified as a Hazardous 
Material by the U.S. Coast Guard, but not by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation. 
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Your announcement letter for today's hearing indicated that the 
Commi would examine the circumstances surrounding and the issues 
raised by the two <2> recent train derailments and toxic spills near 
Dunsmuir and near Santa Barbara. Our organization strongly believes 
that both of these unfortunate and costlY derailments could have 
been avoided by implementation of ncommon sensen railroad 
operational practices. We shall comment on each of the derailments, 
pointing out some of the peculiarities in each of these incidents, 
which we feel could have avoided both of these unfortunate 
incidents. 
DUNSMUIR: This derailment could have been avoided had there been 
sufficient helper locomotives added to this train. The helper 
locomotives would have assisted in the trip up and through this 
mountainous territory. The helpers would have allowed for a 
reduction of the strain on the cars toward the front of the train, 
by the helper locomotives pushing from the rear. With the entire 
motive power of the train coming from the lead locomotives, as was 
the case in the Dunsmuir situation, the greatest strain is on the 
cars t1osest to the lead locomotives; thereby, contributing to the 
"Stringlining", which took place. 
The only other alternative to avoid the Dunsmuir derailment was to 
rearrange the loads and empties in the train to allow for more 
equalized distribution of the total weight. This would have 
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required a relocation of the loads, which were primarilY towards the 
rear of the train, to be redistributed in the middle or front end of 
the train. 
SANTA BARBARA <SEACLIFF>: This particular derailment could have 
been avoided. It could have been avoided if either: (1) heat-
sensitive detectors, located trackside, would have been placed 
closer than 35 miles away from the derailment; and/or (2) if an 
occupied caboose had been the rear car of this train. 
(1) HEAT-SENSITIVE DETECTORS <Hot-Box Detectors): Our 
organization believes that these types of wayside 
detectors, as we 11 as dragging equipment detectors, do 
serve a useful safety function in rail operations. 
However, these detectors, once installed, must be 
maintained to function properly. Our organization 
believes there is a grossly insufficient amount of these 
wayside detectors currently in place. Clearly, there is 
an insufficient number of wayside detectors for operation 
of hazardous materials commodities by RAIL, If heat-
sensitive detectors would have been installed less than 35 
miles apart in this area, this tragedy would have been 
avoided. More frequently-spaced dragging equipment 
detectors could have detected the derailed train once it 
was on the ground. 
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(2 > OCCUPIED CABOOSE: A trained ra i I road operating emp I oyee, 
occupying a caboose on the rear of the Seacliff train, 
would have also prevented this derailment. This trained 
railroad employee in the caboose would have been observing 
forward, and to the side of train, looking intentlY for 
such things as; 
<I> fires adjacent to the track right-of-way as the 
caboose passed; 
(2) to see if things such as smoke, fire, sparks, or 
dust were coming from any of the cars in the train; 
and 
(3) any marks or cuts (gouges> in the ties and ballast of 
the road bed, or in the pavement of an at-grade street 
crossing, which would indicate danger. 
Also, a trained operating railroad employee would be very attentive 
to any unusual smells they may detect, sucl1 as those associated with 
any of the circumstances listed above. 
All of the above-listed occurrences are an indication to the trained 
railroad operating employee that danger exists and corrective action 
needs to be taken. 
In the unlikely event that the presence of an occupied caboose could 
not have prevented tl1is derailment itself, clearly, tile amount of 
damage and destruction which was caused, could have been 
significantly reduced by an early detection of the warning signs and 
simPlY taking quick decisive action to stop tile train. 
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In closing, our organization would again like to restate our 
gratitude to the committee for the opportunitY to express our views 
on the general subject of HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION BY 
RAIL, as well as the specific circumstances and issues surrounding 
the derailments at Dunsmuir and Santa Barbara <Seacliff). 
This concludes the formal written presentation of our organization 
of the hearing today, and both Mr. Easley and myself are available 
for any questions you, the committee members, or your staff may 
have. 
Thank you. 
Enclosures 2 - General Order No. 161 <Adopted 8/7/91) 






Decision 91-08-019 August 7, 1991 AUG 91991, 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
Order Instituting Rulemaking on the ) 
Commission's own Motion to Adopt a ) 
General Order Prescribing Rules and ) 
Regulations for the Transportation ) 
of Hazardous Materials by Rail. ) 
0 P I N I 0 N 
Summary of Decision 
R.88-07-039 
(Filed July 22, 1988) 
Due to the increased transportation of hazardous 
materials by rail throughout the state and incidents involving 
hazardous materials which pose a threat to public safety and the 
environment, the Commission today adopts rules and regulations 
governing the transportation of hazardous materials by rail. The 
recent tragic spill of toxic liquid from a derailed tank car near 
Dunsmuir highlights the need to ensure that this state and its 
communities can rely on railroads having solid effective emergency 
preparedness plans. The rules we adopt today have been under 
development for some time. They address a number of concerns 
relating to the transportation of hazardous materials, such as 
local emergency response in the event of an incident and the 
storage of hazardous materials. We are confident that they fill a 
void in the existing state-federal regulatory scheme governing the 
regulation of hazardous materials transportation by rail. 
While we recognize that federal rules extensively 
regulate the transportation of hazardous materials, coordination 
between the state, local agencies, and the railroads, particularly 
in the area of emergency response, is necessary to enhance safety 
in the transportation of hazardous materials. These rules are 
intended to complement the federal regulatory framework by, among 
other things, encouraging communication between local emergency 





Many other states have adopted hazardous materials regulations. 
Because these rules address safety concerns not addressed by the 
federal rules, we conclude that these rules are not preempted by 
federal law. 
Background 
On July 22, 1988, the Commission issued an Order 
Instituting Rulemaking (R.) 88-07-039 to adopt a general order (GO) 
prescribing rules and regulations for the transportation of 
hazardous material by rail. 
A copy of the proposed GO was served on all railroad · 
corporations subject to the Commission's jurisdiction 
(respondents), and to all police, sheriff, and fire departments 
through whose jurisdictions common carrier rail operations occur. 
The Commission invited respondents and other parties to comment on 
the proposed GO. 
Law enforcement agencies and fire departments supported 
the GO. However, certain parties opposed the proposed GO on 
grounds that the rules were (1} preempted by federal law and 
(2) unduly burdensome. 
After reviewing the objections to the proposed GO, the 
Transportation Division of the Commission filed a motion on 
November 10, 1988 requesting suspension of the schedule for filing 
reply comments. The Transportation Division also requested 
hearings on the proposed GO to resolve factual contentions raised 
by parties. On November 16, 1988, the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) extended the deadline for filing reply comments on the 
proposed GO indefinitely. 
On February 15, 1989, the Commission created the Safety 
Division and transferred responsibility for monitoring railroad 
safety from the Transportation Division to the Railroad Safety 
Branch (Safety Branch) of the Safety Division. Safety Branch 
modified the proposed GO. The modified GO prescribed rules and 




which, to Branch, were not preempted by federal 
law and were not to 
On September 28 1989 Safety Branch filed a motion 
requesting hearings on the fied GO. Safety Branch's motion 
also requested that a prehearing be held to schedule 
hearings and exchange prepared testimony. A copy of the 
modified GO was attached to the The ALJ allowed parties 
until November 30, 1989, to comments on the modified GO as 
well as Safety Branch's request to hold hearings. (ALJ ruling 
dated October 4, 1989 ) 
Various parties certain fire and police 
departments, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company 
(Santa Fe), Southern Pacific Transportation Company (Southern 
Pacific), Union f Rai (Union Pacific), and the 
California Manufacturers Association (CMA) filed comments on Safety 
Branch's motion. The fire police departments which filed 
comments supported the modi GO. CMA and the railroad companies 
pointed out various problems ambiguities in the modified GO. 
To remove ambigu , parties provided extensive comments on the 
proposed rules requested explanations. 
As to Safety Branch's request for hearings, CMA and the 
railroads urged that the hearing be addressed only 
after Safety Branch responded to the comments regarding ambiguities 
and clarified its proposed rules. 
On February 1, 1990, Safety Branch filed a motion to hold 
a prehearing conference. Branch claimed that a prehearing 
conference would provide the best means to formulate legal and 
factual issues in the case. 
Santa Fe and Southern Pacific filed responses to Safety 
Branch's February 1, 1990 These railroads reiterated their 
claim that Safety Branch's request for a prehearing conference 
would not useful until questions raised in respondents' 




The ALJ denied Safety Branch's request for a prehearing 
conference and directed Safety Branch to file its response to the 
issues raised by CMA, Santa Fe, Southern Pacific, and Union 
Pacific. (ALJ ruling dated March 21, 1990.) 
On June 22, 1990, Safety Branch filed its response to 
questions raised by CMA, Santa Fe, Southern Pacific, and Union 
Pacific. Safety Branch explained the modified GO and answered the 
question raised by the parties. Safety Branch made additional 
revisions to the GO. 
Subsequent to June 22, 1990, Safety Branch met informally 
with Santa Fe, Southern Pacific, and Union Pacific to resolve any 
disagreements about the GO revisions. Based on these discussions, 
Safety Branch further revised the GO and filed a motion on March 
29, 1991 to adopt the GO. The GO in its final form is designated 
as GO 161 and is attached to this order as Appendix A. 
In its motion Safety Branch contends that GO 161 is not 
preempted by federal law and is not burdensome. Safety Branch 
asserts the need for GO 161 as a supplement to other federal and 
state requirements to enhance public safety and to protect the 
environment. 
Cities of Azusa, Downey, El Segundo, and Santa Clarita 
filed comments in support of Safety Branch's motion to adopt 
GO 161. 
Southern Pacific and Union Pacific also filed comments on 
Safety Branch's motion to adopt GO 161. Although Southern Pacific 
and Union Pacific do not oppose the adoption of GO 161, they 
believe that there is a substantial likelihood that GO 161 is 
preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and the 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA). 
Safety Branch filed a response to comments filed by 
Southern Pacific and Union Pacific. 
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Position of Safety Branch 
According to Safety Branch, although csx Transportation 
is not binding on this Commission, it has withdrawn its 
recommendation to adopt any provisions of HMTA in GO 161. Safety 
Branch believes that no other provisions of GO 161 are preempted by 
federal law under the provisions of FRSA or HMTA. 
Safety Branch also disagrees with Southern Pacific's 
recommendations to submit GO 161 to RSPA for a determination of 
preemption and to add Rule 10 to GO 161. Safety Branch maintains 
-
that the Commission has the initial authority to determine if its 
rules are preempted by federal law. Safety Branch asserts that it 
has responded to Southern Pacific's and other railroads' preemption 
arguments and that the Commission has adequate information to 
determine if GO 161 is preempted by federal law. According to 
Safety Branch, a decision to adopt GO 161 will, implicitly if not 
explicitly, constitute a determination that the Commission is not 
preempted by federal law. Safety Branch opines that the 
Commission, having made a determination about federal preemption, 
should not apply to RSPA for a ruling. 
Discussion 
The key provisions of GO 161 will require each railroad 
which transports hazardous materials to: 
1. Immediately notify by telephone the 
appropriate emergency response agency (ERA) 
about a release or threatened release of a 
hazardous material. 
2. Provide ERAs along each rail line the 
railroad's 24-hour emergency telephone 
number. 
3. Have in place an emergency preparedness 
plan to respond to hazardous material 
spills. 
4. Ensure that train crew members have the 
ability to communicate via radio 





FRSA nor such specific 
ions of GO 161 supplement, rather 
than dupl or , federal safety requirements; and 
they are needed to address health and safety concerns arising 
out of transportation of hazardous material by rail. Adoption of 
GO 161 will enable an ERA to mitigate the harmful effects of 
accidental release of hazardous material transported through the 
agency's jurisdiction. We will adopt GO 161. 
Turning to Pacific's and Union Pacific's federal 
preemption concerns, these railroads assert only that there is a 
likelihood that GO 161 is preempted by federal law. The railroads 
have not cited any specific provision of GO 161 which would be 
preempted by federal law nor have they cited any federal statutes 
which prevent a state agency from adopting rules which do not 
duplicate or conflict with federal law. Besides, we have already 
noted that neither FRSA nor HMTA/HMTUSA include the specific 
provisions of GO 161. In final form, proposed GO 161 does not 
conflict with federal statutes. We believe that no purpose would 
be served by submitting GO 161 RSPA for determination of 
preemption. 
Finally, we see no 
proposed Rule 10 to the GO. 
between provisions of the GO 
need to add Southern Pacific's 
If a party perceives a conflict 
and federal statutes, the party can 
raise the issue in an appropriate forum. 
Findings of Fact 
... 1. On July 22, 1988, Commission issued R. 88-07-039 to 
adopt a GO prescribing rules and regulations for transportation of 
hazardous material by rail. 
2. All railroad corporations subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction were made respondents to this rulemaking. 
3. A copy of the proposed GO was served on respondents and 
on all police departments, sheriffs, and fire departments through 




4. Respondents and other parties were invited to comment on 
the proposed GO. 
5. Law enforcement agencies and fire departments supported 
the proposed GO. 
6. Certain parties opposed the proposed GO on grounds that 
the rules were (1) preempted by federal law and (2) unduly 
burdensome. 
7. Safety Branch met informally with railroad companies to 
resolve any disagreements regarding the proposed revisions to the 
GO. 
8. Based on its discussion with the railroad companies 
Safety Branch revised the proposed GO. 
9. The revised GO, which in its final form is designated as 
GO 161, is included in Appendix A. 
10. On March 29, 1991, Safety Branch filed a motion to adopt 
GO 161. 
11. Safety Branch contends that GO 161 is not preempted by 
federal law because it has removed all provisions from the GO which 
would duplicate federal requirements for railroad safety. 
12. Southern Pacific and Union Pacific believe that there is 
a possibility that GO 161 is preempted by FRSA and HMTA/HMTUSA. 
13. Provisions of GO 161 require railroads which transport 
hazardous material to notify the appropriate ERA regarding release 
or potential release of hazardous material. 
14. Provisions of GO 161 require railroads which transport 
hazardous material to have an emergency preparedness plan and to 
have other safety devices such as radio communication available to 
its crews. 
15. Neither FRSA nor HMTA/HMTUSA contain the specific 
provisions included in GO 161. 
16. No party has requested a hearing in the matter. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. No hearings are necessary. 
- 8 -
150 
R.SS-07-039 ALJ/AVG/jft ** 
2. GO 161 needed to address valid health, safety, and 
environmental concerns arising out of transportation of hazardous 
material by rail. 
3. GO 161 is not preempted by federal law. 
4. GO 161 included in Appendix A should be adopted. 
5. Concern for public safety requires that this order be 
made effective immediately. 
0 R DE R 
IT IS ORDERED that: 
1. Appendix A is adopted as General Order 161 of the 
Commission. 
2. The proceeding is closed. 
This order is effective today. 
Dated August 7, 1991, at San Francisco, California. 
PATRICIA M. ECKERT 
President 
G. MITCHELL WILK 
JOHN B. OHANIAN 
NORMAN D. SHUMWAY 
Commissioners 
Commissioner Daniel Wm. Fessler, 







BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF ~FORNIA 
GENERAL ORDER NO. 161 
RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS 
MATERIALS BY RAIL 
Adopted August 7, 1991 Effective August 7, 1991 
IT IS ORDERED that these regulations for the safe 
transportation of hazardous materials by railroads shall be 
observed in the state on tracks served, leased, owned or operated 
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RULE 1 - PURPOSE 
The purpose of this order is to establish safety standards 
for the rail transportation of hazardous materials. These rules 
and regulations supplement the Hazardous Materials Regulations 
prescribed by the United States Department of Transportation, 
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 171-174, 178 
and 179 and implement the overall state policy of promoting 
railroad safety as set forth in California Public Utilities Code 
sections 768 and 7671-7673. 
RULE 2 - DEFINITIONS 
Unless the context otherwise requires, the following 
definitions govern the construction of this Order: 
2.1 "Administering agency" means such agency as defined in 
Health and Safety Code section 25501(a). 
2.2 "Commission" means the California Public Utilities 
Commission. 
2.3 "Emergency response agency" ("ERA") means the fire 
department or district or other public agency with responsibility 
for responding to an emergency occurring in the area of an 
incident. 
2.4 "Hazardous materials" means any material transported by 
rail which is designated "hazardous material", "hazardous 
substance", or "hazardous waste" under Title 49 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, section 171.8, as may be revised, amended, 
and published in the Federal Register. 
2.5 "Identification number" means the identification number 
assigned to hazardous materials in Title 49 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, Part 172, Subpart B. 
2.6 "Incident" means any condition involving a release or 
threatened release of hazardous materials where there is a 
reasonable belief that the actual or threatened release poses a 





2.7 "Release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, 
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, 
leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment, unless 
permitted or authorized by a regulatory agency. 
2.8 "STCC" means the first four digits of the Standard 
Transportation Commodity Code, as contained in Standard 
Transportation commodity Code Tariff STCC 6049 series, as 
amended, and all supplements issued thereafter. 
2.9 "Threatened release" means a condition creating a 
substantial probability of harm, when the probability and 
potential extent of harm make it reasonably necessary to take 
immediate action to prevent, reduce, or mitigate damages to 
persons, property, or the environment. 
RULE 3 - EMERGENCY NOTICE OF INCIDENT 
3.1 Each railroad shall immediately notify by telephone the 
appropriate ERA of any incident, as defined in Rule 2.6 in 
addition to any other state or federal reporting requirements. 
3.2 To comply with Rule 3.1, each railroad which transports 
hazardous materials in California shall provide to each of its 
dispatchers procedures for the immediate notification of the 
appropriate ERA of any incident. Such procedures shall include 
the name and 10-digit (area code and local number), 24-hour 
emergency number of each ERA along each rail line. 
RULE 4 - NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
4.1 Each railroad shall provide to each ERA along each 
rail line the railroad's current 10-digit, 24-hour emergency 
telephone number(s). The railroad shall notify each ERA of any 
change in the emergency telephone number(s). 
-3-
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4.2 Within 60 days of a written request by an ERA or an 
administering agency, the railroad shall provide to the ERA or 
administering agency a list of each type of hazardous material, 
by hazard class and by carload or container, transported through 
or within the line segment that includes the ERA or administering 
agency, for the most recent prior 12-month period available. 
4.3 Upon written request by an ERA or an administering 
agency, the railroad shall provide to the ERA or administering 
agency the following information regarding leases for storage of 
hazardous materials within the jurisdiction of the requesting ERA 
or administering agency: 
a) Name of the commodity, STCC and identification number; 
b) Maximum number of cars to be stored at any one time; 
and 
c) Location of cars specific to track number and street 
address. 
RULE 5 - EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN 
Each railroad which transports hazardous materials in 
California shall have an emergency preparedness plan. The plan 
shall include, as a minimum, the following: 
a) Notification procedures for advising the appropriate ERA 
in case of an incident; 
b) Procedures for mitigation of a release or threatened 
release to minimize any potential harm or damage to 
persons, property or the environment; and 
c) Training procedures to instruct railroad personnel on 




RULE 6 - RADIO REQUIREMENTS 
To ensure that train crew members have the ability to 
communicate with each other and with the train dispatcher while 
transporting hazardous materials, all trains (including yard and 
switch engines) transporting hazardous materials shall be 
equipped with at least two (2) radio transceivers in good working 
order. The radios shall be able to transmit and receive on the 
same frequency. One radio shall be in the lead locomotive and at 
least one radio shall be of the handheld type. If a radio 
becomes inoperable, it shall be repaired or replaced at the 
earliest practicable opportunity. 
RULE 7 - RULES APPLICABLE TO INDUSTRIAL TRACK 
7.1 The Commission adopts as its own standards, and 
incorporates by reference, the Track Safety Standards contained 
in Part 213 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and 
any subsequent revisions thereto, for application to railroad 
track outside the general railroad system of transportation. 
7.2 Each railroad shall provide its customers with 
appropriate standards for static protection for all track over 
which the railroad operates which is outside the general railroad 
system of transportation and which is used for the transfer of 
flammable liquids and flammable gasses. 
7.3 When a railroad transporting hazardous materials is 
notified or otherwise becomes aware that the standards set forth 
in Rules 7.1 and 7.2 are not met, the railroad shall not operate 
on an affected track until the standards are met or until 
appropriate remedial action is taken. 
RULE 8 - INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS BY COMMISSION STAFF 
Upon request by a duly authorized representative of this 
Commission, each railroad shall provide for inspection, at an 
office in California, any documents required by this Order. (See 




RULE 9 - EXEMPTIONS 
BY WRITTEN REQUEST. If, in a particular case, exemption 
from any of these rules and regulations is desired, a written 
request may be made to the Commission for such exemption. Such a 
request shall be accompanied by a full statement of the 
conditions existing and the reasons relied on to justify the 
exemption. It is to be understood that any exemption so granted 
shall be limited to the particular case covered by the request. 







l02DCONGRESS H R 2607 
lST SEssiON • • 
To authome actM!Je!' Wide the NcrallW!road S.Set:~· Act of 1970 f~ 
fllcaJ yun 1992 ~ 1994, ud for other J>1Ul>081!1$. 
11\ THE HOUSE OF R.EPRESE~"'''ATT\'ES 
JUNE ll, 1991 
14:. Sw1Jior mlrocbaoed the l'ollcJowmc bill; whicb WU nfl!n'ed 1D \De ~ 
em E-.;y lUll! eom-
A BILL 
To authorize activities unde:- the Federal Railroad Safety 
Act of 1970 for fiscal yean 1992 through 1994, and 
for othe:- pUrpose&. 
1 Be it~ by the &mate Gftd House of ~ta-
2. tlves of the United States of~ i• Congrus a.s:se:mbled, 
3 SECTION 1. SBORT Tm..E. 
4 This Act may be cited as the "Rail Safety Enforce· 
S ment and Review Act". 
6 SEC. 2. ISSUANCE OF BEG1JLA.'J10NS. 
7 Section 202 of the Fede:al Railroad Safety Aet of 
8 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is amended-
9 
10 
(l) in subsection (a), by striking ··, as neces-






(2) in subsection (d), by striking "take sueh ac· 
tion as may bt necessary w••; 
( 3) in subsection (g), by striking "sueh ruJes, 
regulations, orde:-s, and standards as may be neces-
sary" and inserting in lieu thereof "ruJes, regula-



















(4) in subsection {h)(l)(A)-
(A) by striking "sueh init.ia.l rWflli, rerula· 
tions, ordn, ud standards as may be neces-
sary'' and Werting in lieu thereof "initial rules, 
regulation£, orders, ud st.~:wdards"; 
(B) by strik:mg "make sueh revisions in 
any" and inserting in lieu thereof "revise"; and 
(C) by striking ••as may be neceswy• ud 
inserting iii lieu thereof ••, ·based on web addi-
tional safety data as may be pre.seut.ed to the 
Seeret.ary in such review"; 
(5) in subsection (i)(l), by strilcing "such rules, 
regulations, orders, and standards as may be neces· 
wy'' and inserting in lieu thereof "ruJes, regula-
tions, orders, and standards"; 
I 
I • . 
(6\ in subsection (n)-
(A) by striking "sueh ruJes, regulations, 
orders, and standards as may be necflliSary·" 






















ano inserting in lieu thereof ';rules, reg'U}auons, 
ordert., ano stanoards"; 
(B) by striking "including" and inserting 
in lieu thereof "on railroad bridges. At a mini-
mum, the Secretary shall provide"; 
(C) by striking ''s.Jch as" and inserting in 
lieu tilereof "including''; and 
(D) by striking '·relating t.o instances when 
boats shall be used" and inserting in lieu there-
of "for tile use of boats when work is performed 
on bridges located over bodies of water"; 
(i) in subseetion (o)(1}, by striking "such rules, 
regulations, orders, and standards as may be neees· 
sary'' and inse~g in lieu thereof "rules, regula-
tions, orders, and standards''; and 
(8) in subsection (q), by striking "such rules, 
regulations, orders, and standards as may be neees· 
sary'' and inserting in lieu thereof "rules, regula· 
tions, orders, and standards". 
20 SEC. 3. REMEDIAL AC'I10NS. 
21 (a) REPORT BY R.Al:LROADS.-Any railroad required, 
22 under the authority of the Federal Railroad Safety Act 
23 of 19i0 (45 ti.S.C. 431 et seq.), the Hazardous Materials 
24 Transpo:rution Act (49 "C.S.C. App. 1801 et seq.), or the 
25 Act of March 4, J90i (45 l:.S.C. 61 ct seq.; commonly 
•BJ! lifO? Ill 
4 
referred to as the "Hours of Service Act") to undertake 
2 remedial action, sbalJ be required by the Secre~· or 
3 'Transportation (hereafter in this Act referred tv as the 
~ "Secretary") t.o report on the e%eeution of wch remedial 
5 action. 
6 (b) REPORT '1"'0 CoNGRESS.-Tbe Secre~· shall, 
7 within one yec ah.et the date of enactment of this .Act, 
8 submit a report t.o the Conrress outlining proeedu.""eS es-
9 tablished t.o ensure that remedial actions descn"bed in sub· 
10 section (a) are ueeut.ed. 
ll SEC. 4. ENFORCEMENT. 
12 (a) MTh"l)f(J)d A.'\'D MAmmA! Pl::NALTIES.-{1) Sec· 
13 tion 209(b) of tile Federal .Ra.ilroad Safety .Aet or 1970 
14 (45 ti.S.C. 438(b}), section 6 of the Act of March 2, 1893 
15 (4.5 ti.S.C. 6; commonly re!en-ed to as the "Safety Appli-
16 ance .Acts"), seetion 7 of the Act of May 6, 1910 (4.5 
17 tJ.S.C. 43; commonly referred to as the "Accident Reports 
18 Act"), seetion 25(h) of the Act of February 4., lBSi (49 
19 U.S.C. App. 26; commonly referred t.o as tht "Signa! In· 
20 spection Act"), ancl section 9 of the Act of Februa.o:· li, 
21 1911 (4.5 tJ.S.C. 34.; commonly referred to as the "Looo-
22 motive Inspection Act") are each amended by striking 
23 "S250'' and inserting in lieu thereof "Sl,OOO". 
24 (2) Section 5(a)(1) of the .Act of March 4. 1907 (45 
25 "C.S.(:., 64a(a)(l); commonly referred to as the "Hou:s of 





1 Service Act") is amended by striking "penalty of up to 
1 to the enforcement responsibilities of the Federal 
2 $1,000 per violation, as the Seereta.r:r of Transportation ., Railroad Administration. ... 
3 deems reasonable," and inserting in lieu thereof "civil pen-
3 (2) ELEMENTS OF PBOGR.Ul.-The pilot pro-
4 alty in an amount oot less than $1,000 oor more than 4 gram established under paragraph (1) shall pl'O'IIide 
' 
S $10,000, acept that where a grossly negligent violation I 5 for regional directors to be authorized to perform 
6 or a pat.t.em of repeated violations bas r.reated an immi· I 
i! 
6 initial case review, assess penalties, and settle cues. . 
I 7 nent hazard of death or injury to persons, or bas caused !· With respec:t to a violation for which a regional di-' 7 ,.8 death or injury, a penalty of not to exceed $20,000 may 8 rector assesses a penalty in aces& oi $5,000, the 
9 be assessed, and". 9 person against whom such penalty is assessed may 
10 (3) Section 2 of the Act of May 6, 1910 (45 U.S.C. 10 request that settlement-related a.etions be taken at 
·-11 39; commonly referred to as the ".Accident Reports Act") 11 the headquarters level 
1-' 12 is amended by ltrik:.ing "one hUDdred dollars" and insen.- 12 (3) Qo)(Pl'..ETION .A.ND IW"'BT TO OONGB.&SS.-Q\ 
0 13 ing in lieu thereof "$1,000". 13 The pilot program established under paragraph (1) 
14 (4) Section 37ll(c)(2) of title 31, United States I 14 shall be completed within 18 months after the date 
I 
IS Code, is amended by striking ••$250" and inserting in lieu IS of enactment of this Act, and within 2 years after 
16 thereof"$1,000". 16 such date ot enactment the Seereta.r:r shall submit a 
17 (b) ENFOBCEJIW.'T DECENT:&.U..IZATJON Pn..oT PB0- 17 report to the Congress describing the results of such 
18 GR.Ul.- 18 pilot program. 
19 (1) ESTABLlSlnlENT.-Tbe Seereta.r:r shall es- 19 (e) CoNSmEB.ATJONS FOB CoMPBOXI&E OF CmL 
20 tabl.ish a pilot program, involving more than one re- 20 PENALTIES.-(1) Section 209(e) o( the Federal Railroad 
gion of the Federal Railroad .Administration, to 
~ 
21 Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438(e)) by inserting "In 21 I 
22 demonstrate procedures designed to reduce the back· 22 compromising a civil penalty assessed under this section, 
23 log of cues, reduce the workload of headquarters 23 the Seereta.r:r shall consider the safety record of the person 
24 staff, streamline initial cue review, and strea.mline 24 to whom the penalty applies subsequent to the date of the 
\ 
2S transmittal and settlement procedures, with respect . 
.. . 








violation with respect to similar violations or the same lo-
2 cations." after "refemll to the Attorney General.". 
3 (2) Seetion 5{e) of the Act of March 4, 190i (45 
4 U.S.C. 64a(e); commonly referred to as the "Hours of 
5 Serrioe Act") is amended by adding at the end the follow-
6 ing sentence: "In compromising a civil penalty assessed 
7 under this section, the Secretary sha.ll consider the safety 
8 record of the penon to whom the penalty applies subse-
9 quent to the date of the violation with respect to similar 
10 violations or the same locations.". 
11 (3) Seetion 6 of the Act or Mareh 2, 1893 (45 u.s.c. 
12 6; commonly referred to as the "Safety Appliance Acts") 
13 is amended by adding at the end the following sentence: 
14 "In compromising a civil penalty assessed under this sec-
15 tion, the Secretary shall consider the safety record of the 
16 person to whom the penalty applies subsequent to the date 
17 of the violacon with respect to similar violations or the 
18 same locations."'. 
19 (4) Seetion 7 of the Act of May 6, 1910 (45 U.S.C. 
20 43; commonly referred to as the "Accident Reports Act") 
21 is amended by adding at the end the following sentence: 
22 "In compromising a civil penalty assessed under this sec-
23 tion, the Secretary sW consider the safety record of the 






















•)f the violation with respect to similar violations or the 
2 same locations.". 
3 (5) Seet.ion 25(h) of the Aet of Febru&lY 4, 188i (49 
4 U.S.C. App. 26; commonly referred to as the "Signal In-
S sj,ection Act") is amended by adding at the end the follow-
6 ing senteDce: "In compromising a civil penalty assessed 
7 under this section, the Secretary shall consider the safety 
8 record or the person to whom the penalty applies subse-
9 quent to the date of the violation with respect to ;im.ilar 
10 violations or the same loeations.". 
11 (6) Section 9 of the Act of Febnl&lY 17, 1911 (45 
12 U.S.C. 34; commonly referred to as the "Locomotive In-
13 speetion Aet") is amended by adding at the end the follow-
14 ing sentence: "In compromising a civil penalty asse:ssed 
15 under this section, the Seeret&lY shall consider the safety 
16 record of the person to whom the penalty applies subse-
17 quent to the date of the violation with respect to similar 
18 violations or the same locations.". 
19 SEC. I. .rtJDICIAL BJ:Y'IEW. 
20 (a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided m section 203 
21 and 210 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 
22 U.S.C. 432 and 439), a proceeding to enjoin or suspend, 
23 in whole or in part-
24 
15 
(1) 11. rule, regulation, or order of the Secretary 





Act of 1970 (45 'C.S.C. 4,31 et seq.), the Act of 1 (2) Section 2341(3)(B) of title 28, united States 
2 March 2, 1893 (45 U.S.C. 1 et seq.; commonly re- 2 Cvde, is amended by inserting "or the Secretary of Trans-
3 Cerred to as the "Safety Appliance Acts"), the Act 3 portation" after "Secretary of .Agrieu.ltu.l:"e". 
4 of May 6, 1910 (45 U.S.C. 38 et seq.; commonly re- 4 (3) Section 2.342 of t.it.le 2S, United States Code, is 
s ferred to as the "Accident Reports Act"), section 25 S amended-
6 oC the Act of February 4, 1887 (49 U.S.C. App. 26; 6 (A) by striking "and" a.t the end of pa.ragraph : 
' 
7 commonly referred to as the "Signal lnspeet.ion 7 (5); 
8 Act"), the Act of February 17, 1911 (45 U.S.C. 22 8 (B) by strik:ing the period at the end of pan· 
9 et seq.; commonly referred to as the "LocomotiVe In- 9 graph (6) aDd i.nserti.ng in lieu thereof"; and"; and 
10 spect.ion Act"), the Act of March 4, 1907 (45 U.S.C. 10 (C) by adding a.t the end the following new 
11 61 et seq.; commonly referred to as the "Hours oC 11 pa.ragraph: 
..... 12 Serviee Act"); or 12 "(7) all rules, regul&tiona, or final orders de-
0\ I 
N 13 (2) to the extent applicable solely to railroads, I 13 scribed in section S(a) or the Rail Safety Enforce-
I 
14 a rule, regulation, or order of the Secretary of 
I 14 ment and Review Act.". 
lS Transportation under any other Act, 15 SEC. e. P110TEC'l10H OF BAJl..BOAD SAFETY ENFOac::E:MEHT 
16 shall be brought in the eourt of appeals as provided by 16 PERSONNEL. 
17 and in the manner prescribed in chapter 158 of t.itle 28, l7 Section llU of title 18, United. States Code, is 
18 United States Code. i 18 amended by inserting "any officer or employee of the Fed· 
19 (b) TECIDo1CA.L .AKENDME!'I.'TS.--(1) Section 202(f) 
I 
19 era! Railroad .A.dministration assigned to perform investi· 
20 or the Federal Railroad Safety Ad. of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 
: 
20 gative, inspection., or law enforcement functions.," after 
21 431(f)) is amended by striking "chapter 7 of title 5 of 21 "any employee or the Coast Guard assigned t.o perform 
22 the United States Code" and inserting in lieu thereof "sec· 
I 
22 investigative, inspection or law enforcement functions,". 
23 tion 5 of the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act" . 
• a:a.., m ·BR- m 
11 ' I 12 
SEC. '1. POWER BB.AXE SAF!:l'Y. I 1 SEC. .. TRACZ. &.U'EI'T. 
2 Section 202 or the Federal Railroad Safety Act or I 2 Section 202 or the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 
3 1970 (45 t:.S.C. 431) is amentied by adding at tbe end 3 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is amended by adding at the end 
4 the ronowmg new mhlection: 4 tbe following new abeection: 
s "(r) Powu. BB.A.D &.n:Ty,-(1) The Secretary s "(a) TJUCX SAnTY.-{1) The Sec:ret&ry shall, with-
6 shall eonduet a review or the Department or Transporta- I 6 in 6 monthJ after tbe date oC enaetment or thia aubeeetion, 
1 tion's rules with retl'j:leCt to railroad power brakes, and, 1 initiate a l"e"riew or tbe Depart;meD.t or Transportation'• 
8 within 18 monthJ after the date or enactment or this sub- i 8 ata:Ddards relating to track alet;y. Wrtbin 2 )'1!1111'1 aft.e.r 
9 aection, shall rmae neb rules based on neb safety data 9 
10 as may be presented during that review. 10 shall issue rulea, regulations, ord~ or at.aDd.a:rda to re'9iae 
11 "(2) In CII.1Tying oat paragraph (1), tbe Secretary I 11 sueh st.aDdards, bued on meb l&.fety data-is may be pn-
1-' 
12 shall, at a minimum, oouider- I : 12 sented during that J'E!'riew. Q\ 
"(2) The reriew ~ ude.r ~ph (1) shall., w 13 "(A) whether to require 2-way end of train de- II 13 
14 vice~ (or device~~ able to per(onn the same functions) I I 14 at a m.inimwn, addrerl:e-I 
15 
I 
"(A) p~ ~ with maintain.inc to enaNe a train erew to initiate bralcing from the I 15 16 rear or a tnlin; and 16 aDd inatalling ooutinu01111 welded rail and it11 atteDd· 
11 "(B) whether to issue ~t.a or stand- 17 ant~ 
18 a.rda rep.rding dynamic braking equipment. i 18 "(B) reri.liona to rulea with reapect to tnc.k 
19 "(3) The Secretary shall, within 2 ~ after the 19 subject to ~ption from tnc.k aafety lltalldarda; 
20 date or enactment or th.ia wbaection, report to the Con- 20 and 
21 gresa on the reaulta or tbe review eondueted under para-
: I: "(C) employee wety. ". 21 
22 graph (1) and any nwisiona of rules or other lld:iona taken r 22 DC. 1. APPUCABIUT'f Olf JW'LI:8, DGVIJJIONS. OlmDS. 23 in connection therewith.". l 23 AND IT~ 
24 (a) Am..'ICAML~Tt.-Seetion 202(a) of tbe Fedenl 
2.5 RaiJ.roe,d Safety~ oC 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431(a)) ia amend· 
26 ed by adding at the end the following: "Rules, ~tions, 
oiD-1111 oiD-1111 
13 14 
orders, and st.anda.rdJ issued by the Secretary under this 1 (2) the effectiveness in improving cn.shworth.i-
2 title shall apply to any owner, manufacturer, lessor, or les- 2 ness or adding features such li.S oolli.s:.Wn posts, 
3 see of n.ilroad equipment or facilities, to a.ny contractor 3 anticlimher devices, thiclter boo&, and oooopant re-
4 providing goods or &el"VioeS to a railroad, and to any em- 4 &traints; 
5 ployet O( sooh owner, manufa.cturer, lessor, lessee, Or OOD· .5 (3) the estimated t'JOIU and benefits uaociated 
6 t.raetor, to the same e:xtent u they apply to a railroad with 6 with variooa improvement!; to cruhwo~ 
7 respect to the &&me activities. ••. 7 ( 4) the advisability of requiring the retrofitting 
8 (b) PE.'iALTmS.-Section 209(a) of the Federal Rail- 8 or looamotn. built before Augw;t 1, 1990, in ae-
9 road Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438(a)) is amended 9 corda.nce with the Locomotift Crashwort.hioe.'l& Be-
10 by iDJerting ", an owner, manu.f.acturer, lessor, or lessee 10 quiremenu Standard S-580, adopted by the Asao-
11 of railroad equipment or facilities, a contractor providing 11 ci&tion or~ Rail.roadJ in 198!; 
...... 12 goods or se.rvices to a railroad, and any employee of such 12 (5) ~ locomotiw:a equipped with toikta 
(!\ 
13 owner, ~. lesaor, leaee, or contractor" after .g:,.. 13 should be 111bject to requirement.l tl:w 111ch toilet. 
14 "agent of a railroad". 14 are functioning, aanitary, and m.a.int.l.ined on a regu-
15 SEC. 10. LOCOMOTIVJI: CAB 8AFET'f AND WOWIJNG CONDI· IS larbam; 
16 TION& 16 (6) the effect.a on train Cl'e'llrl of the presence of 
17 The Secretary ab.all, within 18 months after the date 
~ I 
17 asbestos in locomotive component&; and 
18 of enactment of this Aet., aubmit to the Congress a report 18 (7) the Secreta.ry'a plans for related regulatory 
19 on the status o( effort~ to impi"'W the safety or employees I 19 action or, i! DO regulatory action is planned., a.n e.x· 
20 in locomotive cabs. Snch report shall, at a minimum, 20 planation of why the Secret.a.ry considers such action 
21 addres&- 21 unnecessary. 
22 (1) the cruhworthinesa of existing locomotives 22 SEC. 11. AUTBORIZAl"'ON OF APPBOPBIATIONS. 
23 ' o( variou! deaigna, including issues raised by differ- I 23 Section 214(a) o( the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 24 ent sill heights; 24 1970 ( 45 U.S.C. 444(a)) ia amended by inserting ", 
15 $51,524,000 for '.5scal year 1992, $55,022,100 for fiscal 





year 1993, and $57,933,400 Cor fiscal year 1994" after 
2 "fiscal year 1991". 
3 SEC. U. LOCAL B.AIL F.IU!:IGBT ASSISTANCE PROGR.UL 
4 Section 5(q) of the Depe.rtment of Transportation 
5 Act (49 u.s.c. A:pp. 1654(q)) is a.mended-
6 (1) by inserti.ng "There are authorized to be ap-
7 propriated to the Secret.a.ry Cor the purposes of this 
8 aection $20,000,000 Cor fiscal year 1991, 
9 $22,000,000 Cor fiscal year 1992, $27,000,000 Cor 
10 fiscal year 1993, and $30,000,000 for fiseal year 
I l 1994." at'te.r SepWnber 30, 1990."; and 
12 (2) by striki.ng "any period after September 30, 
13 
14 
1990" and inserting in lieu thereof "any period aft.e.r 






Proposed Laqislation to ReauthoriEe Railroad Safety Proqrama 
JU!y·ll, 1991 
section 1. I 
I 
Provides short title: "Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act 
of 1991." 
Section 2. Issuance of Regulations. 
This section clarifies existinq provisions of law directinq tn• 
Secretary of Transportation to issue requlations reqardinq 
certain safety ieeuea. It reaffirms the intent of Con9reae that 
such regulations were required to be issued by the Rail Safety 
Improvement Act ot 1988, and confines the issue of a9ency 
discretion to the content of requlations. 
section 3. Remedial ·Actions. ' 
i 
The General Accountinq Office reported to Congress that FRA 
currently does not monitor whether railroads taka action to 
correct safety defects identified by agency inspectcre. This 
section requires railroads to report remedial action• taken, 
a~dition, it requires FRA to monitor thia reportinq to •naure 
auch remedial actions are implemented. 
Section 4. Enforcement. 
In 
This section implements three add ional recommendation• of the 
General Aceountinq Office. 
Subsection (a) increases minimum civil penalties for requlatory 
violations from $250 to $1000. Maximum penaltiea were increased 
from $2500 to $10,000 by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988; 
the section seeks to make ehanqes in minimum penaltiee 
commensurate with thoae in maximum penalties. In addition, it 
conforms all existin9 railroad safety atatut•• to a single civil 
penalty atandard. ; 
I 
subsection (b) requires the secretary to run an pilot program to 
experiment with conducting enforcement activity in regional 
offices. The pilot will be ba•ed on a similar pro9ram that has 
been run successfully by the Federal Hi9hway Administration. 
FHWA regional directors have been permitted to conduet initial 
case reviews, assess penalties, and settle casea on a trial 
basis. The qoala are to reduce the time la9 between violation 
reporting and caae settlement1 confine the caaea settled by 
Headquarters attorneys to only the moat serious; and give 
headquarters attorneys more time for requlatory and legislative 
matters. The pilot program will be followed by a report to 
Congress summarizing the reaults. 
Subsection (c) amends the proviaion of law that allows the 
Secretary to compromise civil penaltiea durin9 settlement. When 
exercising the option to compromise penaltie1, Secretary will 
now be required to consi~er the safety 1 or a 
railroad subsequent the asseasment of 
settled. 
Section 5. Judicial Review. 
current law allows parties in dispute with rules, regulations 
orders and standards issued by the Secretary in mattera of rail 
safety to challenqe the Secretary's actions in DiGtrict Court. 
This provision enables such parties to proceed directly to the 
court of appeals to challenge any rule, requlation, order, or 
standard reqarding rail aafety. This eonforml the rail mode to 
judicial review procedures for both the highway and aviation 
mode. · 
Section 6. Protection or Railroad Safety Enforcement P~1onne1. 
This eection make& it a federal crime for a per1on to aseault an 
officer or inspector of the FRA. Similar proteetio~ is accorded 
employ•es of other federal agencies involved in inspection and 
inveati9attve activities. 
Section 7. Brake Safety. 
The FRA Power Brake Rules have not been comprehensively reviewed 
in over a decade. In the time since, the industry has undergone 
significant transition. New technologies have developed, and 
continue to evolve. This section requires FRA to reopen its 
Power Brake Rul•s and examine the potential safety benefits ot 
requiring the use of two~way end of train devicee that enable a 
train crew located in a locomotive to apply brakes trom the rear 
of the train. In addition, the section asks the a9ency to 
evaluate rules, requlatione, or standards on dynamic braking 
equipment. 
Section 8. Traok Safety. 
FRA has not reviewed its track standard• since 1982. However, a 
string of accidents related to detects in continuous welded rail 
has taken place over the past few years. Theee incidents have 
been caused by buckling of welded rail under extreme heat. Known 
as "sun-kinks" these instances su99•1t a cornprehene look at 
this technology is warranted. This section requires 
secretary to review and revise the traek etandarda. The review 
shall include examination of the in1tallation and maintenance of 
welded rail, proviaiona tor traek subject to from 
current etandarda, and employee 1afety in qenera • 
167 
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SHERIFF 
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UNDERSHERIH 
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August 14, 1991 
Assemblyman Richard Katz, Chairman 
Assembly Transportation committee 
state Capitol 
Sacramento, ca. 95814 
The unified Command Team of the Seacliff Train Derailment 
Incident, on behalf of Ventura County, would like to present 
the following areas of concern identified after the recent 
seacliff train derailment. 
We feel that more protection could be provided to residents of 
rail thru-ways and highways intersecting rail areas if the 
following information was available to local jurisdictions and 
emergency personnel responding to the incident: 
1. Obtain correct off-loading site information. 
2. Achieve enforcement of rules and regulations of incidents. 
3. See that information is available that portrays MSDS 
sheets. Need more detailed information on manifests. 
4. Require container identification to relate back to the 
manifest or flatcar. Possibly identify cars and 
containers. 
5. Obtain access to railway computer information on products. 
6. Allow local jurisdictions to approve railroad's emergency 
operations plan and possibly designate critical areas. 
7. Allocate funding of '1superfund11 money for railroads. 
Explore concept of "clean seas" organization for rail. 
8. Determine the appropriate on-scene responsibility of 
responsible party and local jurisdiction. 
9. Require for Cal-OSHA personnel to report and remain at 
site for duration of incident. 
::J WEST COUNTV DIVISION 
800 South Victoria Avenue 
Ven:ura, CA 9JD09 
ral\~1 t;t;A_ ''~11 
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C CENTRAl COUNTY DIV1SION 
67 Palm Drive 
Camarillo, CA 93010·7995 
(805) 482-9644 
CJ EAST VALLEY DIVISION 
2101 Ea5t Ol;en Road 
Tnou1and Oaks. CA 91360 
(805) 494-8200 
10. Develop legislation to exempt emergency personnel on 
hazardous material incidents from liability and to permit 
debriefings without disclosure. 
ll. Require State personnel presence on scene for haz mat 
response. 
12. Establish eri~inal penalties tor agencies/persons 
deliberately lying at scene. 
13. Resupply State Superfund money to existing hazardous 
materials teams. 
If you have any questions regarding these items, you may 
direct them to Karen A. Guidi, Assistant Director, Sheriff's 
Office of Emergency Services at (805) 654-2551, BOO so. 




·--SANTA BARBARA COUNTY 
AGENDA REPORT 
Oerlt of the Bollm or SUMtMUil"ll 
- ~m 400 105 B. .Mapcmu Smet 
Santa Dllrbara, CA 93101 
(80S) S68·2240 
TO: Board of Supervisors 
., 
FROM: WJ~o.~ Ken Knight, Interim Director 
Office ofEmergency Services 
0Et1 P.Ol 
Agenda Number: 
Department: omce of Emergency Services/Fire 
Agenda Date: 8/20/91 
Placement: Departmental 
Estimated Time: 20 minutes 
Con tun 
STAFF 
CONTAcr: Bruce Carter, ext. 3429 or Mary Barron, ext. 3416 
SUBJECI': 
,'1 
Assessment of Recent Railroad Derailments m Santa Barbara, Siskiyou/Shasta. and 
Ventura Counties, 1991 
RECOM:MENDATIONS: A. 0. Recommendation: ____ _ 
~ 
That the Board of Supervisors: 
Receive and discuss the attached staff report and findings regarding the recent train derailments in Santa 
Barbara, Siskiyou/Shasta, and Ventura Counties and to consider ideas for improving local prepareclness. 
This report summarizes the findings of the County Office of Emergency Services for the Southern Pacific 
train derailments occurring on Vandenberg Air Force Base in March, 1991 and at Seacliff in July, 1991. 
In addition, staff has provided an overview of the Southern Pacific: train derailment at Dunsmuir, which 
impacted both Siskiyou and Shasta Counties in July, 1991. 
Budr,:et Unit! 4320 CumntYr, NmYear Concurrnees Y!NNA 
Obtatud 
Appropriation Chg. so so AudfController N/A 
Revenue Chg. •c )"•Incr. 0 0 CoW1ty COUDSel N/A 
Inter-Dept Transfer Chg. 0 0 R.WtManap N/A 
"( )' • Increase 
Net Cnty Cost/Reserve Chg. so $0 PersoMel N/A 
N/A 
Pcrrn. Posilion5 Chg. (F"J."n) 0 0 Polley CbaDge No . 
Ex. Help/Contr6ct Chg. (FTE) 0 0 Fee lncn!llse N/A 




ASSESSMENT OF RECENT RAILRoAD DERAILMENTs 
IN SANTA BARBARA, SlSKYOV/SHASTA AND VEN1lJRA COUNTIEs 
August 20, 1991 
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I. INIBODUCOON 
AI. you know, there have been three major :railroad accidents within the lut six months 
involving hazardous materials; the first in Santa Barbara County on Vandenberg Air Force 
Baae (V AFB) in March, the second in Siskiyou and Shasta Counties at Dummuir in July and 
most recently in Ventura County at Seacliff. AU of these derailments involved the Southern 
Pacific (SP) Railroad and resulted in the release, or threatened releue, of hazardous 
materials. 
This report will briefly summarize the findinp from the derailments in Santa Barbara and 
Ventura Counties, from staff assessmentl on site. An account of the Dunsmuir derailment 
which affected both Siskiyou and Shasta Counties is also included. However, this synopsis 
was compiled from phone conversations and various newspaper articles as staff wu unable 
to visit the site of this derailment. 
n. lJNDINGS 
A. VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE DERAILMENT 
The V AFB derailment occurred on March 19, 1991 at 4:45 am at milepost 313, about 5 
miles north of J alama Beach. The derailment, which occurred during the March rains, 
resulted when a culvert at Canada Ridse save way. The derailment :involved a southbound 
SP freiaht train originating from Oakland. Of the train's 31 em, 24 derailed including two 
locomotives. 
Local agencies were not notified by SP. The County Office of Emergency Services (OES) 
unofficially received a report of the incident around 7:30 am on KTMS radio. The County 
Sheriff" a Department was notified by V AFB at 7:45 am. OBS spent the first day trying to 
establish contact with SP and obtain accurate information. Initial :information wu obtained 
through V AFB Command and Control Center and their Public Affairs office. 
A key concem was the lack of direct communication with the lite • temporary telephone 
lines had to be installed since cellular phones and radios did not reach thia remote area. This 
took several days. Consequently, :initial contact with SP wu through their diapatch center 
in Roseville (near Sacramento) and the Corporate Headquarters :in Monterey Park. 
The main concern was determining whether hazardous materfala were on board. Reports 
confirmed that two pressurized tank cars. each containins 30.000 p.llom of anhydrous 
ammonia, had derailed along with several other can containing hazardous material&. V AFB 
handled initial stabillzation of the incident by constructini a dike around the spilled 
lw:ardous materials (diael foul and ~trolewn naphtha). SP hazmat tea.ma a.rrfved around 
6:00pm that evening, nearly 14 hours after the :incident occurred. While the tmhytlrou.r 
ammonia tanks withstood the derailment, the primary concern wu for a subsequent releaae 
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The jwisdictional authority for this incident wu unique in that it on 
property (the SP right of way), on federal lands (V AFB), and wttl'dn the County 
Barbara. In addition, the wreck wu situated on a Native American burial ground. 
Because the incident occurred on V AFB, County agencies did not have primary response 
authority. 
Since the incident could have resulted in offsite impacts, OBS took a lead role and requested 
a meeting with the SP incident management team. The following agencies were called 
together in a meeting with SP: County OBS, Fire (Lompoc and County), Sheriff, 
Environmental Health Services (EHS). Board of Supervisors (4th District office )t the Air 
Pollution Control District (APCD) and V AFB. The main objectives of meeting were 
to verify that the situation waa stabilized. obtain the incident plan and a County 
liaison on scene. Through the establishment of an OBS liaison on with 
County response agencies was initiated: APCD provided plume dispersion modelling for 
critical transloading operations and the Sheriff's Office was notified in that an 
evacuation was needed. EHS was also prcaent on Bite throughout the response 
phases. 







Z tank can 
30,000 gal eachs intact 
2 locomotives 
2.,600 sal diesel spilled 
1 tank car (rclidual only) 
None spilled. 
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Fortunately, this incident occurred in a remote u~ of V AFB .. the nea1~0Jt residents were 
three miles away at Sudden Ranch and five miles away at Jfilimla Death. B9$h locations 
were notified by V AFB which had an Air Force )lelicoptcr atandinj by for potential 
evacuations. With the exception of disrupted rail ~me~, both freight BL'.ri Amtrak. public 
impact was minimal. Had this occurred in a popula~ art.~ an ew.~mtion would have been 
likely during the five-day proceu to transload the flnhydroua ammo;'lia. 
In addition to ammonia transloading and rePlOVal, the ate restoratiun inclu·ded huar4ous 
materiall removal of diesel fuel and paraffin we.x, inltallatio.u of fibre o;~'' ~.{CI) cable and 
reconstruction of the culyert. Final restoration wu expectet'i to be conlplt~~ ~n June, 1991. 
B. DUNSMUIR DER.AILMENT 
The next incident, and perhaps the most devastating in terms of off-site impa*', MS the 
train derailment and subsequent release of nuuun sodium :into the &tcramen~ .Rfver at 
Dunsmuir in Siskiyou County at railroad milepost 327.98. On Sunday, July 14, ~~·It !l:SO 
pm, ajx empty cars and one tank car containing the chemica..\ jumped the tracb a;~ ,a sn11all 
river crossing along the Sacramento River. The single-walled ,tlmk ~ br()ke epel'l illaev.'eral 
places, emptying approximately 19,500 gallons of the toxic ches:uical, metam IOIUum, blto t,'be 
river which flowed downstream into Shasta County. The Se'!J'etl dcraileCI cars were part c. 'f 
a 97 .. car, 4-locomotive SP freisht tram. 
Bagrd.ous Matslll• 
The nutDm sodium spill flowed doWDStream. into Shuta C:Ou,ty, and evt\ntually reached 
Lake Slwta, approximately 40 miles from the train deraiJ.m.ent, at 3:00 am on W~eaday. 
July 17, 1991. According to a Material Safety Data Sheet (M'SDS), metmn sodium il a weed 
and tree killing compound in the dithiocarbamate family. 19,500 gallons of a chemical 
concentrate, containing 32.7% pure m«am aodium (a t~ nanu for sodium N-
methyldithiocarbamate), wu beinJ carried in the tank cu. M11am IOdium il water soluble 
and decomposes into m~thylisothiocyaMte. or MJTC, a he&yY gt\1 that is also soluble in water. 
AI a heavy gas, the Mrrc remained in or j'Ult above the wt.te.f aurface. MITC il clusified 
as a strong lacrimator, an irritant to humans causing sympto~n~ such u nauaca and tearing. 
In tum, MITC iJ water soluble and can decompose to mono,_l~lamiM. Hydrog~n Sulfide 
(H,S) can alao be created if a high Ph value is encountered. 
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:Highly toxic to 
cause low toxicity in humans 
(although never tested). 
Strong irritant to akin amd 
mucous membrames. Potential 
chrome earcinosen. 
Highly msestion, 
inhalation, and akin ¥Utna ... ~. 
Strons lacrimator irritant 
to akin and mucoua 
membrane&. 
Flammable, wu:&ge%'01 
(gu or --.---r 
to tiuue, Bxll'l~live 








190 people sought medical attention with complaints nmging from headaches bumins 
mucous membranes and n:ausea. all related to the spill. Of tb01e, only people have had 
marked effects presumably from exposure to the MITC and were admitted hospitals. In 
addition to impacts on tbe local human population, the liquid chemical devutated the river'• 
ecosystem beginning at the spill site and downriver to Lake Shuta; ldl1ing the entire 
fishery and most of the vegetation in and along the river. Long term effects of the 
175 
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aquatic food chain organisms and habitat are expected. Secondary toxicity to birds 
and mammals which rely on the river may be expected. In ahort, the 1pill hal rendered 
that lensfh of the Sacramento almost entirely sterilized. Long term impactl to the 
river's ecosystem a.re rmticipatedi however, the desree of impact Is unknown. 
Fish and wildlife biologists will continue monitor impact& rmd have already begun 
developing restoration plans. The impacted section of the Sacramento River will remain 
cloaed to fishing until mid·September. 
C. SEACLIFF DER.An.MENT 
The latest incident occurred at 12:08 pm on Sunday, July 28, 1991 when aSP freight train 
derailed and crashed into H!shway 101/Seacliff overpus in the northern Ventura County 
community of Seacliff. Railroad official~ cite the cause of the derailment u due to a loose 
ule on one of the freight cars which apparently causht a 1Witch.i.n3 atation. Twelve of the 
37 cars on the SP Railroad train were then catapulted off the tracb. The broken ale had 
sent off sparks and ignited several small brush fires alons the railroad tracka at least 10 miles 
south of the crash site. The derailed can were carrying tractor .. trailer• on flatbeds known 
as '~iggy-bacb11 • The of twisted and wood wreckage ltretched more than 1,000 
feet and dug up 300 feet of ties and The train wu traveling 
approximately SS mllea per hour bearing froze. A groove had been created 
alons the railroad traw from the broken axle u it was draped underneath the northbound 
train. Railroad and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials are still 
investigating the cause of the broken axle. 
HaardOUI MaterialS 
Roughly 440 pllom of the hiihiY toxic material f.UJU.BOW hydra.zlnt, a jet fuel component, 
splashed across the tracks after 12 ca:n of the northbound 39 car SP train detailed. The 
train was carrying at least 4,100 gallons of Hydrazme in eventywalx SS-aallon druml. The 
aqueous hydrtuine spilled when 8 of the drums were ruptured in the cruh. Cean-up crews 
used an 8% solution of calcium hypochl.orite to neuttallze the spilled hydra.zine. When this 
chemical wu sprayed over the contaminated area, the reaultant chemical reaction with the 
calcium hypochlorite neutralized the~· A aecondary chemical reaction from this 
neutralization process caused a cloud of hydrogen sa and ammonia to be released. 
Hydmzins wu also siphoned out of 1~ other drums using a stinger (similar to a pnt 
hypodermic needle). The "needle11 is jammed Into the drum and the ~ is then 
removed by a vacuum hose into a stainless 1teel truck. The remaining drums wore removed 
by a process known as "overpacking", which Involves placlng the umuptu.red drums into 
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The train was uo carrying a cargo container with 6,240 pllcma 
solvent which would potentially ignite and/or explode if it came in contact 
Another concern was the location of two natural gu pipelines, :rur:IIWlLB ""~""""-"&"A 
and buried just 3·4 feet underground. 







One ce.r canying fifty·aix 
SS-pllon dnmls; 
eight of which ·-·"A'"' a 
total 440 gallons. 
Unknown volume. 
One ce.r canying 6,340 
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DqeroUI fire in con·mct 
with orpnic materials. 
ImHctJ 
Several members of the hazardous material~ cleanup crew were exposed to hydrrmne 
they encountered previously unidentified "hot spots" at two different times during the 
cleanup. The exposed crew members were taken to the hospital, treated released. 
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directions for 6 days. All north and southbound traffic wu detoured onto two-lane Highway 
150 through Ojai and to Highway 33. In northern Santa Barbara County, traffic bound for 
Ventura and further aouth wu rerouted on Highway 166. All mil service north and south 
was also canceled. In addition, more than 350 people were evacuated from the communities 
of Seacliff, La Conchita, and Muuel Shoak. The American Red Croas opened shelters both 
north and south of the incident for both evacuees and stranded travelers on Sunday night. 
In Ventura County, shelters remained open to evacuees until Friday, when residents were 
permitted to return to their homes. 
m CONCLUSIONS 
Baaed on our own experiences in Santa Barbara County and the information we obtained 
from Ventura and Sialdyou/Shuta Counties, OBS lw identified the following issues. 
1. ~e containers for shi:gmgt of Hnprdo!JI Materlll .. Although the m~tam ~odium spilled 
in the Dunsmuir incident wu being transported in a single-walled tank car per Department 
of Transportation regulation, when the car derailed the tank car ruptured and released the 
water soluble chemical into the Sacramento River. Exposure to water caused a chemical 
reaction in which the metam sodium decomposed into a more hazardol.ll chemical DOT 
should investipte more atrlnjent container requirements for highly reactive chemicala. In 
addition, DOT ahould also analyze the rlslm of transporting huardoua materials, such as 
aqu~ous hydraz.iM in safer, double-walled tank carl u a bulk shipment inltead of amaller, 
less protective drums. While the risks involved with the bulk shipment fD tank can may be 
amaller, the conaequenccs of an incident would be much larger. Thae riW should be 
compared to the relatively smaller conaequenccs and mper riab 111ociated with drum 
shipment of hf.Wll'doua materials. 
2. Iimetv loc:al 'ienQY notification - Local agencies should be notified immediately of rail 
incidents by the railroad to ensure timely emergency response planning and coordination. 
Local agencies can and will be the primary response team until railroad respome teams 
arrive on scene. Although the County of Santa Barbara did not have primary response 
authority on site for the V AFB derailment. the worst case scenario necessitated off lite 
planning on our part (e.g., if a large scale ammonia release had occurred which moved off 
V AFB). As a rault, OES provided liaison for planning and coordination purposes. In 
addition, BHS responded to the scene to monitor cleanup activities, APCD provided plume 
dispersion modeJlin& County and Lompoc fire departments provided teclmical information 
on hazardoUI materials and the Sheriff's Department notified nearby ruidents prior to 
critical operations. 
3. Identification of MaterlaJJ On Board m In order to ascertain the aeverity of a dcr8.ument 
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materials on board the train. This information ill provided on the train'& conailt (see 
attachment 1) and should be tran&mitted to responders at the time of notification (via 
facsimile). Such information is essential 10 that the local jurildiction can quietly convey 
emergency public information, plan for evacuation~ and respond more safely and effectively. 
4. Emergency Planning and Coordination .. Increased plannins is needed between rafiroads 
and local jurisdictions. Integration of emergency response plans through joint planning and 
training efforts would assist with this process. The Office of Emergency Services will review 
incident response data from our counterpart& in Ventura County and Northern California 
aa it becomes available. Lessons learned from these incidents, u well u the V AFB 
derailment, will be incorporated into the County•s Hazardous Materlalfl Emergency 
Response Area Plan. Railroad& should coordinate with emergency response Plannina effom 
with local jurisdictions. For example, SP should provide trainins for interasency ,..G,"'nftlllil' 
personnel at least twice a year. In addition. SP should conduct emersency response 
exercises to maintain an adequate level of preparedness. 
S. R0utin1 -An three train derailments involved rail car111 canying 
Bach derailment involved the release or potential release of hazardous material~ which had 
significant offsite impacts to the surrounding area. Routing of trains "-'""MIIm h!Wlt'dO!Ill 
materials should be more thoroughly reviewed by DOT and State autJboriltiea 
coastal route should be restricted to local shipment~ on a resuJar ,,.,1'\an 
needed basis. Otherwiee, the main north-south rail line through San "'..,_"'IIMU 
be utilized for shipments between Los Angeles and San Fnmcisco uea aealtmaUOIJII. 
com.parilllon should be conducted to determine the effect of this tttullp!:)rta11lo:n propoall 
interstate commerce. 
6. Community Awareness -The railroadlshould establish an ongoing · awareness 
campaign regarding the transportation of hazardous material~ by rail. State and federal 
legislation already mandates tlUI for fixed facilities (AB 2185, 1985; SARA Title III, 1986). 
A case in point is the Seacliff and Dunsmuir derdmenta, where the public impact was 
extreme. The public needs to be educated on the types of material~ being tnmaported by 
rail. and what to do in the event of a derailment (e.g. education on shcltering .. in .. pllce for 
hazardous materials emergencies and special hotlinu to call for information requests). 
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ATI'ACBMENT 1 
TRAIN CONSIST EXAMPLE 
This document was obtained from Southern Pacific Transportation Co. and was part of the 
consist for the freight train involved in the March 19, 1991 Vandenberg Air Force Base 
derailment. 
I 'fl'ICCJ!U'!f:Ntt FROM/$Hlf.'F'I~'< \:XXONCIIEI%1'1£R CHtVRQCHtM 7 C ~ftYTOWN TX ~ZCHHQNU C~ 1 006 tCUX3~406~ ! TSE E DAN 
j ···················~······ ./ II I 




007 UTLX 77,90 ~ T50 X PETPRD 
OD~ UT~X 712,5 L T'D X rETP~D 
009 U1~X 71266 L T5D X P~T~RU 
0\0 WCRC 322• £ ~r t 
F~IJI'I/ tU H'F'CIIC 
tHt:VROCti£!11 1 C 
IU CIII"'OND CA 




PI.AC:MWU! Cfll'WUST 111\.t 
SH1PP~R CONTACT• 
t.:HF.HTI<EC 
H~%HAT fTCC• ~91~:'9 
O't CATX 91!50 L T76 I ANHAHH DAN NG 
11111111111111111111111111 
:B I UANCtROUf I 
11111111111111111111111111 
EMERGENCY CONTACT! 800•42~p9300 









IG12 $MHX 30f6 1.. T16 I ANHAH11 DAN NG 
··················~······· 
··I 
• DANCEROUS I 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 







013 ITA~ ?42fi I. C~G ~ SDDAtH 
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vta tauimile 
Attention; LaurA Reyn\)lds!Kate Riley 
!5396 JUncon Beach Park Drive 
Ventura. CA 9300 l 
August 14. 1991 
Honorable Richard KatZ 
Member of the Assomblv . 
9140 Van Nuys Blvd., ~uite 109 
Panorama City. CA 91402 
O.W Assemblyman Katz. 
Subj~-t: Southern Pacific Train Wreck and Toxic Spill at Seacliff 
IH02 P02 
The. Seacliff Beach Cdcny Homeov~~·ners Association 11t comprised of the cwnen of the 49 
houses wruch we.re evacuated as, a result of tile Julv .:;8th Southern Pacific train wreck and 
toxic &pill. • 
The attached list summarizes the out<)tanding qu~-stiotJ.S, issues and cc.ncern6: which aTe of 
I.Um~t importance to At~sociation members. We hope that tire perspectives c,f tllose most 
directly affected by this disaster will be of value to you in your analysis of the need for 
more slrinietll ~iulatory measures, monitoring and enforcement procedures. 
We strongly support your commitment to improving the level of safety for all who live, 
work. or visit areas contiguous to railroad rights of wa]. Your leaderohip in pursuing the 
crtncal issues outlined herein woulcl be gratefully appre.::.iated. If your s:atiis a,·ailable to 
discuss this matter, or can answer any of the enclosl!'d questions, I can be reac:hw 




Chair, Environmental Committee 
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lnues lbganUna the Southern Padf'h.~ Train Derailment 
Auauet 14, 1f91 page 1 of 4 
1. WHAT CHEMICALS WERE INVOLVED? 
It is believed that aqut®S hydra:rine in :1 SO% &f>luticn was the only chemical that spilled. 
However, the e:xact idcmtity and quantity of chemleals splUed have aot yet 
been ab10lutely connnned. \\'hat chemicals were/are involved and in what amounts? 
-le.a.ked, spilled or released from the train 
-clouds and (umes relf.ased at the time or the wreck and during cleanup 
·breakdown components or each chemical interacting with the air, 
ground surfaces, and other chemicals released 
-clean up chemicals and their interactions 
2. WERE PEOPLE EXPOSED 
WRECK? 
CLOtDS SET OFF BY 
We were told that the wind was !::&owing awa} from Seacliff towards the 
a northerlv direction, so that people at the site or in the vicinity to the southw£st were not 
exposed. ·Howe:ve:r, computeliz.ed dam 1 from the Di&itar weather starion alA Seaciiff 
home (see below) shows that the wi car·rying the toxie rloud wru; blowina in 
a south/southwest dirtc:tlon cUnctly over the Seaclifl' community bcad1 
areas for several hours afttr tht Wrttk oteurrtd. 
Helicopters tlying over the wreck and beach areas caused si~ficant turbulence and 
dispersal of tne cloud in There is a stronger pos~1bility than was 
assumed that people at and adjacent areas were exposed to the 
hydraz.ine \'apors, 
. 
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, 
TO:CAPITOL OFFI 
AUG-14-'91 WED 06 l 
1'1Ut:l 14 ··:n .;..;. ~· _,, 
SeadU'f Beach 
laue& ReaarcUng the 
Av;uet 14, l!J9t . pase l 
J. DID PEOPLt: SUFFER 
EXPOSURE? 
TEL NO: **102 P04 
Association 
Train Derailment 
EFFECTS FROM TOXIC 
There was no interview or survey a.r.d others who were evacuated to determine 
if they had any syntptoms of hazardoWi exposure. Resident~ who were evacuated 
have experienced various respirato lmenu that indieate po$Jible 
hazardoul exposure to the toxtt da micals. 
Who is responsible for inve3tiitttine such a public health concern~ conducting a study of the 
resid~nts' s)mptoms to dettrmme cau5e and effect? Were special hazards posed to the 
elderly, infmn, children, infante;, pr~gnam women. m1d women of child~ng ase? What 
data needs to be ccllecmd to detemune t~ neat·, rrud and lona term potenual hea.l.th hu.ards 
from exposure to ie:akina or spilled chemicals, fumes 3rtd clouds from the wreck, 
chemicals used in the cleanup a.lld their interactive chemical reactions. or dust and ditt 
clouds spewini from f>trtet s·.vecpers and other cleanup vehicles. 
4. WHO WAS IN CHARGE? 
It has been verified tbat no cleanup ex:is~.ed prior to the wreck, and there \)..'as a 
substantial delay 1dendfying the involved. We understand that there were 
numerous public agencies involved in discreet aspects of the emergency resJX>nse and 
cleanup eff·oru. Agencies were frustrated their admirable efforts te respond to thi~ 
emergency We commend those involvec! in the emergeri~ response efforts and 
deeply app~iate their best attem~ dealini with such pUl.rlin& ctrcumstances. 
While recognizing the nee-.d for teamV~-'ork. lt was apparent that there was no slnale 
eoof'dlhating aaency dlrectina tnt ~ dfo11. This created a chaocic situation 
when residents attempted to find a consistent and reliable source of criticaJ information and 
updates. It also prevented residents, once scattered, from locating each otht:·r or 
communicating through a central clearinghouse. 
5. WERE THE OCEAN AND BEACHFRONT CONTAMINATED? 
WIUttutl reporttd obsening the spined ebemieals leaklna Into the stonn 
drain that empties under the free,·ay ramp directly Into the ocean. Witnesses 
also observed workers hosing down th~ cleanup chemicals into the 'tonn drain. Was the 
outflow tested for contamination as !t drained inro tbe ocean? 
It was verbally indicated to us and reported in the pr~ that it was advisable (()r 
beac:hcombers. swimmers and swfers to stay out of the ocean for ten days after the wreck. 
No reasons were gh·en, no si!nage was posted, no monitoring program was in effect and 
no enforcement was taken. Therefore, people begnn using the beach and swimming. within 
a week of the spilL What data was used to dctennine when the beach and ocean \\'ere safe 
for use? 
183 





Auauet 14, 1991 
WAS SOUTHERN 
ACCORDING TO 
We we.re told that Southern Pacific was""'"'"''.,"" 
on their property. if all 
environment and the 
~Tminini And certifi..cAtion o£cleanup crew: 
were hired for rh.is · on an emergency 
hired by C00tfactCJr !Hf .. >ni'l••rl 
eluses prior 
'·WILL 
ENVIRONMENT . \L 
1 
TEL NO: **102 P05 
II 
TO:CAPITOL OFrlC~ 
AUG-14-'91 WED 12:07 ID: 
RUG 14 'Sll. l1: 14 .Jt,.IHI'! ~. i,;H'J~'''• Hi'J ... TEL NO: ;t102 P06 
SeaeUff Beach Colony Homeowners' AHodatlon 
bluu Regardtna the Southern Padflc Train Derailment 
Auaurrt 14, 1991 pase 4 of 4 
10. WHAT W.tLL PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN? 
We are concerned ~ith the immediate questions regarding personal safety. We are equally 
concerned about policies and procedures to en.~ure our safety in the future. It Is clear 
that .the rules which sovem trains tarrying toxit and huardou• mat~rlals 
are In need of eomplete restructuring. · 
We know that there were simple and comparatively inexpensive regulati0118 that could have 
prevented this disaster. SOmeone riding in the caboose would have. setn the sparks miles 
before the train derailed If individual containers were specifically labelled, the cleanup 
approach could have begun earlier. If batrets holding the chemicals were stutdjer or better 
iMulated, they might not have ruptuted on impact. 
Considering the potential for more devastatine; consequences, there are reasons to be 
thankful. There were no hunum death$, a mir~e considering the heavy weekend use of 
the Rincon Parkway. Personal vehicles were not occupied when the train can crushed· 
them. A bi.cycbst o:n the ParkWay was pedalling alonfside the engine, rather than a fe\v 
yanh behind. Sparks along the Rinoon did not grow mto e:t~osive fires. headina for the 
adjacent oil fields and trapping residents and beach users. Onlookers were able to put out 
the grass fires on the railroad right of way in Ventura and along the Parkway. Napthalene 
remained untouched in an adJacent conminer. rather than interacting with the hydruine, 
causing a catastrophic disaster and many deaths. 
In the near future, comprehensive regularory mea.Nre:s~nust be enlded.. monitored and 




'IO: The State Assembly Transportation Corrrnittee 
DATE: August 14, 1991 
FROM: Rex and Norine Fine, Seacliff residents 
SUBJECI': Transportation of hazardous materials and Southern Pacific 
train derailments in Ventura (Seacliff) and Shasta Counties 
We did not know of the hearing being held in the State Building, 107 So. 
Broadway on 8/15/91 until we read it in the Los Angeles Times on 8/13/91. The 
possibility of changing our work schedules to be downtown Los Angeles between 
9:00-12:00 on 8/15/91 is unlikely. 
It is our hope that the enclosed letter will reach the carmittee by courier 
Thursday morning. We would appreciate you taking a m:::ment to read the letter in 
lieu of our public testirnoney participation. 
Please notify us of any future hearing dates. We are very concerned about 
the future of train transportation and transferring of toxic chemicals. Thank 
you for your time. 
sr2:7~/4~<-~~~ 
Rex and Norine Fine 
5510 Rincon Beach Park Drive 
Seacliff Beach Colony 
Ventura, CA 93001 
Residence (805) 648-2872 




Mr. William F. Currier 
Su-perintendent, Southern Pacific Transportation Cc:mpany 
1200 Corporate Center Drive 
~bnterey Park, California 91754 
Dear ~1r. Currier, 
I am asking you to please take a mc:rnent to help reduce U1e risk of accidents 
and possibly save lives. This letter is prompted by the recent evacuation of my 
wife and I from our home in Seacliff Beach Colony (Ventura) due to a Southern 
Pacific derailment and subsequent toxic spill (hydrazine) at the accident site. 
Presently many Seacliff residents are experiencing uncertainty, fear, anger, 
and lack of safety. There is also a great deal of anxiety regarding the short 
term and long term effects of the toxic chemical hydrazine. In an effort to 
bring some safety and harmony back into the lives of the Seacliff residents I am 
asking that you reduce the speed of the Southern Pacific trains to 15-20 m.p.h. 
when cc:rning Urrough the Seacliff area. I am sure that the residents of Faria and 
Solimar, just south of Seacliff, would appreciate the safer speed as well. South-
ern Pacific and Amtrak are presently coming through the Seacliff community at the 
reduced sr~ of 15-20 m.p.h. while the accident area is being repaired. Under 
the circumstances surrounding the train derailment, the request for reduced speed 
is not illlreasonable. 
I watched the accident happen and was on the scene quickly. It was amazing 
that no one on a bicycle, on foot, or in a car was hit by the collasping train. 
I had intended to write to Southern Pacific before because high speed trains 
coming tltrough the area literally shake the ground and houses. Unfortunately I 
didn't. It was the high speed and the "scraping sound" that drew my attention to 
this train and how I have come to realize that a slower speed could have prevented 
this kind of accident. ~. Currier I am asking for your support and help in 
resolving same of the events surrounding the Seacliff accident and helping prevent 
further accidents. 
This past weekend many Seacliff residents ccmnented on how much safer it felt 
with U1e train moving slower. This was a positive feeling felt by many after two 
weeks of disruptive feelings. If the request for reduced speed is unreasonable or 
too expensive I would like to know how this is concluded. If you have any solu-
tions to help prevent further accidents at Seacliff and help the residents live 
safely I would appreciate your thoughts. 
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the 
1 • Signi reduced through Seacliff, 
Faria and Solimar. 
2. If the speed will not be reduced then build a wall for safety, noise reduct-
ion and ground The wall would also be protective for beach 
walkers, campers, vacationers, bicycle and vehicles along the much 
traveled Pacific Coast Highway. 
3. Label distinctively the container and the particular railroad car that toxic 
material is inside. Also identify the chemical. 
4. The conducter or specified person should have on his or her posession an 
inventory list of all toxic chemicals being transported. (In the Seacliff 
accident 36 hours had gone by and no one was exactly sure what the toxic 
chemical was.) 
In closing let me say that the lives of all Seacliff residents have been 
significantly affected. When my wife and I were evacuated we were able to take 
our golden retriever "Spencer" with us. OUr next door neighbors were not hane at 
tl1e time of the evacuation and were not allowed back into the area to get their 
two dogs. Subsequently when tl1ey were allowed to return to their hane one of 
their dogs was dead and traces of hydrazine were found in their hane. Hydrazine 
was found in their heme seven days after the accident and now our friends and next 
door neighbors have decided to move out of tl1eir home permanently. I ask that you 
do your part to help prevent tl1is sort of accident from happening in the future. 




5510 Rincon Beach Park Drive 
Seacliff Beach Colony 
Ventura, CA 93001 
Business (818) 881-9493 
Home (805) 648-2872 
cc: Patricia Eckert, President, State Public Utilities Commission 
Jack O'Connell, Assemblyman (D) Carpenteria 
Richard Katz, Assemblyman (D) Panorama City 
Bob Campbell, National Transportation Safety Board 
Mike Mohan, President, Soutllern Pacific Transportation Company 
Penny Newmann, Citizens Clearing House for Hazardous Wastes 
Joanna M. Mi.ller, staff writer on the scene of the accident, L.A. Times 
Carol Goldstein, Seacliff Residents Train Accident 
Jerry Fine, Esq. 
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Testimony of Dr. Laura Lake, NCJW/LA Environment Committee 
Before the California Assembly Transportation Committee Hearing 
on Toxics Shipment Transportation Safety 
Los Angeles, August 15, 1991 
Good morning Assemblyman Katz. On behalf of the NCJW I wish 
to commend you for holding this important hearing, and bring to 
your attention key issues of concern to our Environment Committee. 
As you know, our organization played a major role in the Rocketdyne 
case, and we are once again involved in a vi tal alliance of 
environmental organizations committed to the safe handling and 
disposal of nuclear waste. We are here because of our concern for 
the transportation accidents attendant with the Ward Valley Low 
Level Radioactive Waste Facility. Included in such transportation 
grids is air shipments of radioactive material. 
One of NCJW's national resolutions on nuclear power 
specifically concerns the safe transport of nuclear waste and the 
safe disposal. Almost all attention has focused to date on the 
disposal, and none on transportation safety. As the press 
statement of our alliance makes clear, we expect that these issues 
be addressed in advance of a license, not afterward. 
According to an article by Nancy Leiserowitz in the Feb. 22, 
1990 Lansing State Journal, "more than 2 million radioactive 
packages ... are shipped in the United States each year .... Trucks 
carrying nuclear waste have accidents at the standard rate of one 
accident for every 150,000 miles traveled. 
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"From 1971 to 1985 there were 1034 accidents or incidents 
involving low-level wastes. In 90 cases, radioactive materials 
were actual released. 11 The worst case was on I-235 Wichita, 
Kansas bypass, in 1978, when 54 drums of uranium yellowcake 
spilled. Motorists and the Highway Patrol rushed to assist and 
walked through the material, unaware of its danger. The first 
person to respond, a state trooper, died of lung cancer seven years 
later. 
Every community along a radioactive/toxic haul route faces a 
Bhopal situation. Few are prepared. We must examine the safety 
of transporting these materials rather than safe on-site storage 
as practiced in Canada. 
Again, NCJW appreciates the opportunity to testify today, and 
urges this committee to pursue answers to these critical questions. 
### 
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FOR RELEASE AUGUST 15, 1991 CONTACT: LAURA LAKE 
(213) 470-4522 
PRESS RELEASE 
Imagine if you will that the last two California train spills 
had been radioactive cargoes rather than highly toxic chemicals. 
This committee has the task of asking what can go wrong with toxic 
and nuclear waste shipment--before it happens again. 
r-:;......,r-, .... ..--:--
-..~ ... -._J '-4 .t:.'- -
4- '"...-. • :_ vias te Dt:.rr.p 
proposed Ward Valley Low Leve2 
t~e Assecbly Transportation C:~~ittee 
tc :E~~=~ a f~:: investigation and public hearings on: 
t::C.e safety and insurance record of the f i rrr.s engage-:: 
hauling rad:oactive waste, 
the labeling req~irements for this cargo, 
the status of rail and road systems leading to the dump (see 
at tache:! r.evJs article December 2 5, 1990, July 2 5, 1990 s~c>·::. ng 
washed-c~t reads to the Ward Valley site), 
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the liability for California for non-California radioactive 
waste transported to the site, and 
the preparedness of first responders, including the CHP, 
and volunteer firefighters, to respond to radioactive spills, and 
finally, the liability for cleanup of contaminated sites. 
Until a full study is conducted, the alliance urges the 
Transportation Committee to support a moratorium on the siting of 
the Ward Valley Facility, and to order the Department of Health 
Services not to issue a license pending the transportation safety 
analysis of this committee .. 
These organizations are concerned that. the transportation 
safety impacts of the Ward Valley site were ignored by the 





Dear Mr. Fu r-son: 
ENT OF UMAN OUR 
HEALTH Dl\'!S!ON 
flA<llologlc•l He•lth Section 
50S L•:·l !{in~ .Str-:<'1, Hoom 203 
C<>r,on CH~·. Nev<>tb 89710 
(702) 885-53')4 
LAW!lfNCE I> ~~' 
AJmlnl,INM 
JOSEPH Q. JArtVI 
Htealth Ojfk, 
Your letter dated Oc:tcbe:r 1, 1937, is acknmvledged. The lettar 
1:equest.s a surrunary of ,_.iola.tions doc1.wnent~d during state 
inspections of low-level radi.oactive waste shipments received at 
Rocky I1ountain Compact Reg.i onal faciLity near Beatty, Nv. 
ng categories sumrnnrize the violation types documented 
May 1, 1986 - December Jl, 1986. 
Documentation-Related 
Improper/In~omplete bill of lading 3 
Improper placards or improper display of placards 19 
Radiation Safety-Related 
No notification prior to entering state 
Bracing not adequate to prevent-. all mo•:ement of 
shipment contents 
Radiation levels exceeding permissible limits · 
Drive failure to follo\·l exclusive usc instructions 








STATE OF NEVADA 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 
~-
... 
RICHARD H. BRYAN 
GOViJfllOf 
HEALTH DIVISION 
RADIOLOGICAl. HEALTH SECTIOIJ 
505 East l<lng Street, Room 202 




April 3, 1987 
Eob Fulkerson 
Citizen Alert 
P.O. Box 5391 
Reno, Nevada 89513 
Dear Mr. Fulkerson: 
Your letter dated March 4, 1987 is acknowledged. The- letter 
requested information concerning the Beatty low-level radio~ctive 
waste di~posal site . 
... 
Month Shipments Violations Volume(cu. ft.) 
1986 January 0 0 0 
February 0 0 , .... 0 ' 
Iv1arch 0 0 0 
Apr"il 3 0 1,327.5 
Hay 11 5 5,200.9 
June 7 2 2,952.3 
July 21 8 8,080.5 
August 21 10 8,566.5 
September 37 7 15,108.8 
oct;pber 31 10 16,884.8 
November 24 2 12,696.1 
December 49 11 23,403.9 
.!.O"d 
I. 
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Vice Chairman 




July 29, 1991 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company 
One Market Plaza 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
Dear Mr. Starzel: 
CONSULT ANTS 
John R Steve~s 
Pnnc>pa 
L EnK Lange 




Sacramento CA 95814 
(916) 445-7276 
Yesterday, a Southern Pacific train derailed on the main line 
between Los Angeles and Oakland, spilling hydrazine on the rails 
near Ventura. In the wake of the Dunsmuir tragedy earlier this 
month, this incident raises serious concerns about Southern 
Pacific's ability to safely transport hazardous materials on 
California's rails. 
Should either of these accidents have occurred in the densely 
populated areas through which these trains traveled, the 
consequences would have been even more devastating. 
For that reason, I am requesting that Southern Pacific immediately 
take the following voluntary steps: 
1) Perform an immediate inspection of all equipment (including 
rail cars owned by other entities) and track used for the 
transportation of hazardous material. 
2) Implement enhanced safe operating procedures at locations on 
any Southern Pacific line with a pattern or history of 
derailments. Such procedures could include instituting the use of 
helper locomotives at lower weight thresholds than is currently 
the case in areas such as the Dunsmuir derailment site. 
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I believe these actions are necessary in order to ensure the 
safety of California's citizens and to restore the confidence of 
the public in the safety of our rail system. I look forward to 
your immediate response to this request. 
~0'1 
RICHARD KA~ 





Mr. Richard Katz 
Chair, Assembly Transportation Committee 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Chairman Katz: 
Please refer to your letter of July 29 expressing your 
concerns about the movement of hazardous materials on railroads in 
California, and specifically requesting that Southern Pacific take 
voluntary steps to enhance safety. 
Your letter makes two specific requests, and I shall address 
them in turn. 
First, inspection of all equipment and track used for the 
transportation of hazardous material: The rail industry is 
governed by the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, which sets 
forth the standards of operation, inspection, maintenance, and 
safety for both equipment and track. Adherence to these standards 
is monitored by Federal Railroad Administration inspectors who are 
constantly visiting our property. These regulations require 
regular foot-by-foot inspections of track by qualified inspectors 
(generally twice weekly on our main-line routes) and we follow 
these schedules scrupulously. In fact, our track maintenance, 
inspection, and safety standards, and speed of trains restrictions 
equal or are more stringent than those specified by the Federal 
Railroad Administration. 
We also inspect rail cars on our property (including cars 
owned by others) before they are moved in a train, and repeat the 
inspection process as the train moves through each major terminal. 
In addition, crew members must inspect their own and other trains 
at each opportunity. All employees working on line are also 
required to observe each passing train. 
Second, you also ask about institution of new operating 
procedures whenever clusters of accidents are found. we are 
concerned when accident clusters are found, and the Engineering, 
Operating, and Mechanical groups within the Company cooperatively 
tackle the problem to find the right answer. Sometimes revised 
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operating procedures will reduce accidents; other times track 
changes, or mechanical responses, will be needed. We do stand 
ready to implement operating procedure changes that will help. 
In addition to these corrective measures which respond to 
accidents or accident patterns, it should be noted that Southern 
Pacific is regarded in the industry as a leader in promoting 
measures which will help prevent accidents. 
Southern Pacific, for many years, has been an active leader in 
the Inter-industry Task Force on the safe transportation of 
hazardous materials by rail. This Task Force is sponsored by the 
Association of .American Railroads (AAR), the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association (CMA) and the Railway Progress Institute (RPI). This 
Task Force has been instrumental in instituting safe work practices 
for the Chemical and Railroad industry, and as example, attached is 
a copy of .AAR Circular No. OT-SSA, which recornmands operating 
practices for the transportation of hazardous materials. Southern 
Pacific has not only adopted these operating practices but, in 
addition, has established even more stringent practices, namely: 
Any train on Southern Pacific containing a s~ngle car placarded 
Explosive A, poison gas,. radioactive, or a tank car containing a 
product classified as flammable gas or any of 21 other specific 
commodities (including 15 environmentally sensitive commodities) is 
given the recommended handling. 
Additionally, we have been very active within the Task Force 
to encourage the use of a stronger vehicle (steel pressure 
specification car with a working pressure of 500 PSI, head shields, 
no bottom outlets, etc.) for the transportation of selected 
environmentally sensitive commodities. 
I assure you we are making every effort to maintain and 
increase margins of safety so we can quickly restore, through 
results, yours and the public's full confidence in our rail system. 
The railroads are a much safer conduit for hazardous materials 





H. H. Bradley 
\'in· President 
December ll, 1990 
CIRCULAR No. OT-55-A 
RECOMMENDED RAILROAD OPERATING PRACTICES 
FOR TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
TO THE MEMBERS: 
Based on recorumendations of the Inter-Industry Task Force en 
the safe transportation of hazardous waterials by rail, the o-T 
General Com."'ni t:tee and the AAR Board of Directors approved for 
im.mediat~ publication the following recommended operating practices 
for the transportation of hazardous materials. 
Road operating Practices 
I. Industry-wide Implementation of "Key Trains" 
A. Definition: Any train with five tank car loads of poison 
inhalation hazard (packing group I, as defined in HM-181) or 20 car 
loads or interrnodal portable tank loads of a combination of PIH 
(PGI}, flammable gas, Class A explosives, and environmentally 
sensitive chemicals shall be called a "Key Train". Attached as 
Appendix A is a list of PIH (PGI) and environmentally sensitive 
chemicals with 49 STCCs. 
B. Restrictions: 
1. Maximum speed -- "Key Train" - 50 MPH. 
2. Unless siding or auxiliary track meets FRA Class 2 
standards, a Key Train will hold main track at meeting or passing 
points, when practicable. 
3. After 12/31/93 no cars with friction bearings will be 
perwitted in any 11 Key Train 11 • The A.AR will initiate the process of 
amending the lnterchange Rules to require that all cars with 
friction bearings be eliminated from interchange service by 
12/31/93 rather than the current date of 12/31/94. 
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4. When a moving "Key Tra is stopped by any emergency 
brake application, or by some unknown cause, the train must be 
inspected for derailed or defective cars. If the train is stopped 
at a place where it cannot be safely inspected (e.g. bridge), the 
train may be moved if conditions permit to the nearest place where 
it can be safely inspected. 
5. If a defect in a "Key Traintt journal is reported by a 
wayside detector, but a visual inspection fails to confirm evidence 
of a defect, the train will not exceed 30 MPH until it has passed 
over the next wayside detector. If the same car again sets off the 
next detector, it must be set out from the train. 
11. Industrywide Designation of '1Key Routes" 
A. Definition: Any track with a combination of 10, ooo car 
loads or intermodal portable tank loads of hazardous materials, or 
a combination of 4,000 car loadings of PIH (PGI), flammable gas, 
Class A explosives, and environmentally sensitive chemicals, over 
a period of one year. 
B. Requirements: 
l. Wayside defective bearing detectors shall be placed a 
maximum of 40 miles apart on "Key Routesn, or equivalent level of 
protection may he installed based on improvement in technology. 
2. Main Track on "Key Routesn must be inspected by rail 
defect detection and track geometry inspection cars or any 
equivalent level of inspection no less than two times each year; 
and sidings must be similarly inspected no less than one time each 
year. 
3. Any track used for meeting and passing "Key Trains" must 
be Class 2 or better. If a meet or pass must occur on less than 
Class 2 track due to an emergency, one of the trains must be 
stopped before the other train passes. 
III. Yard Operating Practices 
A. Maximum reasonable efforts will be made to achieve coupling 
of loaded placarded tank cars at speeds not to exceed 4 MPH. 
B. Loaded placarded tank cars of PIH (PGI) or fla~able gas 
which are cut off in motion for coupling must be handled in not 
more than 2-car cuts; and cars cut off in motion to be coupled 
directly to a loaded placarded tank car of PIH (PGI) or flammable 




Proposed Separation Distance (In Feet) 
Loaded Tank Cars and storage Tanks from Mainline 
Class II Track or Better 
Activity 
Loading or unloading 
if conditions permit 






Storage of loaded tank cars 25 
Storage in tanks 
If conditions permit 
not less than 
50 
25 
PIH (PGI), Flammable 
Liquid, Flamma~le Gas, 
Non-fla~able Gas and 






With regard to existing facilities, maximum reasonable effort 
should be made to conform to this standard taking into 
consideration cost, physical and legal constraints. 
The proposals apply to storage on railroad property and on che~ical 
company property located close to railroad mainline. 
V. TRAINING OF TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES 
Imple~entation of Railroad Industry Training Objectives for 
Railroad Operating Employees 
The following obiectives should be met in everv railroad's 
~rogram for training operating employees (non-emergency resRonders) 
Who handle hazardous materials in transpQitation: 
A. Employees (including supervisors) who handle shipments of 
hazardous materials in rail transportation should learn to perform 
the following tasks as they apply to their assigned duties: 
1. Comply with the requirements for hazardous materials 
shipping data in rail transportation of hazardous materials; 
2. Recognize markings and placards that indicate the 
presence of hazardous materials; 
202 
- 4 -
3. When required by regulation, inspect the external 
conditions of placarded hazardous materials shipments to assure 
that they are properly prepared for transportation; 
4. switch placarded hazardous material shipments in 
compliance with applicable rules and regulations; and 
5. Place placarded hazardous material shipments in a train 
in compliance with applicable rules and regulations. 
B. Employees (including supervisors) who handle shipments of 
hazardous materials in rail transportation should learn to perform 
the following tasks in hazardous materials incidents: 
1. Make the appropriate identifications and notifications and 
provide the appropriate information as required by railroad 
operating rules and instructions for handling hazardous materials; 
2. Take appropriate action to protect self and others on the 
scene; and 
3. Provide assistance to the local emergency response agencies 
in the form of identification of the hazardous materials and their 
location(s) on the train. 
c. The training objectives set out in paragraphs A and B 
(above) should apply to and meet the specific requirelnents of 
particular crafts, for example: train crews, inspectors, and clerks 
who prepare consist information. 
D. The objectives set out in paragraphs A and B (above) cover 
a basic training program for employees (including supervisors). 
Frequency of training in this category should be consistent with 
the timing of existing railroad re-examination programs. 
E. Training of employees {including supervisors) who handle 
shipments of hazardous materials on a "Key Route" (as defined in 
Part II above) should be conducted on an annual basis. This 
training should meet the objectives set out in paragraphs A and B 
{above}, but should also cover additional subject matter, including 
special hazardous material operating requirements for the route, 
yard emergency plans and practices in those plans, and basic 
chemical characteristics. Each of these employees should 
demonstrate proficiency by passing a written examination or by 
other means such as a successful work practices audit. 
F. All training should be recorded. It will suffice if the 
individual carries a card indicating that he meets certain 
requirements or if his personnel record indicates the date and 
level of training received. 
.. 
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Chloroacetic acid, liquid 
Chloroacetone, mono, stabilized 
Chloroacetonitrile1 
Chloroacetophenone (CN) liquid 
Chloropicrin* 
Chloropicrin mixtures, N.o.s.· 
Chloropivaloylchloride2 
Crotonaldehyde, stabilized 
Cyanogen bromide (solid) 
Cyclohexyl isocyanate1 




Dimethyl thiophosphoryl chloride2 
Dimethyldichlorosilane 
Dimethylphosphorochloridothioate 










Hydrocyanic acid aqueous solution (HCN 5-20%) 1 
Hydrogen cyanide, anhydrous· 
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PIH (PG!) Liquids as proposed in HM-181 
Methyl orthosilicate1 
Methyl phosphonic dichloride 
Methyl phosphonousdichloride, pyrophoric liquid 







Nitric acid (over 70%) 3 











Poisonous liquid, N.o.s. 1 
Poisonous liquids, flammable, N.o.s. 1 
Poisonous liquids, corrosive, N.o.s. 2 
n-Propyl chloroformate1 
Sulfur chloride (mono) 



































Materials that are not in 49 CFR 172.101 Table by name but have been 
assigned a 49 STCC under an appropriate N.o.s. proper shipping name. 
2 
3 
Materials that are not in 49 CFR 172.101 Table by name and which do 
not have an assigned 49 STCC code. Since no one has requested a 49 
STCC number, it is unlikely that the material is moved by tank car. 
There is no proper shipping name for Nitric Acid (over 70%). Nitric 
Acid (over 40%/ is the D.o.T. proper shipping name. 
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Chloropicrin and methylbromide mixtures· 
Chloropicrin and methylchloride mixtures 
Compressed or liquified gases; flammable, toxic, 
N.o.s., LC50 less than or equal to 1,000 ppm2 
Compressed or liquified gases, toxic, N.o.s., 







Hexaethyl tetraphosphate & compressed gas mix. 
Hexafluoroacetone1 
Hydrogen selenide, anhydrous 
Hydrogen sulfide, liquefied 





Nitric oxide and nitrogen tetroxide mixtures1 
Nitrogen dioxide 
Nitrogen trioxide1 
Organic Phosphate or compounds mixed with 
compressed gas 
Oxygen difluoride1 







































Materials that are not in 49 CFR 172.101 Table by name but have been 
assigned a 49 STCC under an appropriate N.O.S. proper shipping name. 
Materials that are not in 49 CFR 172.101 Table by name and which do 
not have an assigned 49 STCC code. Since no one has requested a 49 
STCC number, it is unlikely that the material is moved by tank car. 
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Ethylene Dibromide* (alreadly listed as PIH) 




























August 13, 1991 
Mr. Richard Rat~ 
Chairman 
Assembly Committee on Transportation 
Assembly California Legislature 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
Please refer to your letter of July 23, 1991 concerning the 
J'uly 14 Southern Pacific Transportation Company ( "SPT") derailment 
near Dunsmuir. Following up on my July 29, 1991 response to you, 
SPT has developed the following further information in response to 
your requests: 
1. In response to the second request in your letter, the 
rail, tie, and surfacing maintenance performed on the 
line within a mile in each direction of the derailment 
for the past three years is set forth in Attachment A. 
The information is broken down by date, location, and the 
amount of work performed. Please note that heavy tie and 
surfacing maintenance on Southern Pacific is scheduled on 
a 4-year cycle. The last heavy tie and surfacing 
maintenance occurred on the line in 1987 and was 
scheduled again for later this year. 
2. In response to your third request, we are reviewing the 
privacy considerations involved in disclosing the safety 
record of the engineer and conductor involved and will 
further respond to you concerning this request shortly. 
3. In response to the seventh request in your letter, the 
total number of placarded rail cars, trailers and 
containers transported over the line by year from 1986 
through the first six months of 1991 are set forth in 
Attachment B. 
If SPT can be of further assistance, please let me know. 
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DETAIL OF RAIL MAINTENANCE 1987 TO DATE 
~c~ LINE MP 826.98 - 328.98 
07/~:1/91 
l..EFT I F:AlL 
LJORt( FROM TO RlGHT LA!rt RAIL 
ItATE MILEPmiT MIL~F·OST RAIL. F'EET WEIGHT 
------- ..... -·------·- -- -·-··-·- --· ----- --·----
08/17/90 Z26 .. 92 -:::;:7. 00 R 467 186 
08/20/9(:) 326.92 :;::~:'7. 00 L 467 1:::6 
04/21/87 :~27. 00 :::~?. 10 R 480 136 
04/?2/87 :!:27 .. 00 :~:27 .10 L 480 1:::6 
08/l5/90 :::27.10 :::~~7. 20 L 525 1~6 
08/26/90 ;:.:27. l. 0 827.20 R ~19 1:::6 
04/16/87 :::27.:::0 :::27.40 R !.20 12.6 
04/16/87 827. ~::o :::27. 40 F: 20 l:::6 
04/20/87 ~~ ~~ 7 • :~: 0 :::;:~7 .. 4~"' L 520 1~:6 
08/14/90 ~;27. 42 :~!;~7. ~50 L 2ei~, 1 :;:(; 
o;/14/90 :::~7. 42 ~~: ~? 7 • !:~ 0 R ze.o 136 
08/1:::/90 :::27.52 :::27.60 L 438 1 :~:6 
08/14/90 :!:27. 32 %'7 .60 L 488 l. :;:6 
08/08/90 :::27.81 :~:28 .. 17 L 1000 1:::6 
08/0'7'/90 :::27.81. :::z:t-;. 17 l 600 1~:6 
08/l0/90 :::27- ~::1. :::::8.17 f( 1000 1:::6 
0 8/1 :::I 'i (l ::~27.8~ ::;:2t~. 17 F: 600 l:i:!6 
f.=)4/'l2/8C' 327. ~<:; ~~:::~7. 85 r-: 20 :l. ~=6 
04/1 ::!/87 :::27.86 ::;. ;.~ 8. j, 8 L 1770 1 :;:6 
04./1.4/87 :::27. E~~, :::.zs. 18 ~~ 1770 1::_:6 
12/18/89 ::;:~'B _ 1 o :~: ~~ E: .. 4C F' 6 ... ,. .. ·=·c.\ 1::% 
(H/(:4/9(l :::~:8. 20 :::z:B ~ ~:2 l 706 1~:6 
01/04/90 ::!28. ::~2 ::::i'E;. 40 F: ~C'"c:" · ... · ·-' ·-t 1:::6 
08/~2/89 ~i28. ::::.:: :::28.41 L ::~~::9 1~::6 
0912::::/89 :::28 ~ :~:~=; :~:.:::s. 41 .... ::::::9 l3b r, 
06/0:;:/88 328 • .40 ::_;:zs. 48 f;: :::78 1:::6 
OB/21/8'7 ~=:~~8 .. !:;0 :::28" .6.4 F: 66::: 136 
08/22/8'7' :::28" 50 :~:28. 64 L 663 1:::6 
01/03/90 ::::28.50 3~'f{. 64 R 166 136 
01/0:::/90 ::::?8. 50 :::::·a. 64 L 815 :t:.::6 
Q€;;0:::/90 :::28.83 .:_. r.tc> • o::: F: ~;eo 1::::6 ..... , ' 08/06/90 628. a::: :::29. o::: k: ::004 1:::6 




D~1AIL OF TIE MAINTENANCE 1987 TO DATE 
·· C ··· L 1 N C M r:· :;: 2 6 • 9 8 - :::2 8 • 9 8 
071:::1/91 
WORV FROM TO M OF 
[lATE: MILEPOST MILEF·OST TIES 
--------- --·------ --------
10/09/87 :::2!:,. 50 :::27.40 600 
12/27/89 S27.20 S27.15 ::;7 
12/28/89 :!!27. 20 =::::.?. 15 59 
12/29/89 ;::27. 20 :::27.15 ~ ...... ~:· L.. 
10/04/90 ;:;27. 50 327.50 36 
02/26/87 327.70 327.70 6 
10/07/87 :::27.70 :::28. 00 504 
09/25/90 827.80 ::;:27. 80 1 .... L. 
10/08/90 :::~ ... 7. 80 :::27.80 48 
09/24/90 :~27. 90 ~:27. 90 11 
09/21/90 :::27.90 :::27.90 7 
10/02/90 :::z7. 95 :::27.95 47 
10/01/90 ~:327. 98 :=:27. 98 28 
10/06/87 :::28.01 :?!28 .. 20 :;:22 
07/29/87 ::;28 .. 02 :::28.02 -::· .,. 
0l/Z9/89 ::::;:>8. 05 :;:28. 05 15 
07/29/87 :::~'8. 08 ;~::28. 08 ..... .. 
o:::/Ob/90 :::28.20 :::28-20 12 
10/05/E::? :::~'ft. "'i 0 :::;;:·9. 20 ::; 2 J 
07/12/89 :::28. 60 ~:zt-;. 60 6 
06/14/91 :.:;28. 7:':· :::28. 75 1"' .. 
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!rt::.lAJI_ OF SURFAC.:JNG MAINTENANCE 1987 TO DATE. 
~c~ LINE MP 326.98 - 328.98 
07/:::1/91 
WOf::~~ F f.;; OM TCJ SURF" ACE 
IrATE M:CLE.F·OST MILEF·OST FEET 
-------- -------- -------- -------
10/22/87 325.00 :::;:? .00 10584 
05/22/87 S26.90 :::z;r. 1 o 1056 
10/19/87 :'£!27. 00 327.40 2112 
10/21/87 ::::7.00 327. ll. 580 
O:J/09/90 :';~27 .15 :!:27. :::o 600 
05/21/87 SZ7.25 ~=27. 45 1E>56 
10/12/90 :;:27 .. ?.G :;:26. 90 2112 
10/11/90 327.64 :::27.:::2 1160 
07/20/91 :::27.70 :::27. 90 l.036 
06/:::0/87 827.70 =;:~··7. 60 lt::=l 
10/09/9G' :::27,.80 :::27. :;4 1~:68 
05/21/87 :?.27. 8~~ 328. 10 1:;:zc 
06/01/88 :-:::27.85 :::ze. C>5 10~;6 
07/19/91 ~:27. 90 :::za. 10 1056 
l.0/04/90 2:28.00 328.20 1056 
10/08/90 :;:28. 00 827.80 1056 
04/25/87 :::;.;~e. oo ::::za. 2c~ 1056 
1 Q/l~~/87 :?:28.00 :;:28. 10 444 
06/04/91 :::2:8. j 0 :::~·8 .. ~;0 2120 
07/26/91 :;::;;;:8. 10 ::;.zc:. 20 C" ... \0 ... •t..-..J 
10/14/87 ~~::~8. 10 :::28. ,C:(-) 1640 
10/02/99 :::28" :~6 :~!28. 4::: 390 
10/13/87 :;:z:c. 40 :::28.60 1140 
10/0l/90 :::28. 60 ~:,:8. 4::: ;!:90 
0?/29/89 ::::?8. 7 4 :~:~S. 69 1050 
06/05/91. :::~8. 80 :::28. 70 528 
10/0::;:/89 :::28.85 ~::28. :.'0 1848 
10/16/90 3£~S). 5(J :::2G. 8~; 1.056 
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ATTACHMENT B 
PLACARDED LOADS OVER SHASTA ROUTE 
Inte.rmodal Intermodal 
Year ~rloads Containers t,railers 
1986 5118 100 361 
1987 4883 233 175 
1988 4854 104 397 
1989 5141 135 530 
1990 5727 262 3446 
1991 2486 142 2113 

K. A MOORE 
Southam Pacific 
Transportation Company 
Southern Pacific Building • One Market Plaza • San Francisco, California 94105 
,.ICE PRESIOENT·Of"'!:qA Tl0f'.l5 
From: K.A. Moore, Vice President -Operations 
R.H. Berry, Chief Mechanical Officer 
To: General Managers 
Assistant Chief Mechanical Officers 
All Locomotive Plant Managers 
Date: March 23, 1990 
RE: Policy Memo -- FRA Enforcement Activities 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company has adopted the attached policy 
document to address the stepped-up Federal Railway Administration inspection 
activity and defect discovery rate during the past year. 
This policy will also further the railroad's commitment to a safe and reliable 
locomotive fleet, reduce fines, and stem the costly service interruptions that 
FRA discovered violations have created. 
Nothing short of the highest level of commitment by each and every Southern 
Pacific employee involved will give us the focus and attention to detail that is 
necessary to successfully implement this policy. 
Please read the objectives and assignments carefully. Questions concerning the 
specific requirements of this policy should be addressed to R.H. Berry. 
K. A. Moore 
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Policy Memo - Response to FRA Enforcement Activities 
March 23, 1990 
BACKGROLJNI? ISSUES~ 
o Significantly increased Congressional oversight activity. 
o Changes in the Federal Railway Administration's legislative 
authority and administrative procedures brought about by the 
1988 Rail Safety lmprovement Act have dramatically affected 
SPTCo. 
o Inspection activity is up; there is a higher proportion of 
violations to inspections; there are higher fines per 
violation. The impacts of this increased FRA activity are 
unacceptable. 
0 In February 1989, the FRA effectively closed down our 
Tucson facility for over 48 hours. The resultant service 
disruptions jeopardized over $225,000,000 in SPTCo. 
revenues and even more importantly, threatened a loss of 
goodwill by thousands of our customers. 
o By effectively responding to these mounting FRA challenges, 
SPTCo. will also support its overall goal of operating a safe 
and reliable locomotive fleet. 




To promote a safe and reliable locomotive fleet 
By July 1, 1990, reduce by 50% the defect ratio (found 
through random sampling) and by January 1) 1991 achieve 
an additional 25% reduction. 
To avoid diverting resources (both shop time and money) 
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FRA Locomotive Defect Discovery Rate 
' of lnepeoted Unite Found Defective 
100\ ---------------··--------·-------
80\ -·---------·------------------------/ 
2 0\ ----··---------------·-- ------------------
0\~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F 
Month (Jan 88 • Feb SO) 
pNpartcl by W .. ttrn PoWir AIIOCiatea 
3 
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The FRA Shutdown of SP's Tucson Yard Put 
$225,000,000 of Annual Revenue at Risk! 
o 7 stack and UPS trains significantly delayed 
o Thousands of valued customers representing 
annual revenue of $225,000,000 to SP were 
impacted with delayed shipments. 
o The shutdown tied up 38 locomotives for 
approximately 400 hours of additional 
maintenance and repairs. It cost the railroad 
tens of thousands of dollars. 
How Many More Shutdowns Can 
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OVERVIEW 
FRA COMPUANCE PLAN 
This plan requires a high level of commitment on the part of all involved parties to 
aggressively pursue continual improvement in the quality and safety-related conditions 
of the SP/SSW locomotive fleet. Plan Implementation is a multi-faceted strategy to 
improve: the quality of locomotives released from major plants and service facilities 
through employee involvement and self-monitoring, and the routine servicing of 
locomotives (including those from outlying areas) at these facilities on a periodic 
basis, at an increased frequency. 
Critical to the success of this plan is to clearly identify those facilities capable of 
performing high quality service levels (SLS, SLT, SLF and cleaning) as opposed to 
those qualified to perform run-through type, mainline servicing (SLN). ln this regard, 
most SPT facilities have been evaluated and certified as capable of performing levels 
of service/overhaul from SLN through M30. (See Facility Matrix -- Page 6.) 
FACILITIES CERTIFIED TO SERVICE ALL CLASSES OF POWER: 
Eugene, Roseville (service track), West Colton, I.A Taylor, El Paso, 
Houston (Hardy Street), Pine Bluff (service track), Alton & Southern, 
Denver and Salt Lake City. 
FACILITIES CERTIFIED TO SERVICE LOCAL AND SWITCH LOCOMOTIVES ONLY: 
Oakland, San Antonio, Kansas City, Tucson, Avondale, Lafayette, East St. 
Louis, Grand Junction and Pueblo. (Some additional remote locations 
may, from time to time, be certified to service switch engines.) 
Each of these locations is equipped to satisfactorily dispatch all classes of locomotives, 
of the category described above, in compliance with existing safety regulations and 
policies or take appropriate action to handle as a "non-complying'' locomotive. 
5 
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FACILmES CERTIFIED FOR SERVlNG ALL LOCOMOTIVES 
-----------------------------------... ------------------------------------------------------
Service Level SLS SLT SLF M03 M06 M12 M50 M30 
............... ---------------------------... ·-·---------------------------------------------......... -...... 
Eugene " ......... X X X X X X 
Rose..ille ...... X X X X X X X 
LA Taylor ..... X X X X X X X 
W. Colton ..... X X X X X 
El Paso ....... X X X X X X 
Hardy Street ... X X X X X X X 
Pine Bluff . "" ". X X X X X X X X 
Denver ......... X X X X X X X X 
Salt Lake City .. X X X X X 
Sacramento X X X X X X X X 
A&S . . ... X X X X X X 
FACILITIES CERTIFIED FOR LOCAL AND SWITCH SERVICING 
------------------·--.. -------------------............................... _ ... ________________________________ .,...., ______ ... _______________ .................... -- ... -----· 
Service Level SLS SLT SLF M03 M06 M12 M50 M30 _____ ......... -............. _____ ..,.,...,.,._.., __ ............... _ ...... __________________________________________________ ... ____________ ..... _ ... _ ................. .. 
Oakland .. ,. ... X X X X 
Bakersfield .... X 
San Antonio ... X 
Kansas City ., .... X X X 
Tucson 1 ...... X X X 
Pueblo ......... X X X 
Avondale ...... :X: :X: X 
Lafayette ...... X X X 
East St. Louis ..• X 
Grand Junction . X X X 




~ ... i - .. 
........ ' 9 
-F~ ::~:• .:ft.T~ r-;//~,- :h.Jn,.-.:3. 
. ~ , 
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KEY CONCEPTS: 
o Plant Managers and Division Mechanical Officers are responsible to attest 
that locomotives released from their respective facilities comply with 
existing regulations and policies. 
o Plant Managers and Division Mechanical Officers, will coordinate the 
rotation of units with Regional Transportation Center Officers as follows: 
Don Marson in the Western Region, Assistant Chief Dispatchers in the 
Central Region, and Torn Williams in the Eastern Region. 
o Locomotives will be routed to the appropriate facility for SLS, SL T, SLF or 
maintenance at least every: 
-- 7 days for road freight locomotives 
-- 15 days for local or switch locomotives. 1 
OVERALL APPROACH: 
To make a significant improvement in FRA compliance of our locomotive fleet by: 
1) quantifying the degree of our problem; 2) measuring improvement; and 3) 
communicating the results back to our employees. To better accomplish this, 
management team involvement at the locomotive facilities will be significantly 
increased. Officers will randomly check the quality of repaired locomotives using 
standard formats. Supervisors will be required to inspect outbound consists, and 
lastly, in-house audit teams will periodically visit locomotive facilities to verify the 
quality of the product. 
Obviously, a critical element is employee involvement, and that improved involvement 
is a function of better two-way communication. A significant effort has begun to 
communicate to SPTCo. employees the severity of our problem and the need for more 
consistent attention to detail. 
1
• A separate study C\IJTently under way will address locations currendy usa:! for locomotive fueling with the intent of 
reducing the number of locations fueling locomotives. Mainline fueling locations such as Tucson, Dalhart. Liberal, Kirby, 
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MAIN OBJECITVE: 
The main objective of this plan is to complete more high quality repairs and to 
measure the results of efforts at the major locomotive repair and service facilities. 
With increased discipline in routing locomotives on a timely basis to repair facilities 
which have adequate machinery, materials and trained personnel, our ability to 
produce safer locomotives with improved FRA compliance is certain. 
8 
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A. Meeting with General Managers -- February 23, 1990 
(1) Review of aggressive FRA Activity 
(2) Conceptualize Plan 
B. Meeting with Plant Managers - February 26, 1990 
C. Meetings with Division Mechanical Officers - March and April 1990 
(1) FRA Activity 
(2) Impact of 1988 Rail Safety Improvement Act 
(a) Implication of Daily Inspection 
(b) Increased fine level 
(c) Personal liability 
II. IN-PLANT INITIATIVES 
A. Improve In-Plant Quality/Reliability 
(1) Plants must provide high quality locomotives 
(a) Supervisors inspect each consist prior to departure 
(b) Officers will spot check consists each tour of duty 
9 
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(2) Provide training on specific defects 
(a) Develop checklists of most common FRA defects 
(3) Major repairs to be done while unit is in shop -- minor on 
service track 
( 4) Emphasis on FRA clean transcontinental power 
(5) Consider relocating locomotive supplies if other locations 
are available and satisfactory 
(6) Develop wheel match data document when locomotive 
comes off drop pit or peeler 
(7) Hostler inspection at locations where hostlers put outbound 
consists on train 





(f) Auto-brake valve 
(g) Dynamic brake 
(h) Sanders 
(8) Feedback by engineer directly to plant manager via special letter 
(9) Use employee involvement techniques to promote quality 
improvement 
(10) Use internal measure of quality 
(a) Mean days between failures 
(b) Number of FRA defects during audits 
(11) Increase quantity and quality of heavy overhaul 
10 
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(12) High potential test units with "nothing found" reports and 
second time failures for ground relay 
(13) Perform FRA daily inspections where possible 
at locations where mechanical craft forces are available 
III. OUTLYING POINTS 
A. Control of Power 
(1) Run-through power back to SP for 92-day inspections 
(2) Trade out local power for service and fuel. 
(a) Plant Managers will work with Regional Transportation 
Center to accomplish within respective regions 
B. Training 
(1) Develop and distribute engineer training film 
(2) Distribute information to Regional 
Transportation Centers on mechanical 
requirements 
(3) Increase shop craft and supervisor technical training 
by EMD/GE 
( 4) Training of training officers 
(a) Refresher training on FRA regulations 
(b) Improve employee attitude 
toward FRA inspections 
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(6) Create and publish in-house manual: 
'What Every fnspector Should Know' 
(7) Complete DC hi-pot safety training 
C. Daily Inspection Locations 
(1) Perform daily inspection with mechanical forces 
when possible 
(2) Enginemen to inspect where mechanical forces are 
not available. Specify outbound inspection on 
specific routes 
(3) When FRA defects are identified, unit to be repaired or 
traded out 
(4) Produce specially prepared units for dedicated outside 
locations 
(a) Weekly follow-up inspections by Division 
Mechanical Officers 
D. Fuel and Sand Locations 
(1) Sand to capacity policy 
(2) System fuel study to consider sanding locations 
(a) System fuel study to specify and limit number 
of locations for fueling 
(3) Redefine 'SLN' as 'fuel but not complete service'. 
Only locations listed on page 6 can report 'SLS' on 
appropriate class of locomotives. All other fueling is 
reported as 'SLN'. Turns without fuel are not to be 
reported as 'SLN'. 
12 
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IV. QUALI1Y ASSURANCE PLAN 
(1) Road freight locomotives released from Eugene, Roseville Service 
Track, LA Taylor, West Colton, E1 Paso, Houston Hardy Street, 
Pine Bluff (service track), Alton & Southern, Denver and Salt Lake 
City will be in condition to reliably operate for a period of not 
less than seven (7) days with only 'SLN' fueling required. 
This will be accomplished by executing action items including, but not 
limited to, the following: 
(a) Measure progress by Mean Time Between Failure and by 
random sampling inspection of a selected list of items 
(Appendix A). 
(b) Outbound inspection to be performed by Mechanical 
Department officers. Sampling to be a minimum of 10% of 
daily production at each location. A summary report will 
be made monthly to the CMO. 
(c) Train officers and inspectors as to appropriate locomotive 
safety regulations and policies. 
(1) Create instruction videos 
(2) Complete and publish manual -
'What Every Inspector Should Know' 
(3) Complete DC hi-pot training 
(d) 100% supervisor walk-through of outbound consists 
(e) lmplement a modified wheel match data document 
for use at peelers and drop pits (Appendix B). 
CO Eliminate F ARR. expansion joints and re-torque exhaust base 
bolts on M24's. 
13 
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(g) Provide needed high pressure 
washers for cleaning 
(h) Initiate the use of DC hi-pot for 
repeat offenders and for 
"nothing found" cases 
(i) Institute use of locomotive engineer feedback letter 
(Appendix C) 
(j) Institute employee involvement in developing quality 
improvement programs 
(k) Utilize resources where possible in heavy overhaul program. 
This includes truck and turbo programs. (See Appendix D -
Five Year Plan). Reinforce that quality must be built in 
from the start; it cannot be added on later. 
(I) Improve material supply. A primary function in the 
improvement of locomotive performance lies in replacement 
of components. Obviously, parts can only be replaced if 
made available. 
(2) Local and switch locomotives released from Eugene, 
Roseville Service Track, LA Taylor, West Colton, El Paso, 
Houston Hardy Street, Pine Bluff, Denver, Salt Lake City, 
Oakland, Bakersfield, Tucson, San Antonio, Kansas City, 
Avondale, Lafayette, East St. Louis, Grand Junction, and 
Pueblo will be in such condition to reliably operate for a 
period of not less than 15 days with only 'SLN' fueling 
required. (Some additional remote locations may, from time 
to time, be certified to service switch engines.) 
14 
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This will be accomplished by executing action times including, but 
not limited to, the following: 
(a) Measure progress by random sampling inspection of a selected list 
of items (Appendix A). Inspections to be performed by 
Mechanical Department officers. Sampling to be a minimum of 
10% of the daily production by an officer at each location. A 
monthly summary report will be made to CMO. 
(b) Train officer and inspectors as to safety 
regulation and policies appropriate to 
locomotives: 
(1) Create and distribute video for inspectors 
(2) Complete and publish in-house manual: 
'What Every Inspector Should Know" 
(c) Supervisor walk-through of locals and switch engines 
(d) Provide needed high pressure washers for cleaning 
(e) Send all local and switch power to a certified road-freight service 
location for M06 and higher maintenance 
(f) Institute use of locomotive engineer feedback letter (Appendix C) 
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V. LEGISLATIVE EFFORT 
(A) Develop high profile with AAR to minimize cost of FRA 
compliance. Regulations should be more specifically concerned 
with safe train operation 
(B) Develop Railroad and AAR support for a proposal to FRA to 
extend daily inspection of through freight operations. 
(C) Develop a "locomotive safety inspection" similar to Appendix D of 
the Freight Car Safety Standards. 
VI. OUTSTANDING ACITON ITEMS 
A Complete operating plan changes - A L. Marzano 
B. Complete fuel location plan - G. L. Pollitt 
C. Reestablish where and by whom dailies will be performed -
General Managers and K. R.. Schaeffer, After Items A & B Above 
D. Finish Hi-pot Training- G. L. Putman, 4/1/90 
E. Distribute Engineer training video - J. B. Harstad, 4/1/90 
F. Distribute inspector and supervisor training manual 
''What Every Inspector Should Know" - J. B. Harstad, 4/1/90 
(Mo<>l'te) 
G. Formalize Plan for I<.A.t;<- K. R.. Schaeffer, 4/1/90 
H. Distribute updated inspector video - J. B. Harstad, 5/1/90 
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t lOCOMOTIVE INSPECTION/ DISCREPANCY REPORT 





l This fomaupplements, but Is not to be used In !leu of, FAA Form No. 2·A. C.S.·2326. Each locomotive unit a hall be inspected In 
accordance with Rule 203 of the Ia~. rules, and Instructions for Inspection and testing of locomotives other than steam. 
L This form Is to be used to log discrepancies or defects found on locomotives and to list the COff'ttetlve actions taken. This form 
Is to be used for all defects and actions taken not covered by a scheduled malnteMnce procedurlll • 
. - Upon eompletlon., the form must be separated and OfigiMI sent to Production Planning l Control, Office of CMO, San Francisco . 
. tNSURE THAT BOTH THE ORIGINAL AND COPY ARE lEGIBLE 
c EAC: ------------- LOCOMOT1VE Ut>IIT 'LOCATION _____________ DATE ________ TIME ____ -:-:.INmAL ANO NUMBER:::-----
• ASSOCIATED SCMEOULEO 
. UNIT ARRIVED· WORKING DEAD FAILURE CODE MAIN.,.ENIIt-lCE (IF ANYi 
1-iif'!+i;liilit•):l•lJ•:&iOJ;i:~iCWfi'lt;!:=;fj!;l'j:!§§•)§ .. :eo:• · "l:tttU'H1BOUtl.:llr~~: ' ,_ ,,.::::11;\' 
SERVICE TRACK YES NO 
1 Daily inspection card 229.21 
2 Blue card (Periodic inspection) 
l Controller 
' Motor C/0 (all in or DIC !; S11-.ders (all workinsz) 
6 Oil on walkwav 
7 Wheel defects (Visual) 
8 MR Securement (Visual) 
9 Safety Appliances (Clearances) 
lO Couuler Lock Lift (Clevis Clearance) 
_ll Decals (hi Volt Fuel Cutoff emz brake valv :) 
_12 Flv Wheel at:x 2en covers !M covers 
11 G~~;ar cases 
14 Sen:n:·ation of tornedos and f1.1sees 
.1.3 Trash in sumn 
J.6 Fuel tank bolts (Visual) 
ll MlJ cables misPlaced (Q_ e:1d free) 
1B Walkwavs chains (cont Barriers) 
.ll Pilot: clearance 3-6" 
_20 Brake ri22in2 shoes. & travel 
-" ~ ~raiY'I!!: fin .a:~t.omat:ic oosit:ion) 
..2? Vimu11 @Vidf'!n<"P of P"<h::~,~t lPIIkt:~ 
~1 T-ftrht'!t - Cah walkvav t. Fni:l Room 
.:l! ,.., .... '"' '· ,..,, '""'"'~" 
Form is to be filled out below If supplementing FRA Form No. 2·A. C.S.·2326. 
MAIN RESERVOIR PRESSURE LBS. __ BRAKE PIPE PRESSURE LBS. 
CONDmON OF BRAKES AND BRAKE RIGGING-------------------------
Signatl.lfe o1 Employee Making lnspeclion Occupation----------
ihe above work has been performed. exceot as noted. ano the report 15 aoproved. 
Cc::;catlon --.-----------
~~ == . .l \ : 
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LOCOMOTIVE INSPECTION I DISCREPANCY REPORT 
S FORM SERVES TWO PURPOSES: 
fti:V. 7-80 
APPENDIX A-2 
~ This form supplements, but Is not to be used in lieu of, FRA Form No. 2·A. C.S.·2'326. Each locomotive unit shall be Inspected In 
accordance with Rule 203 of the laws, rules, and Instructions for lnlpectlon and testing of Jocomotl-..a other than Iteam. 
L This formls to be used to log discrapancles or defects found on locomotives and to list the corrective actions taken. This form 
Ill to be used for all defects and actions taken not coverltd by a acheduled maintenance procedura. 
m completion, the form must be aeparated and original sent to Produc:Uon Pfannlng & Control, Office of CMO, San Francisco. 
SURE THAT BOTH THE ORIGINAL AND COPY ARE LEGIBLE 
.... 
I.OCOWOTIVE UNIT :AnON--------------DATE _______ nME----~~t~mAL AND Nu-..ae1t:::-----
uscct~<TEo SC~-tEDULED 
IT ARRIVED· WORKING DEAD FAILURE CODE MAINTENANCE OF ANY) 
~·--------------------------
-l.•i~"11!; l:..tl•t.:-.•::~~•J!-.'itj' :::.r,,..'ft4" • ::I' ·• :lo."'iii~ :I :ltj;::U • • 'l::lrrotH'l::lf: 1011 •L:•r,, ;• 1- ·.r~HI:::III:\' 
SHOP l.ELEASES YES NO 
1. Oil Leaks & Sump cleanin~ 
'1 ~f' .. nct ('!Z'.f.-}, i>lAf'"'c)(f't'll"'f'r:tc!f'irH• r,.,,f'\.,.C:' 
J. Floors, Windows, Cabs. Seats 
A.._ Safetv Ban2ers 
5. Check Exhaust Chambers for leaks 
and/or loose bolts 





:Inn is to be filled out below if supplementing FRA Form No. 2·A, C.S.·2326. 
~I'N ~ERVOIR PRESSURE lBS._ BRAKE PIP£ PRESSURE l.SS. 
:-tiOmON OF BRAKES ANO BRAKE RIGGING-------------------------
9'-~ture of Em~ro:'" MakmQ lnspee:lon Cccupatlon ----------
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EXISTING ACTION CORRECTED ' 





' " ~~ . ' .... . . 
.. ·~ .. . .. - •. : 
.-. 
SP CONDE.MNlNG RIM THICKNESS l:1i 1" & SWITCHER 
SP CONDEMNING FLANGE TH ESS : 15/18" FREIGHT & SWITCHER 
SP CQNDEMNING FLANGE H = 1 1/2"' FREIGHT & SWITCHER 
.MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE MISMATCH WITHIN LOCOMOTIVE 11111 5/8' RADIUS (4 & 6 axle units) 
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE MISMAT-CH WITHIN 3 TRUCK = 3/8" except; IF PROPERLY 
·. '~:;; ·. ·~ .~ 5 ;~ :' . MMEO MAXIMUM = 5/8"" WlTH SHIMS 
~ ~ ' ... ', ;,: . "' 
REFER. r_o·bMP 403 ~oR WEAR UM WH 
·: "-\.. ··., 
ACTION.CODES: , 
::. =! •m• -... ;;, 
~. • '<# .. .. : :~;; ~ ; : .~ e ~ ·-· : " ~~ •: 
LOCOMOTIVE IS ON DROP PIT OR PEELER 
• • • > • • • : ~ .. ., 
.~. ~,. '.; '"•" c:.,.. •• 
·: :. -:;. :5 : 0 ... _..No actidn required 
- - ~~ , .. ,. '., ." , ... 0 ~ .. 
PAGE.002 
·•· CONVERSION TABLE 
; !~ .. 
. ~ . . 
1111 -~-1118" 
~·· ,., 111" 
3111 .. 3118. 
4111 ... 114 .. x. 
5111 .. 61f1•.·. 
II'MI • !18" ·'-
1116 ... 7ttfJ•· 
8111 ... 112'" ... 
Silt8 .,. 8114!1"' 
1011'1 ... 518 .. ,. • . • ·'. 
1111• .. 1111r . . : ; 
--12'111 81314"' 
-.'11118 "">! .13118"' ;; ·; 
·:14/UJ -:":.111• • ·: ·" 
·''1'5111 .._ 15118"'. . 
. ··13/fiJ .. :1.. , . . -.: 
.. 11111 .... 1 1111"' .. : • : • •, 
11111 .... 1 118* • . ! i ~ 
. 18HI • .;1 31t3" :·~ . 
·'at"'C • ~1 114"; 
''21111 ... 1 5111"' 
"lnue "" 1 :ua· . 
23111 •J1- 7111" .. "' 
24111 ... ; 1 112" • • ·. ~ ., 
21111 lilt • 'f t/111" . 
. , 
• 




6 .... ~ ""' ..... ;"""" . . . 




271Ul ·.,. 1 11118" 
21118 - 1 i314-
29118 - 1 '13118. 
30116 • 1 i J'UJ" 
31116 - 1 15118" 
m11 -... r 
33/11 .. 2·1118"' 
:uns .. 2 ·ua~ 
WUI l.. 2 Sl1t .. 
31111 011 2 !14w 
37111 ... 2 1111'" 
31118 ... 2 318" 
3!HH~..;. t:7111~· 
40111 .. !'11:! • 
.-sne "' 2 1116" 
42111 :.. 2 '511" 
4311111 ... :tl11t1111"' 
44/11 ... 2 314*, 
45/11 IIIII ~ 1Sf"fl* 
wte ... 2'na· 
4111111 ... 2 !11111111" 
4tUI • s• 
ana .. s;ma• 
10111 "" 3 11I.IJI", 
i . 
METHODS OF APPLYING AAR STEEL WHEEl GAGe' 




:wHEEl RADHJS. MEASUREMENT~ 
: . ~ I I 
:r 
NOTE: use 15111 .. ~ ••~ 
gage to condemn wheel 
for tin ft111nge 
.J 
_____ ,ng point 
MR wheel gage tread 
Thickness Nading ""' 1 118"' 
· .. 
.... -· t ·; 
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locomotive Cab Environment 
TO: OPERATL~G DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES 
FROM: MECHA.~~'lCAL DEPARTMENT El'¥1PLOYEES 
As operating department employees are the users of the product provided by the mechanical department, 
we at the ramp and sef'ltice track would like to know what is most important to you as our customers. We 
know that the locomotives must meet certain F.RA guidelines and we know that if we provide you with 
trash containers you will return a clean cab to us. But beyond trash bags and the F.R.A, how do you feel 
a locomotive should be equipped or prepared to make your tour of duty more pleasant? If we were to 
prepare a FH'IAL CHECK LIST, what do you feel should be on that check list? 
Make your comments below, fold this pre-addressed form and place in company mail receptacle. Signing 
your name and occupation is optional, but encouraged. 
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